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The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 set off the worst crisis between Russia and the 
West since the 1980s. In the wake of this event, a reunified Germany has emerged as the 
key leader to engage Russia on behalf of the West. The Crimean episode shattered the 
1975 Helsinki foundation for the peaceful inviolability of Europe’s existing borders. The 
shock of the Russian intervention in Ukraine and the Crimean annexation destroyed the 
illusion of the German Ostpolitik since 1969 of perpetual entente with Moscow and 
challenged the European security order.  
This study examines historic German-Russian relations and Germany’s foreign 
policy, with an emphasis on Germany’s Russia Policy and post-1990 Ostpolitik. The 
evolution of policy from “change through rapprochement” to “change through trade” 
forms a special focus. Caught between an interest-led Realpolitik and a value-based 
Moralpolitik, Germany has changed its Russian statecraft since the Crimean annexation. 
The thesis examines this German policy transformation and presents its implications for 
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The community of fate shared by Germany and Russia reemerged in 2014 as a 
leading question of global security. Peace and stability in Europe and the world rely on 
compliance of international law to enable cooperative relations with prosperous 
economies and the peaceful settling of conflict in whatever form. During the Cold War, 
the conclusion of the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe was a major step out of that conflict and laid the foundation for Europe’s 
inviolability of existing borders in the post-1945 order of nation states. For a quarter of a 
century, from 1989 until the day before yesterday, the idea of a great power violently 
changing the borders of Europe as in an earlier eras, especially as in during the 1919–
1939 era, seemed completely unthinkable to most, notwithstanding the peaceful end of a 
divided Germany, the quiet eclipse of Czechoslovakia, the bloody breakup of Yugoslavia, 
and the sunset of the USSR. Despite public acknowledgement (save for Central 
Europeans) of Russia’s constant claim for its sphere of influence—the “near abroad”—
the world seemed shocked and surprised in 2014, when Russia violated existing 
international law and, in a coup de main of irregular war, annexed Crimea, thus violently 
changing borders in Europe with a bravado that especially shocked a younger generation 
with no tangible memory of such events.  
The reunited Germany of the Berlin Republic especially has embraced its role as 
the bridge state between East and West in its geographically central position. Beginning 
at the end of the 1960s with the advent of Willy Brandt’s détente with the Soviet bloc, 
and especially in the second decade of the new century, the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG) has been a strong mediator between the West, the United States, and Russia. In 
this respect, especially in contemporary German political culture, statecraft and popular 
will manifests an understanding of Russian beliefs, behaviors, goals and self-interests, 
which have led to an international perception of Germany among its critics and skeptics 
as being a “Russian Firster,”1 prioritizing Russian interests over NATO allies and 
                                                 
1Pal Jonson, “The Debate about Article V and Its Credibility: What Is It All About?” (NATO Research 
Paper No. 58, May 2010), 5, http://www.ndc.nato.int/research/series.php?icode=1. 
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collective defense. In a 2015 interview with the German weekly magazine Der Spiegel, 
former chancellor Gerhard Schroeder (1998–2005) openly praised Otto von Bismarck as 
his example of statesmanship and guardian of a European order, a figure whose statecraft 
had famously swung from east to west, but which generally had anchored the fate of the 
Second Reich to Petersburg and the Romanov dynasty.2  
While Schroeder’s successor, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, does not have 
the same close relation to Russian President Vladimir Putin as her predecessor, in the 
midst of the Ukrainian crisis and even before, she had still used the avenues of dialogue 
with Russia and its political elite instead of such alternatives of power politics that 
recalled the Cold War, or something even worse. But having lost patience and with 
factual evidence at hand in the course of the Malaysian passenger jet being shot down 
over Ukraine in 2014, as well as with Putin’s late personal statement in 2015 that the 
Crimea annexation was deliberately planned and executed on order in a manner that 
recalled too well the worst of modern European history, Chancellor Merkel had no choice 
but to rethink Germany’s foreign policy towards Russia in the hard and brutal realities of 
crisis in the years 2014–2015. From the comfortable and morally pleasing role as 
mediator in East–West relations between the poles of Washington, London, Paris, and 
Moscow, the German chancellor, in the course of 2014–2015, has turned to a tougher 
stance with respect to Russia in order to ensure compliance with international law: the 
basis and precondition for twenty-first-century postmodern diplomacy. This study 
addresses the context and content of this shift in policy, which constitutes a diplomatic 
revolution for German foreign and security policy, which is not well understood in the 
United States or which all too often becomes the butt of caricature.  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The objective of this thesis is to answer the question of whether the Russian 
annexation of Crimea in 2014 has fundamentally altered the tenets of German foreign 
policy regarding the Russian-German partnership and the compromise between East and 
                                                 
2Martin Doerry and Klaus Wiegrefe, “Wie man Frieden sichert: Spiegel-Gespraech mit Altkanzler 
Schroeder” [How to secure peace: Spiegel-interview with former Chancellor Schroeder], Der Spiegel, no. 
14 (March 28, 2015), http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-132909486.html.  
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West. In the second instance, if this crisis has ushered in such a fundamental change as 
some new epoch of conflict and its requirement for diplomacy, what are the root causes 
of diverging German-Russian relations since Germany’s reunification in 1990? An 
additional focus seeks to explain the international perception of German Foreign Policy 
as being too Russian-friendly, despite Germany’s strong ties and cultural foundations in 
the Euro-Atlantic hemisphere. 
B. RELEVANCE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TOPIC 
With the fall of the inner German border and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet 
Union during 1989 to 1991, Germany suddenly went from being the sundered cockpit of 
the Cold War conflict to its central geographical position in Europe, as it had been before 
1945. This position had lately resembled a bridge towards Central and Eastern European 
nations and Russia, in which all that transpired between the two was interpreted as 
friendship, amity, and prosperity. The episodes of conflict from the eighteenth through 
the twentieth centuries gave the imperative for cooperation an added boost. Because of its 
geography and modern history, Germany has a long tradition of alternately friendly and 
hostile relations with Russia, respectively the Soviet Union, since 1918, if not since the 
time of Frederick the Great’s Prussia. Since Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik in the late 1960s, 
West Germany has promoted cooperation over confrontation, aiming at Wandel durch 
Annäherung—that is, “change through rapprochement”—in its foreign policy towards 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union beginning with the nadir of the Berlin crisis in 
1961, which moved Egon Bahr and Willy Brandt to revise Cold War statecraft of the 
formation of eastern and western blocs.3 With German reunification in 1990, Berlin had 
to take on the role of a bridge or mediator between east and west, a fact that did not 
manifest itself fully until the geopolitical changes of the new century. In accordance with 
this role and in compliance with the 2+4 Treaty connected with unity, which finally freed 
the nation from the reserved rights of the victors of 1945, Germany has always attempted 
to maintain close contact in its negotiations with Russia. This statecraft that had been so 
                                                 
3Sven Bernhard Gareis, Deutschlands Außen- und Sicherheitspoltik: Eine Einführung [Germany’s 
foreign and security policy: An introduction], 2nd ed. (Opladen, Germany, and Farmington Hills, MI: 
Barbara Budrich, 2006), 57. 
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successful under Helmut Kohl in the late 1980s and 1990s continued with Gerhard 
Schroeder in 1998, but it took on a new quality that granted the latter’s biography and the 
national interests of both nations that became manifest in ideological as well as trade ties 
in the Schroeder chancellorship. Since about 2013, in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis, 
such policy in the minds of critics has led to strong discussions between so-called 
Russlandversteher, or Russian apologists versus what is also a noteworthy rise of Russian 
and or Putin critics within German domestic politics.4 The role of such figures in the 
domestic politics of Germany requires interpretation for a non-German-speaking 
readership, which this study aspires to do, along with the explanation of foreign policy 
making in Germany to a non-German readership that should become acquainted with this 
major issue of global security.  
A sudden and recent unexpected change in Germany’s foreign policy toward 
Russia, which supposedly happened in 2014, can be regarded as a diplomatic revolution 
for future policy-making decisions in Germany, as well as in Europe. As of spring 2015, 
this change has already worked its overall effects on foreign and security policy, and it 
may in time conceivably alter the balance of power in Europe and Eurasia, which is very 
much in flux. Not only is Russia a part of continental Europe, but it is also Germany’s 
eleventh largest bilateral trade partner. According to the Federal Foreign Office, bilateral 
trade figures were declining by 6 percent in the first half of 2014, after having declined 
already by 5 percent in 2013; even more important is that “German exports to Russia fell 
by 16 percent in the first half of 2014,”5 creating a complex problem for Germany’s 
decision of how to engage with Russia, as German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier clearly stated: “Russia’s actions on the Crimean Peninsula were a serious 
violation of international law and of the principles upon which European peace is based. 
                                                 
4Andreas Rinke, “How Putin Lost Berlin: Moscow’’s Annexion of Crimea Changed Germany’’s 
Policies towards Russia,” Internationale Politik 69, no. 3 (May 2014). 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1556286035?accountid=12702.  
5Federal Foreign Office, “Russian Federation,” Foreign and European Policy, Federal Foreign Office, 
accessed December 2, 2014, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01-
Nodes/RussischeFoederation_node.html.  
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That is why we cannot let pass or ignore what took place.”6 With the Russian annexation 
of Crimea in 2014, Russia changed European borders by both force of arms and an 
especially coercive diplomacy that radiated out well beyond the Black Sea and across 
new democracies that had formerly been an integral part of the USSR and its weary and 
wary neighbors in Central Europe. This earthquake-like event, felt beyond Kiev, Odessa, 
and the Donbass, compelled German politicians to reevaluate the political tenets that had 
grown familiar and comfortable for their generalized good feeling and absence of bullets. 
Is this the dawning of a new age in German-Russian relations that somehow resembles 
the unhappy memories of the prelude to 1914, or to 1941, or to 1961?  
With the primacy of foreign policy over other fields in Germany, foreign policy is 
the major instrument to influence other states, in this context Russia.7 Although sufficient 
literature is available on German and Russian foreign policy, this thesis aims to 
contribute to the understanding of Germany’s policies on Russia with respect to the 
foundations of interests and constitutional values based on a case study of the Russian 
annexation of Crimea. This thesis also aims to explain the extent of Germany’s “Russia 
Firsters,” or Russlandversteher, Russian apologists in Germany. 
C. HYPOTHESIS 
During the quarter century since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, a reunified 
Germany has gained ever more strength on an international scale while the U.S. role in 
Europe has shrunk to a shadow of its former self, and the other powers expect those who 
rule in Berlin to take over more political responsibility. Germany’s traditional Ostpolitik, 
with its cooperative foreign policy, has always aimed at maintaining good, cooperative 
relations with Russia, at first as a means to end the national division, and then as a means 
to assure the peaceful transformation of Russia into a European democracy with the 
                                                 
6Frank-Walter Steinmeier, interview by Christiane Hoffmann, “German Foreign Minister: ‘Crimea 
Will Remain a Source of Conflict,’” Spiegel Online International, November 25, 2014, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/german-foreign-minister-steinmeier-on-russia-and-ukraine-a-
1004891.html.  
7Lisette Andreae and Karl Kaiser, “The ‘Foreign Policies’ of Specialized Ministries,” in Germany’s 
New Foreign Policy: Decision-Making in an Interdependent World, ed. Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl 
Kaiser (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 46. 
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junking of imperial fantasies of the old stripe. Since 1990, Germany had also always been 
“an advocate for Russia in the European Union.”8 After perceivably having overcome the 
dramatic Russian weakness in the wake of the breakup of the USSR (which was widely 
accepted, even by Russian politicians at the beginning of this century), Putin assumed 
office and, with regard to a general primacy of domestic politics over foreign politics in 
Russia, first exploited the opportunity for a coup de main in the Caucasus with war 
against Georgia in 2008 and then offered a second, greater chance to upend the post-1989 
order. Putin used the ongoing and sharpening political crisis in Ukraine as his stage and 
illegitimately annexed Crimea with a small degree of violence—a rather bloodless 
Anschluss with concealed conflict on the old Soviet model.9 Initial international reactions 
of shock and calls for a wholly force-free, political solution during the crisis have not led 
to a satisfactory result as of spring 2015, once Russia had finally integrated the territory 
into its administration and regarded the Crimea as part of sovereign Russian territory. 
Claudia Major and Jana Puglierin have stated that “the Ukraine crisis has substantially 
and perhaps permanently altered Europe’s security structure. Europe is now much less 
secure, and its security architecture altogether less stable, more confrontational, and less 
predictable.”10 In other words, the tenets of German foreign and security policy, so long 
celebrated for half a century, have endured a horrible blow, and the effects and character 
of this event demand close scrutiny.  
The hypothesis of this study suggests that German foreign policy, closely 
connected to the institution and personality of German Minister of Foreign Affairs Frank-
Walter Steinmeier, and especially to German Chancellor Angela Merkel, changed 
fundamentally in the course of the Ukraine crisis during 2014–2015. On the basis of 
                                                 
8Stefan Meister, “Reframing Germany’s Russia Policy: An Opportunity for the EU,” Policy brief, 
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 24, 2014, 1, 
http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/reframing_germanys_russia_policy_an_opportunity_for_the_eu3
06#sthash.lQ5Iu4uz.dpuf.  
9Michael McFaul, “Domestic Politics of NATO Expansion in Russia: Implications for American 
Foreign Policy,” policy memo no. 5, PONARS, October 1997, 1–2, 
http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/domestic-politics-nato-expansion-russia-implications-american-
foreign-policy-michael-mcfaul.  
10Claudia Major and Jana Puglierin, “Europe’s New (In)Security Order: The Ukraine Conflict Has 
Changed the European Security Architecture,” IP Journal, German Council on Foreign relations, 
November 25, 2014, https://ip-journal.dgap.org/en/ip-journal/topics/europes-new-insecurity-order-0.  
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historic German-Russian relations from the nineteenth century onwards, this thesis 
furthermore hypothesizes that root causes for this rupture include, among other causes, a 
combination of the West’s underestimation of the influence of the siloviki—the leading 
people with military, police or intelligence backgrounds—within Putin’s closest advisors 
in the Kremlin. Of further significance is the shared German Democratic Republic (GDR) 
past of the 1970s and 1980s in the respective backgrounds of acting personalities such as 
Angela Merkel and Vladimir Putin. Additionally, such elites’ misinterpretations of the 
Russian insistence of its spheres of influence, the “near abroad,” and the respective forces 
of domestic pressures in the statecraft and external relations of Russia and in Germany 
are of significant relevance. Whether as a legacy of the former GDR or out of a reflexive 
and historical anti-Americanism and neo-Bismarckian orientation, the strong presence of 
Russian apologists in German politics and society adds to the complexity of the foreign 
policy change and influences its durability, especially in this moment of crisis.  
D. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
At the core of the research design is the evaluation of historic literature on 
German-Russian relations, as well as the analysis of the Ukraine crisis as a single case 
study to determine changing German foreign policy. In regards to the wealth of literature 
dealing with Germany, its history and foreign policy—qualitatively as well as 
quantitatively—a selection of German and English sources are used. Due to the current 
nature of events in Ukraine, the research primarily draws on secondary sources, including 
scholarly articles, political commentary, and think-tank reports, such as the German 
Council in Foreign Relations (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik [DGAP]), the 
German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft and Politik 
[SWP]), or the European Council on Foreign Affairs, as well as monographs and books 
dealing with German and Russian relations and their respective foreign policies. In 
addition, primary sources are used to take into consideration the perspectives of German 
and Russian top politicians, analyzing, for example, speeches by the German chancellor 
or by the Russian president. The events, which peaked in the annexation of Crimea, are 
briefly recapitulated in chronological order to explain the conflict and the initial efforts 
undertaken in light of German foreign policy and put in the context of historical German-
 8 
Russian relations. The historical perspective of German-Russian relations is required to 
show the fundamental changes that have taken place in Germany’s foreign policy towards 
Russia, which adds to the value of this thesis. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The master thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter I discussed the relevance and 
current significance of the topic, the hypothesis for the research, and its methodology and 
research design. The Chapter II provides background on the development of the German-
Russian relations since the seventeenth century, taking into account the principles of 
German Ostpolitik, the Soviet-Union’s role in the reunification, and the current state of 
affairs. Chapter III focuses on the formation of German Foreign Policy, explaining the 
structure of the federal German government and considering the role of civil society in 
foreign affairs before ending with a discussion of Germany’s Russia policy. Chapter IV 
focuses on the case study, initially discussing the formation of current Russian foreign 
policy and its parameters, as well as its interdependence with domestic Russian politics 
and the current dominance of the siloviki in the Kremlin. In a second part, Chapter IV 
discusses the evolution of events that peaked with the annexation of Crimea and 
subsequent German and international reactions. Chapter IV ends with an evaluation of 
whether Putin’s decisions pay off. Chapter V contains the analysis of a German foreign 
policy change and its root causes, determining its extent and evaluating whether the 
wider-spread understanding of “Russia Firsters” has declined. Chapter V ends with a 
discussion of the consequences of such a policy change for German security and foreign 
policy. Chapter VI summarizes findings, identifies implications for Germany’s foreign 
and Russia policies, and provides recommendations for future research.  
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II. HISTORY OF GERMAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS 
Germany and Russia share a longstanding and ambivalent common history—from 
the Battle at Lake Peipus in 1242, where Alexander Nevsky defeated the Knights of the 
German Order, to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and beyond—and have experienced 
the full spectrum of conflict and cooperation over the past centuries. The mutual 
influence on the development of both nations has had significant relevance. This story 
forms the basis of any understanding of contemporary German-Russian relations. Walter 
Laquer underlines these close relations, saying, “Culturally, the two nations were for 
many years nearer to each other than to any other country.”11 These ambivalent relations 
depended on such leading personalities as Peter the Great, Tsar Nicholas II and his cousin 
William II, Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin, Mikhail Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl, and, 
within the last fifteen years, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder (who was succeeded in 2005 
by Chancellor Angela Merkel) and President Vladimir Putin. The dualism of these 
contemporary figures fits into a pattern of personality and statecraft that has mesmerized 
Europe for centuries and been the pivot of war and peace.  
This chapter focuses on the history of German-Russian relations more or less 
from the seventeenth century until today in four parts, laying the historic background to 
comprehend contentious German-Russian statecraft, which scholars like Angela Stent 
characterize as “comrades in misfortune”12 or as historian Walter Laquer suggests is a 
“love and hate relationship unique perhaps in history . . . [as] every now and then . . . 
Germany has been branded as the enemy par excellence.”13 After providing historic 
origins of German-Russian diplomacy until the end of World War II, this chapter depicts 
the emergence of détente under Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik during the Cold War, before the 
discussion of the Soviet influence on Germany’s reunification. Chapter II ends with 
Russia’s rebirth and a retrospective on the twenty-five years since German reunification, 
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contributing specific attention to the personal relations of Russia’s and Germany’s 
leaders until today. 
A. GERMAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS BEFORE 1945 
The story begins recently, that is, more recently in modern history than most 
ancient accounts of the Teuton and the Slav suggest, especially when one wishes to 
underscore the closeness of the German-Russian relationship. Although German-Russian 
history dates back as far as 1242, when Alexander Nevsky defeated the Teutonic knights 
of the Bishop of Tartu, Herman I, in Estonia, it was actually Peter the Great (1672–1725) 
who invited Germans at large to assist in developing Russia—politically and 
economically—because Romanov elites perceived the West, especially Germany, as 
scientifically advanced.14 Thus, Peter the Great adapted Russia according to the 
absolutist dynastic regimes in Europe and reacted to the developments in military affairs 
of the standing army and the post-1648 absolutist order by reforms from above, which 
built the foundations of Russia’s later status as a member of the five leading powers in 
the era of the wars of the cabinets. The first Russian universities built in St. Petersburg 
and Moscow were modeled after German examples, thus exhibiting Germany’s 
increasing influence on education, science, trade, craftsmanship, and even philosophy, 
military affairs, and state administration to such an extent where “about one-third of high 
government officials were of German origin at a time when Germans formed about 1 
percent of Russia’s population.”15 Despite a perpetual flow of 500,000 German 
immigrants to Russia in the nineteenth century,16 Angela Stent emphasizes that Germans 
formed only a small percentage of the population in Russia before the revolution in 1917, 
but that they influenced Russia to a larger extent than Russians influenced them.17 In this 
respect, Germans formed the niche administrative elite in the dual societies, especially of 
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Eastern Europe, which were later doomed to disintegrate in the stresses and strains of the 
nineteenth century with the advent of mass politics.  
As Napoleon reached the height of his power in 1812, the Prussian General Yorck 
von Wartenburg, although aligned with France in the war against Russia, signed the 
Tauroggen convention against his king’s initial will and declared neutrality in order to 
free Prussia from French occupation. Hence, Tauroggen signifies the modern tradition of 
Prussian-Russian cooperation. Laquer points out that such cooperation led to a “direct 
line to Bismarck’s coalition with Russia.”18 When the Congress of Vienna defined 
Europe’s eastern border at the Ural in 1815, it meant that a significant portion of Russia 
belonged to continental Europe: Russia was one of the five Great Powers19 that 
determined Europe’s future in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The holy alliance 
that grew out of Metternich’s diplomacy cemented the northern courts, especially in the 
maelstrom of 1848, only to witness the breakdown of this bond in 1852 with the war in 
Crimea when Austria and Prussia did not stand with the Tsar against the French and the 
British.  
After 1871, German chancellor Otto von Bismarck was convinced that another 
war in Europe would not be to Germany’s benefit and focused his foreign policy on the 
preservation of the status quo of three great powers aligned with each other out of the five 
powers: a strong Germany with an isolated France. In 1873, Germany and Russia became 
part of the Dreikaiserabkommen, and a revival of the northern courts pact. The Three 
Emperor’s League consisted of Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary, was renewed in 
1883, and was succeeded by Bismarck’s Reinsurance Treaty with Russia in 1887.20 The 
German decision in the Wilhelmine era not to renew the Reinsurance Treaty after 
Bismarck’s dismissal had significant consequences for Russia, which then opted for 
closer ties with France and subsequently concluded the Franco-Russian alliance in 1894. 
Despite the alliance with the French and its path to the emergence of opposing alliance 
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blocs in World War I, Russia did not want to risk relations with Germany, especially 
because Germany after 1871 had become Russia’s most important trading partner.21 
Present-day trade between Germany and Russia has its roots in the nineteenth century, 
when from 1858 to 1913 German imports to Russia rose from 28 percent of all Russian 
imports to 47 percent, while Russian exports to Germany, mainly natural resources, rose 
from 16 percent of all Russian exports to 29 percent.22  
In the decade prior to the outbreak of the 1914 war, the devastating Russian defeat 
in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 had severe implications for Russia as it finally ignited 
the revolution in St. Petersburg. The war drove Russian aspirations back to Europe from 
expansion in Asia, back to the Balkans, and back into greater conflict with the powers 
with whom it had been allied in the past. The revolution called for a constitutional 
government with legislation and citizens’ equal rights before the law, a revolution against 
the Old Regime. Martin Malia compares the Russian 1905 revolution to Germany’s 
revolution of 1848, where in both cases “the outcome was what was called a 
Scheinkonstitutionalismus, a pseudo-constitutionalism, in which the monarchy granted a 
legislative parliament but did not accept that the government be responsible to it.”23 
Consequently, the members of the Duma were virtually responsible for the state of the 
country, but they had no controlling and constitutional power of checks and balances, 
which created an incomplete political structure incapable of survival in the rigors that 
awaited them domestically and internationally. 
While German-Russian trade relations prospered, rising imperialism and the 
developments in the Balkans of perpetual war and conflict between Ottoman, Habsburg, 
and Romanov led to enhanced anti-German attitudes in Russia and, by 1910, to the view 
in both Germany and Russia that war between them was unavoidable.24 Still, after the 
Balkan crisis of 1912–1913, when William II made his loyalty to Austria-Hungary 
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evident, the German Emperor was reluctant to go to war with Russia, and thus with his 
cousin, over the Balkans which many in the Berlin government felt was unworthy of 
national sacrifice, especially because Habsburg sought a more assertive policy there at 
the expense of Russian interests. In Russia, the results of the Balkan crisis of 1913 were 
regarded as further defeat—after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 and the Bosnian 
annexation crisis in 1908—and the German military mission to Constantinople led by 
Lieutenant General Liman von Sanders in June 1913 worsened the German-Russian 
relations even more as Wilhelmine Germany extended its reach possibly to the Persian 
Gulf and to spheres of influence of the other imperial powers.25 Russia became 
convinced that it was necessary to stand up in order to retain its status as a Great Power in 
the shifting powers of 1913–1914. The July crisis of 1914, after the assassination of 
Austrian-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand, quickly paved the way for the general 
war that eventually became known as World War I, when Germany gave Austria-
Hungary the carte blanche against Serbia, which inevitably meant the involvement of 
Russia. The German leader had become fatalistic and pessimistic about the rise of 
Russian power in the European system and opted for earlier war to preclude being 
suffocated by the Russians later on. Although the Germans tried to convince Russia not 
to mobilize in order to prevent a European war, the Russian order for mobilization could 
not be reversed, and subsequently, Germany declared war on Russia on August 1, 1914.26 
The German war plan has foreseen the two front problem to require first a swift blow 
against France, and then the eventual confrontation with the Russians. This plan was 
overtaken by events. The Germans were soon faced with an unexpected advance by the 
Russian Army into East Prussia and Galicia, but the victories of Paul von Hindenburg 
and Erich Ludendorff at Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes in August and September 
1914 enabled the German Army to occupy large parts of the Baltic and Poland by 1917, 
as well as the wield destruction on the Serbs and secure strategic goals in the East, 
despite the damage that the Russians did to Habsburg in what is modern-day Ukraine.27 
                                                 




After having finally inflicting defeat after defeat on the Russians during the three years in 
what Erich von Ludendorff defined as total war, causing three million Russian casualties, 
the February Revolution of 1917—aided by the German secret military intelligence 
organization—led to the formation of a provisional government in Russia and the 
abdication of Nicholas II, thus ending the Romanov Old Regime.28  
Due to the influence of German experts in supporting the state and administration 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, by the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, most 
areas of Russian domestic politics or foreign policy were in part shaped by Germans.29 It 
was German assistance that enabled the return of Lenin to Russia, via Finland, following 
his exile in Switzerland in April 1917. In 1914–1918, the combatant powers used indirect 
and concealed means to wage war against each other with gusto. In coordination with the 
German Auswärtige Amt (Foreign Office), the objective was to strengthen the Russian 
revolution in order to set up a new provisional government after the February revolution, 
which would negotiate a truce and peace deal, as well as enter into new German-Russian 
diplomatic relations.30 It was the consequence of Russia’s defeat in World War I, which 
“disorganized Russia’s still immature political structures to the point where the Bolshevik 
Party . . . was able to seize power in the ‘October coup’ of 1917.”31  
Under the leadership of Vladimir Lenin, the Bolsheviks formed a new 
government, which made a truce and engaged in negotiations with the Central Powers, 
leading to the conclusion of the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918. Brest-
Litovsk has been perceived as the “first milestone in Soviet-German relations after the 
revolution,”32 but the treaty came at a disastrous cost for Russia as the Germans claimed 
a third of Russia’s population, half of its industry, and up to 90 percent of the coal-mining 
industry. The Russians were defenseless and saw the treaty with the Germans as one 
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without alternative.33 The amendment to the treaty, signed in August 1918, supported the 
Bolsheviks’ claim to power among domestic turmoil in Russia, of which the Germans 
were fully aware when they tried to secure sufficient reparations.34 Germany indirectly 
set the stage for the rise of the Soviet Union, which would dominate German-Russian 
relations for decades to come. With the abdication of William II and the signing of the 
armistice in November 1918, the German Empire ceased to exist. 
Germany signed the Treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919, as part of the Paris 
suburban pacts with the Central Powers, that is, the treaties with Austria, Hungary, 
Bulgaria, and Turkey. The Treaty of Versailles became a symbol of humiliation, 
injustice, and loss for those Germans unwilling to accept defeat in their numbers. The 
new European order was laden with smoldering conflicts in the East, which made the 
German-Russian relationship all the more fateful in the years 1919–1939. Although the 
renewed independence of Poland separated Russia and Germany, they were tied together 
by the fact that the Parisian victors excluded the defeated Central Powers and Red Russia 
from having a say in the fate of Europe and beyond. As a result, both nations were eager 
to revise the terms of the Versailles Treaty and the Paris system of 1919.35 Despite the 
fact that the new Weimar government was highly anti-communist, the force of power 
politics drove Berlin and Moscow together once more, as part of the revival of Ostpolitik 
á la Bismarck was put in hand by the young German democracy, specially by its anti-
democratic military leadership in the Reichswehr. At the international conference in 
Genoa, Italy, in 1922, the Russians and Germans were allowed only a passive role and 
engaged in bilateral negotiations that ended in the surprise of the German-Russian Treaty 
of Rapallo, which was directed against the western victors. The international community 
in London, Paris, and Washington, DC, was shocked by the prospects of German-Russian 
rapprochement. Although the significance of the treaty has been exaggerated, the pact—
which included the reciprocal waiving of reparations, re-establishing diplomatic ties, and 
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expanding trade relations—became a symbol of renewed Russian-German relations, 
although it was not an alliance.36  
The Berlin Treaty of 1926 supplemented the Rapallo Treaty, was more specific, 
and declared mutual neutrality in case of a third party’s aggression toward either Russia 
or Germany.37 In Stent’s assessment, the treaties of Rapallo and Berlin, used as symbols 
of cooperation, did not have such an exaggerated significance, but rather shaped the 
attitudes of Germany’s and Russia’s neighbors in the Little Entente in Paris, Warsaw, 
Prague, and Belgrade, which feared too close a relationship between the two nations.38  
Equally significant was the secret military cooperation initiated and organized 
with the Soviets by the leadership of the Reichswehr, especially by its chief of staff, Hans 
von Seeckt, whose open eastern orientation was no secret and probably at variance with 
parliamentary control of military policy, as well as foreign policy. This secret military 
cooperation support began in 1922 and was beneficial to both nations and armies. While 
the German Army set up trainings camp for weapon systems (aircraft and tanks) that 
were forbidden under the Versailles Treaty in Germany, the Russians gained access to 
modern military equipment from Germany; thus, ironically, the Soviets enabled the 
creation of the modern armor branch Panzerwaffe, which would attack Russia in a 
Blitzkrieg only six years after the end of the bilateral military collaboration of 1933.39 
The leadership of the German army, impressed by the people’s army of the Red Army, 
developed a pro-Soviet wing, which became a model for a new national army mobilized 
by an aggressive, totalitarian ideology. Werner von Blomberg, in particular, was but one 
of leading Reichswehr officers blinded by the red star, which made him susceptible to the 
Nazis when their time came in the 1930s.  
In the later 1920s, the Russian-German trade relations prospered as the political 
bilateral relations cooled down due to the fact that Russian and German politicians lost 
their interests because the political situation in Europe had changed with the arrival of 
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normalcy and détente with the western powers, symbolized by Locarno and Gustav 
Stresemann’s effort to lessen the diplomatic wreckage of the war.40 This period of 
stabilization was preceded by great uproar as the immediate post-war period came to a 
close. By 1923, the Weimarer Republic was struggling to avoid economic collapse in the 
aftermath of the Ruhrkrise, where French and Belgian forces occupied the West German 
Ruhr area, and to re-stabilize domestic politics. The diverging interests of the wide 
spectrum of parties in Germany, from the Communists to the Social Democrats, the 
Centrum Party to the rising Nazi Party, led to multiple chancellors during the 1920s and 
an interlude of stability followed by renewed chaos after 1929. The failed coup in 
Munich 1923 provided Adolf Hitler with broad attention, and after his short time in jail, 
Hitler refounded the Nationalsozialitische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP).41 The 
Russian influence in the NSDAP was significant, in that Baltic Germans who had fled the 
Bolsheviks came to Munich and exerted an early influence on Hitler and his upper-
Bavarian comrades with the extremism that had been native to the Red Terror. Baltic 
Germans also imported the vicious anti-Jewish ideas of Imperial Russia into the NSDAP, 
which sought an end to assimilation and tolerance for Jews that had been obtained in the 
second Reich. 
In the fight among the branches of the left wing, the Soviets under Stalin 
encouraged the Communist Party in the late 1920s to ally with the Nazi Party to counter 
the Social Democrats, which Stalin wrongly saw as his main opposition to successful 
world revolution of the working class.42 With Hitler’s seizure of power on January 30, 
1933, it was expected that the German-Russian relations would deteriorate, but there was 
no initial break on either side because both nations were preoccupied with their domestic 
situations.43 However, in the course of 1934, Hitler’s Gleichschaltung, persecution of 
Jews and suppression of other minorities, as well as members of the opposition, including 
the ban on communists in Germany, led to Moscow’s reexamination of Germany and its 
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imminent risks to Soviet Russia.44 Soviet Russia was hardly able to react because 
Russia’s population had declined between 19 and 20 million people between the late 
1920s and 1939 due to collectivization and the extermination of the Kulaks, especially in 
1931 in Ukraine, and with Stalin’s purges within the party and society that began in 
1934.45 In addition, the USSR was technologically backward compared to Germany, and 
its rearmament program only began in earnest in the mid-1930s, employing many of the 
weapons and tactics that had been perfected in common labor in the training areas and 
weapons forges maintained jointly by the two nations in the Weimar era. 
With Nazi Germany’s rhetoric becoming more and more aggressive with the anti-
Comintern campaign and the Spanish Civil War in 1936 and its racial ideology, including 
the objective for Lebensraum im Osten—expanding living space in the East—Stalin 
became nervous and distrustful but tried to avoid further escalation in German-Soviet 
relations. Economic trade decreased significantly to only 0.6% of overall German foreign 
trade after 1933 reflected exactly the increasing tensions on all levels of German-Soviet 
relations up to 1939.46 By 1938, Stalin was engaged in half-hearted negotiations with the 
British and French, but the proposed alliance failed in the course of the summer of the 
next year. Thus, in a diplomatic revolution with echoes of Tauroggen and Rapallo, Berlin 
and Moscow signed a non-aggression pact, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939, 
instantly improving trade relations, especially because Germany needed raw materials in 
order to support its heavy industry for war preparations that had been underway since 
1936.47 The pact with Soviet Russia liberated Germany from the threat of a two-front war 
against France and Russia and enhanced its war fighting capabilities. Subsequently, 
Germany attacked Poland on September 1, 1939. After concluding a truce with Japan on 
August 15, 1939, the Russians attacked Poland from the east on August 17, 1939. 
Germany and the Soviet Union split Poland after its capitulation only weeks after the war 
had begun and consequently shared a common border. 
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While Stalin fought the winter war against Finland in 1939, Hitler attacked 
Denmark and Norway in spring 1940 in order to sustain the flow of resources the Third 
Reich needed for the war economy and for the attack in the West against the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, and France, which took place May 10, 1940.48 In December 
1940, in an effort to collapse the British Empire, Hitler entreated Foreign Minister 
Molotov to make common cause in a German-Italian-Russian and Japanese offensive in 
Eurasia, to which Molotov demurred because of the neutrality of the Japanese in Asia in 
the wake of the 1938–1939 Soviet Japanese war. This refusal to participate fully in Axis 
world strategy opened the door to a revision of statecraft, and the German side decided on 
an offensive against the Soviet Union, which, they believed, was hopelessly weakened by 
ideology and inner contradictions, not the least being the gutting of the brains of the Red 
Army through the purges.  
Finally, Hitler attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, which came as a 
shock to Stalin, despite Stalin’s own assessment that a war between Germany and the 
Soviet Union rather sooner than later was inevitable.49 Stalin has assumed that he would 
have to fight all the capitalist powers in a later war, a task that would be made easier once 
the capitalist powers had weakened themselves in the present war. After operational 
successes during the first months of war against the Soviet Union, the Germans advanced 
deep into Russia and came to a halt only short of Moscow. The offensive began again in 
1942; however, it reached a tipping point in Stalingrad, which in early 1943 marked the 
most serious reversal of German fortune at arms with the loss of Field Marshal von 
Paulus’ 6th army. The German and Axis allies waged war without quarter in the USSR in 
1941–1942, with the ideal of the Generalplan Ost drafted by the SS, which foresaw the 
extermination of Slavic and Jewish populations in European Russia to make way for a 
Eurasian continental German empire on an unprecedented scale.  
Stalin’s propaganda reinforced a brutal image of the Germans, which, together 
with more than 27 million Soviets killed, left a lasting image in the mind of the Soviet 
people: the bad German, an image that would later be transferred onto only West 
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Germans as heirs of the Third Reich made more dangerous by an imperialist United 
States; on the other hand, Germans in East and West did not forget the brutal occupation 
of Soviet Forces in 1945, the ethnic cleansing of ethnic Germans in Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, or the property seizures in East Germany. All of these events influenced 
German-Russian relations  throughout the decades of the Cold War and beyond with a 
monumental burden.50 After the allies had advanced into Germany, Hitler had committed 
suicide, and the Russians had taken Berlin, the new government under Großadmiral Karl 
Doenitz signed an unconditional surrender on May 8, 1945. This left the Soviet Union 
and the other allies as victors, as the Third Reich ceased to exist in the division of 
Germany among the victors as a prelude to the Cold War. 
From the Convention of Tauroggen to the Reinsurance Treaty, to the Treaty of 
Rapallo, to von Seeckt’s secret German-Soviet military collaboration, to the Hitler-Stalin-
Pact of August 1939, and finally to the third Reich’s capitulation on May 8, 1945, there 
have always been times of cooperation and confrontation in historic German-Russian 
relations until the end of World War II, which did not affect only Germany and Russia, 
but Europe as a whole. 
B. THE COLD WAR AND EMERGENCE OF A NEW OSTPOLITIK  
The Cold War system of German-Russian relations emerged from the failures 
among the victors to end the war with a durable European order of peace and security, as 
in 1815 or even 1871. Rather, the peace of Europe lay in its division, which meant the 
division of Germany and Austria, as well as parts of Yugoslavia. This regime began to 
transform in the early 1960s and ended at the close of the 1980s, after the long sacrifice 
of the Cold War in which the common fate of Germany and Russia was always a leading 
theme.  
The Allies took control of a fully occupied Germany on June 5, 1945, established 
a provisional government, and set up four occupational zones: a British, American, 
Soviet, and also, as agreed in Yalta, a French zone.51 Additionally, the former German 
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capital Berlin was divided into four sectors. Coordination among the allies was supposed 
to be in the Allied Control Council by achieving consensus, which proved to be a 
challenging task because “the Four Powers not only had very different goals with regard 
to Germany but no long-term strategy either.”52 The Soviets had gained vast territories 
during and before World War II beyond their initial borders, such as the Baltic States, 
and were occupying complete Eastern Europe, which, among other things, led the Soviet 
Union in 1945 to be one of the two global superpowers thereafter. By that and by 
Poland’s west border shared with the Soviet occupation zone in East Germany, Germany 
lost its territories east of the Oder-Neisse-line. The main objective for Stalin was to 
prevent any future German aggression, as the Soviets feared neo-Nazi German 
revanchism for the territories lost and were obsessed with the need to ensure buffer states 
between Germany and the Soviet Union.53 The delay in Polish free elections, as stated in 
the Yalta, and the manipulated results in early 1947 elections—enabling a communist 
government—aroused suspicions among Western allies; and in the context of the 
progression of communist-modeled governments in Eastern and Central Europe, the East-
West conflict escalated with the Western Allies prioritizing a democratic government in 
West Germany.54 
When Stalin realized that he had failed to reach the objective of a neutral and 
communist Germany, he insisted on its division. In the West, it was perceived highly 
unlikely that the Soviet Union would have agreed to any other status of Germany, where 
the Soviets would not have control or economic access to parts of it, like the Soviets did 
when the decision was made in 1947 to govern the Soviet occupational zone separately 
from the West.55 In the midst of working on the German question, the Cold War erupted 
in Greece and elsewhere over the Truman-Doctrine and Andrei Zhdanov’s subsequent 
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answer: dividing the world into the “free world and the totalitarian camp,”56 respectively, 
or “the imperialists and anti-imperialists.”57 With the confrontational divisions arising 
among the former allies, it was clear for Stalin that the most important problem to be 
solved was the German question, as the Soviets wanted to prevent a democratic West 
Germany from adopting an Atlantic orientation.58 When George C. Marshall proposed 
the Marshall plan in June 1947 for economic aid to the Soviets and Eastern European 
nations, Stalin feared a pro-western attitude within the Soviet satellite states and rejected 
the offer. For Western Europe, the Marshall Plan’s objective was to stabilize the social 
and economic situation on the capitalist or social market economy model and thereby 
support reconstruction in order to avoid vulnerability to communist ideas.59 With the 
Berlin Blockade from June 1948 to May 1949, Stalin’s objective was to destroy the 
Allies cohesion and to continue negotiating the German question and thus prevent a West 
Germany. The plan failed completely and achieved nearly the opposite because (a) 
Germans in West Germany and West Berlin united to outlive the crisis, West German’s 
public opinion of the Soviet Union plunged, and attitudes towards the United States 
soared with the airlift; (b) the Allies and Germany grew closer because the Germans were 
grateful for the Rosinenbomber, which positively influenced public opinion for a long 
time; (c) it became obvious that hopes for a united Germany had no prospects of success; 
and, therefore, d) it accelerated the creation of and determination for a West Germany.60 
With the parliamentary council’s61 acceptance of the Basic Law—the German 
Grundgesetz—the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was proclaimed on May 23, 
1949, although not as a complete sovereign state.62 The Allies retained control of 
Germany’s jurisprudence as “occupational law took precedence over German law,”63 
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which was only partially eased by the Petersberg Agreement (Bad Godesberg) in 
November 1949, while full sovereignty would not be achieved until the 2+4 Treaty in 
1990. In August 1949, Konrad Adenauer of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) 
became the first chancellor of West Germany, who concentrated his ambitions on 
Westbindung rather than Ostpolitik; he was determined to achieve Germany’s integration 
into the West because he believed that the Western Allies would grant Germany more 
freedom to act on domestic and foreign policy only if the Germans could convince the 
Allies of the wish and will to integrate with the West.64 Adenauer’s idea of statecraft 
arose from his own Rhenish biography within Prussia of the Weimar Era, and from his 
dislike of the policy of swinging from west to east (Rapallo versus Locarno) that had so 
ill served the first German republic. Moreover, the center of gravity of German socialism 
lay in Saxony, now in Soviet control, and the Socialist Party of Germany (SPD) pushed 
for neutrality and unification, a policy at odds with the United States, UK, and French 
powers on whom Adenauer relied for the fortune of the FRG. 
Due to the fact that Stalin could not reach his objective of a united but neutral 
Germany, where the Soviets could exercise some codetermination, the founding of the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR) on October 7, 1949, was perceived as the Soviet 
answer to the new FRG.65 When the two German states were founded in 1949, the major 
Soviet goal was to exercise control over the GDR and establish a viable government.  
The Marshall plan was not enough, however, and the West German state had to 
assure its security with the aid of what presently became its Atlantic allies. A security 
pact was essential, a requirement made all the more urgent by the worsening of the Cold 
War in the years 1949–1950. In the context of the global situation and perceived advance 
of communist influence, the Western Allies signed the Washington Treaty on April 4, 
1949, founding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the words allegedly 
ascribed to the first NATO Secretary General, Lord “Pug” Ismay, NATO was founded 
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“to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down,”66 in order to deter 
Soviet expansionism, prevent the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a 
strong North American presence on the continent, and encourage Western European 
political integration.  
The Soviet eventual answer to NATO was the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact on 
May 14, 1955, uniting the eight Soviet satellite states under the umbrella of mutual 
cooperation and defense, where the GDR became a full member.67 Both nuclear armed 
organization dominated the East-West conflict until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 
and the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union, and resembled the respective pillar of 
deterrence and power projection in Europe. The first Soviet nuclear detonation in August 
1949 reassured the Allies in their formation of NATO, while it also underlined the new 
superpower status of the Soviet Union. The bloc formation, including the foundation of 
the Warsaw Pact in 1955, determined the two opposing sides of the Cold War, which for 
the Germans meant the inevitable risk of a German brother war, putting Germany in the 
center of a potential battlefield. The Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe used the 
perceived West German danger as pretext for its legitimization and as raison d’etre for 
the Warsaw Pact.68 However, the relevance of West Germany for the Soviets should not 
be underestimated, as for 40 years Soviet security would be challenged by West Germany 
for two main reasons: the FRG was the United States’ key NATO ally, and due to its 
geographical location was perceived central to NATO’s effectiveness during the Cold 
War; and the FRG was the only country sincerely interested in closer relations with an 
Eastern European state—the GDR.69  
When NATO was founded in 1949, the Allies, especially the British and the 
Americans, had previously held their forces in Germany in fulfilment of their occupation 
duties and were incapable of significant military operations on the scale of 1944 or 1945, 
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so only smaller contingents remained in the FRG, while at the same time the Soviets had 
over thirty divisions deployed to East Germany.70 This uneven military threat led 
Adenauer to worry about Germany’s position, hoping to avoid a fate like Korea, where 
communist North Korean forces overran South Korea after crossing the 38th parallel in 
June 1950, thus initiating the Korean War with international involvement under U.S. 
leadership. After strong initial opposition by European neighbors, especially France, to 
Germany’s rearmament, a solution was reached to create a European army, the so-called 
European Defense Community (EDC), which was the ideal of western defense along with 
NATO until 1954, when the French abandoned the idea. Instead, NATO allowed West 
Germany to establish its own new force in 1956, called the Bundeswehr (the federal 
armed forces), to attain full control of its forces. It was led by a defense minister and fully 
integrated within NATO and the mechanism of the Western European Union as the heir 
to the failed European Army.71 West Germany’s armament and admission to NATO by 
the Paris Treaties was paralleled by the revision of the General Treaty with the Allies, 
which, despite a few limitations, gave the Germans much of their national sovereignty 
back from the most severe regime of occupation.72 Thus, exactly ten years after the end 
of World War II, the occupation ended and West Germany became a full member of the 
Western Alliance, founding the new federal armed forces (the Bundeswehr) to counter 
the threat from the East. 
In the period from 1952 until 1955, especially with the death of Stalin, the Soviets 
reacted to discussions of West Germany’s rearmament with an intensified policy towards 
the German question and tried to pressure the GDR into campaigning with an all-German 
election, but failed. The Stalin Note in 1952, proposing a unified and neutral Germany, 
was an unsuccessful attempt to prevent West Germany’s NATO admission and further 
integration into the West, but it was also driven by a geostrategic motive: the possibility 
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of enhanced US-Japanese relations due to the Korean War.73 Although Adenauer rejected 
the Stalin Notes immediately, fearing a solution to the German question by the victors of 
World War II to the disadvantage of Germany, the SPD “saw the notes as a real 
opportunity to move closer to the goal of restoring German unity.”74 Those plans were 
abandoned when, in June 1953, the worker uprising in East Berlin threatened the survival 
of the communist East German government under Walter Ulbricht. The Soviet Union, 
shortly after Stalin’s death, decided to use military force to end the demonstrations and 
support the GDR in political and military means, thereby introducing a shift in Soviet 
foreign policy that gave priority to the support and preservation of the GDR rather than 
countering improving relations with West Germany.75 
After times of power struggle in Moscow, Nikita Khrushchev became the next 
Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) heading the 
Politburo. His regime put in hand a mini détente, which entertained ideas of pulling back 
on the Cold War front lines and of precursors of the policy solutions that did finally 
emerge in 1989. Adenauer accepted a surprise Soviet invitation to Moscow in September 
1955 to discuss the German question and the release of German prisoners of war still held 
by the Soviet Union. After being received by Khrushchev and Prime Minister Bulganin, 
Moscow and Berlin agreed to establish diplomatic relations, while Adenauer made clear 
that such would not mean any recognition of the GDR.76 It was a core part of the CDU’s 
and Adenauer’s Deutschlandpolitik, that is, the Hallstein Doctrine, for Germany not to 
have any diplomatic relations with nations that recognized the GDR, with the exception 
of the Soviet Union due to its immediate relevance and status. In that perception, the 
FRG was Germany, whereas the new GDR was only the Soviet Zone of Occupation, a 
bastard regime of Soviet vicegerents without legitimacy or any basis in constitutional 
heritage. In the chancellor’s report to the federal parliament, Adenauer stated that his 
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administration would regard any recognition of the GDR by a third state as an unfriendly 
act because it would support the deepening of Germany’s two state situation.77 
Throughout the later 1950s and the early 1960s, the relationship between the two 
German states became increasingly competitive in terms of attractiveness for its 
population. West Germany was experiencing an economic miracle with the help of the 
Allies and the Marshall Plan. While the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) in East 
Germany was content with economical output, it was struggling under the dismantling of 
its industrial base to the Soviet Union as part of the reparations of World War II. In 
addition, East Germans experienced arrests and purges in the wake of the 1953 uprising 
and enjoyed a lesser degree of freedom. The SED regime introduced a news series of 
socializing measures in 1958 at the time that Nikita Kruschev called for the wrapping up 
of four-power rule in divided Berlin.  
West Germany enjoyed a freer society and an improved standard of living in the 
years 1958–1961, which led to about three million East Germans having fled to West 
Germany by 1961, posing a serious threat to East Germany.78 The construction of the 
Berlin Wall started the night of August 12, 1961, and according to Schöllgen was the 
capitulation before the realities: the mass fleeing of the East German population in which 
a divided Germany might end with another 1953 uprising or worse.79 The construction of 
the wall in the summer of 1961 also constituted a diplomatic revolution in the Cold War, 
once the confrontation reached its low point amid the prospect of thermonuclear war and 
the limits of the Adenauer regime and the Hallstein doctrine.  
In the following weeks, the complete border between the FRG and GDR was 
closed with barbed wire, mine fields, and surveillance measures, thus sealing off East 
Germany and prompting horror, fear, and helplessness on the West German side. But 
none of the Allies, nor Germany itself, could do anything to stop the construction of the 
Wall and consequently had to accept and thus find a new way ahead in West German–
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Soviet relations other than perpetual conflict with the possibility of nuclear war and 
national extinction. The Allies and Germans in West Berlin knew that Khrushchev had 
threatened several times that a war over Berlin would turn nuclear; thus, it became clear 
that the Western powers—foremost Washington—would not be willing to risk a nuclear 
war with the Soviet Union.80 West Germany quickly grew weary of the burdens of its 
status as a frontline state, while Adenauer continued to pursue the West integration. His 
“German policy . . . was to ignore, as far as possible, the Soviet Union and the other 
Communist regimes in East Europe.”81 This confrontational Ostpolitik under Adenauer 
and the CDU did not bring any new impetus towards the German question. Thus, it was 
time to change Germany’s Ostpolitik as the Adenauer regime entered into its eclipse after 
1961.82 
The CDU had ruled in West Germany with Ludwig Erhard (from 1963 in a 
coalition with the FDP) and Kurt Kiesinger (from 1966 in a grand coalition with the 
SPD) until 1969, when the SPD, under Willy Brandt, the former first governing mayor of 
Berlin, formed a coalition with the liberal Free Democratic Party of Germany (FDP). It 
was the first time that the Social Democrats took over the governmental responsibility in 
West Germany. In the meantime, Leonid Brezhnev had succeeded Khrushchev in 
Moscow in 1964. Under Khrushchev and in the wake of the generalized prospect of the 
end of the world with the Cuban crisis of the fall of 1962, the first signs for détente with 
the West had appeared, such as the beginning of negotiations in 1959 regarding nuclear 
test bans, which were interrupted in the crises of 1961 and 1962 and the first grain import 
from the United States in 1963.83  
The policy of “peaceful coexistence” was central to Khrushchev, who was trying 
to convince the world of the Soviet Union’s objective of securing a peaceful coexistence, 
because “the Cold War appeared to be winding down” in the years after 1962 and 
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because the United States had turned its attention to Indochina.84 Brezhnev continued the 
path of détente towards the West, but he also oversaw the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
1968, which sparked new fear in West Germany. With the possibility of the defection of 
the Central European satellite states declining after the Warsaw Pact invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968, and with the division of Europe now secure, 
small revisions and a lessening of tension could resume. But on the grounds of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine, the Soviets achieved a feeling of flexibility in its Westpolitik without 
endangering Soviet hegemony in their sphere of influence, thus, opening the door for a 
more cooperational Westpolitik. In other words, while the Soviet satellites in Central and 
Eastern Europe were firmly under control, Moscow could be more flexible on its stance 
on relations with the West. 
It was in this setting that German chancellor Willy Brandt’s new Ostpolitik of 
being “willing to recognize the European status quo” fully initiated a new impetus for 
Soviet–West German détente in 1969.85 For Brandt’s social-liberal administration, it was 
important to reassure Western Allies of its loyalty to solidarity in the West and dismiss 
any rumors about a changing West German orientation of neutrality before embarking on 
the new Ostpolitik, which the chancellor achieved through engagement in the European 
Economic Community.86 Brandt connected his Ostpolitik to three main objectives: (a) the 
social-liberal administration aimed at achieving a modus vivendi to deal with the divided 
Germany without recognizing it politically; (b) through actively participating in the 
détente process instead of denying it, Germany wanted to regain the initiative in dealing 
with the German question before the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE), and thus an eventual multilateral détente, convened; and (c) Germany wanted to 
improve the standards of living on both side of the Wall in Europe.87 Egon Bahr’s slogan 
Wandel durch Annäherung—”change through rapprochement”—became the motto for 
the new Ostpolitk, arguing “that a recognition of the geographical status quo was a 
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prerequisite to eventually overcoming the political status quo.”88 But Brandt’s Ostpolitik 
led to the most controversial discussions in German politics and with the U.S. 
administration of Richard Nixon. As Haftendorn related to Henry Kissinger, “If any 
détente policy is to be pursued with the Soviet Union, then we’ll be the ones doing it.”89 
With the pre-1937 borders of Germany in mind as the measure of German nationhood, 
the German opposition leader, Rainer Barzel (CDU), after agreeing on the 1970 
Renunciation of Force Treaty between the USSR and the FRG, accused Brandt of treason 
for having sold off former German territories in Central and Eastern Europe to the Soviet 
Union by ceding German demands.90  
However, during Brandt’s tenure, the relations with the Soviet Union, but also his 
personal relationship with Leonid Brezhnev, improved significantly, which also fostered 
enhanced economic relations, as in 1970 when a first deal on Soviet export of natural gas 
was concluded, igniting energy relations that would gain substantial importance for 
Germany, Russia, and Europe as a whole.91  
Despite the strong opposition to détente and Ostpolitik, the federal elections in 
1972 showed sufficient support for Chancellor Brandt’s policy and a desire for the 
administration to continue its policy of détente with the East.92 The factual recognition of 
the European geographical status quo by West Germany gave them new freedom to act 
and broadened their foreign policy options. On the issue of German-Soviet trade, German 
exports to the Soviet Union, mainly machinery and industrial technology, rose between 
1973 and 1976 by 61 percent, while the Soviet Union continued to deliver natural 
resources.93 On the issue of diplomatic relations between the East and West—the 
Warsaw Pact and NATO, respectively—two separate but parallel developments took 
place in 1973. On the one side, the Soviet initiative of the CSCE started in Helsinki, 
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while NATO and the Warsaw Pact began negotiating possible Mutual and Balanced 
Force Reductions (MBFR) in Europe in the face of unilateral attempts in the U.S. 
Congress to withdraw U.S. forces in order to impose a greater defense burden on Western 
Europe amid the Indochina War and the invasion in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 
(CSSR). While the negotiations on MBFR did not achieve any results until 1989, the 
CSCE Final Act was signed in 1975 by thirty-three European states, the United States, 
and Canada, agreeing, among other things, on the renunciation of use of force, territorial 
integrity, inviolability of existing border, and peaceful mediation.94 After a Soviet top 
spy had been uncovered in the direct vicinity of Chancellor Willy Brandt, who seemed to 
be exhausted by the office in the Bundeskanzleramt, Brandt was forced to step down and 
Helmut Schmidt (SPD) succeeded him.  
Despite the fact that the Soviets could not achieve all their objectives at Helsinki, 
the conclusion of the Final Act was a major success for Brezhnev. It de facto legitimated 
the Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe for the time being and with little inkling of what 
lay ahead in the decade to come.95 However, relations with West Germany did not 
improve any more for multiple reasons: Brezhnev became too ill after 1974 to advance 
the Soviet Union’s Germany policy any further. The United States became increasingly 
disillusioned with détente and Schmidt over questions of nuclear deterrence, as well as 
with the impact of stagflation on the western economy. And despite pressure to back off 
economically in the German-Soviet relations, Brezhnev retained economic relations but 
committed himself to containing the Soviet military threat and remaining loyal to 
Germany’s integration with the West with a dual track decision in 1977.96 During 
Schmidt’s first years of chancellery, two issues dominated the Soviet-German relations: 
trade and ethnic Germans in the Soviet Union. It was estimated that 1.9 million ethnic 
Germans lived in Soviet Central Asia who were eligible for emigration as they, like the 
Soviet Jewish population, had no national republic of their own, but only about sixty-two 
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thousand Germans were allowed to emigrate to the FRG and GDR in the 1970s.97 West 
German–Soviet trade relations became a boost when, under the Schmidt administration in 
1978, another cooperation agreement in the energy and natural resources sector was 
concluded, which, despite pressure from the United States, was not halted or cancelled as 
a result of the Soviet Afghanistan invasion in 1979.98  
Schmidt wanted to enhance the détente process by adding components of arms-
control at a time when the post-1973 military buildup in the Warsaw Pact (with the 
planned deployment of Soviet SS-20 medium range missiles) strengthened the Warsaw 
Pact and forced West Germany to rethink its defense if the medium-range missiles could 
not be included in an arms control regime.99 The Soviet-American conclusion of the 
Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) I and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972 
had from a continental-European perspective manifested a de facto agreement on the non-
use of strategic nuclear weapons above the intermediate-range level and enforced 
Schmidt’s fear that the nuclear balance had tipped to the Soviets in Europe because it 
created an East-West disparity, thereby compromising European security.100 In his 1977 
speech in London, Schmidt called for a level of parity on all levels, not just on 
conventional systems but to include nuclear weapons. While Schmidt’s initial aim was 
not a demand for new weapons, but for enhanced engagement within the MBFR talks, the 
main objective was to retain the engagement of the United States in Europe, which was in 
doubt in Schmidt’s mind with the post-Vietnam malaise and the aborted attempt to 
deploy neutron tactical nuclear weapons.101 While the Soviets favored Schmidt’s 
Ostpolitik, they were reluctant to discuss any reductions of their missile capabilities with 
the United States and regarded Schmidt’s engagement for retrofit armament 
(Nachrüstung) of the existing nuclear weapon systems at the end of the 1970s, as détente 
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expired, increasingly critical.102 Schmidt was convinced that, after a failed arms control 
mechanism on intermediate nuclear missiles, only strong retrofit armament could ensure 
Western Europe’s, and thus Germany’s, security. It was West Germany’s consistent 
pressure that led NATO to the double-track decision in 1979, which foresaw the 
deployment of modern Pershing-II systems and ground-based cruise missiles to Europe, 
thus underlining U.S. commitment to European security and assuring all levels of 
escalation in deterrence.103 Despite Brezhnev’s warning about Nachrüstung, Moscow 
could not prevent the decision. For Soviet-German relations, the NATO double-track 
decision posed a major setback, and fears of a renewed Cold War appeared, while 
domestically the double-track decision led to most controversial debates and 
manifestations.104 In late 1982, Schmidt was toppled over the implementation of the 
NATO double-track decision in Germany, when his own coalition of SPD and FDP fell 
apart and the Bundestag voted on a resolution of no-confidence achieved by the 
CDU/CSU and FDP.  
On October 1, 1982, Helmut Kohl (CDU) was elected by the Bundestag and took 
over office of the chancellery until the federal elections in March 1983. The Kohl 
administration was confirmed, while the Green Party for the first time entered the 
Bundestag (the federal German parliament), which necessitated coalition with the 
FDP.105 Domestic tensions in West Germany grew stronger after the Bundestag decided 
in October 1983 to implement the NATO double-track decision by allowing the 
deployment of U.S. Pershing-II systems to Germany, which, in the light of the 1979 
Afghanistan crisis and the 1980–1981 situation in Poland, marked an absolute low in the 
German-Soviet and the East-West relations.106 The situation was marked by the 
deployment of Soviet SS-12/22 to Central Europe and a propaganda effort aiming at 
pacifist and anti-American sentiment in the German public. The Soviets stressed historic 
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fears derived from German aggression against the Soviet Union in two world wars and 
underlined the sacrifices endured by the Soviet population—which continued to affect the 
Soviet people—warning that Germany should not threaten the Soviet Union again and 
accusing Germany of revanchist attitudes.107 One consequence, which the Soviets failed 
to understand, is how the Kohl government resisted the urge to go neutral and that 
increased Soviet pressure—military and political—drove West Germany westwards and 
enhanced the American–West German cohesion at the height of the Intermediate Nuclear 
Forces (INF) crisis in the years 1983–1985.108 
Brezhnev’s successors, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, both died only 
months after taking over the office of Secretary General of the CPSU, which led to a 
stagnation in the Soviet Union’s foreign policy until the accession of Mikhail Gorbachev 
in 1985. The comparably young Secretary General was driven by concerns for Soviet 
collapse due to the devastating state of the Soviet economy, and less by communist 
ideology, as his goal was to strengthen the Soviet Union economically and politically to 
develop its international competiveness.109 Recognizing that the Soviet Union was in a 
terrible state—”suffering a moral, cultural and economic crisis”110—Gorbachev 
introduced a major reform to modernize Soviet society and socialism—Perestroika—
which was tied to an inherent new approach in the Soviet Union. The “new thinking,” 
introduced by Gorbachev, led to a revival of détente between East and West in 1986 with 
the Reykjavik proposal to abolish nuclear weapons on the grounds of Gorbachev’s 
disarmament proposals and enabled the continuation of negotiations for the INF Treaty, 
which was concluded in December 1987.111 Gorbachev needed the INF Treaty to be a 
foreign policy success because with the nuclear catastrophe in Chernobyl in 1986, the 
international reputation of the Soviet Union and its leadership had been damaged. The 
Soviet Union’s military power was the dominant factor in its foreign policy, but due to 
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the technological backwardness, the superpower status was eroding. Consequently, the 
new thinking in foreign and security policy was closely connected to the domestic state of 
affairs when Gorbachev decided to cut military spending in favor of industrial 
modernization.112 
Gorbachev announced such additional signals in 1987–1988 that were interpreted 
as cooperative, as with the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan and further reforms in 
Eastern Europe. The Soviets underestimated the severity of the Eastern European 
situation because “the majority of them did not favor the reform of socialism—they 
wanted to get rid of it.”113 While the Soviet’s policy regarding Eastern Europe was 
contradictory in the early years, it became increasingly clear that the Soviet Union and its 
empire had lost its legitimacy, which Gorbachev failed to recognize.114 Gradually, 
Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would no longer interfere militarily to 
impose stability and order in any of its socialist Eastern European states, thus ending the 
Brezhnev doctrine á la Czechoslovakia in 1968 and opening the way for democratization 
and liberalization in Eastern Europe.115 The first signs of change came from Poland, 
where the labor union Solidarnosc, founded in 1980, initiated severe general strikes, 
which led to free elections in June 1989, while at the same time the nationalists in the 
Baltic States urged the Soviet Union to admit the details of the Hitler-Stalin Pact from 
1939.116 The independence movements among the nationalities within the Soviet Union 
grew and threatened the stability of the Soviet imperial system. However, in the face of 
such generalized reform, the GDR’s anti-Perestroika regime under Erich Honecker was 
reluctant to reform and implement measures of Glasnost because it feared the repetitions 
of 1953 and 1971. Honecker still believed in true socialism in its original post-1949 
model and resented Gorbachev’s new thinking. Even if Soviet-GDR relations had already 
been tense when Gorbachev assumed office, they worsened as an Intimfeinschaft 
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(personal antagonism) between Gorbachev and Honecker developed through the fall of 
1989, which increasingly undermined Soviet-GDR relations, in times where they would 
be needed more than ever, in order to stabilize the turbulent times, even in the GDR.117 
In the summer of 1989, tensions in the GDR grew significantly as thousands of East 
Germans assembled each Monday for demonstrations calling for peace, reconciliation, 
and liberalization; and East German citizens fled into the West German embassies in 
Prague and Warsaw, seeking emigration through the now semi-open border to the south. 
The opening of the “Iron Curtain” between Austria and Hungary, which was publicly 
done by the respective ministers of foreign affairs in June 1989, acted as a catalyst to the 
situation in the GDR, as tens of thousands traveled to Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 
order to cross the border into Austria and the FRG.118 Gorbachev had supported the 
liberalization by Perestroika and, as long as the territorial cohesion of the Soviet Union 
was not in danger, tolerated the developments, which changed once the Soviet republics 
declared their wish for independence.119 The developments in 1989 now eclipsed those 
of 1953, 1956, and 1968 in a way that astonished all concerned.  
Therefore, Gorbachev’s long-planned visit to the FRG in June 1989 came during 
troubling times for the Soviet Union. It was, however, a visit with tremendous relevance 
because it not changed the mutual perception in West Germany and the Soviet Union, 
despite the low in personal relations between Kohl and Gorbachev, which was based, 
among other things, on Kohl’s inadvertent and indirect 1986 comparison of Gorbachev to 
Nazi propagandist Joseph Goebbels. The population received Gorbachev like a hero, and 
the two men developed a special and close relationship, which would show its historic 
significance in the critical months that lay ahead, which would be full of surprises.120 
Although hopes for unification were heard among the German public, the Soviet leader 
denied publicly any reports about a possibility that the Berlin Wall could come down in 
the near future, while in the GDR, Erich Honecker had envisioned, in January 1989, that 
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the Wall would stand another fifty to a hundred years.121 The latest crisis in NATO over 
the modernization of short-range nuclear weapons had just been solved with a strong 
West German effort at nuclear roll back, and West Germany’s Allies, especially France, 
again raised concerns about a “Rapallo repeated” on the grounds of the Joint Declaration 
between the FRG and the Soviet Union. The GDR under Honecker, who was still not 
willing or able to realize the situation and to initiate reforms, became increasingly 
isolated, especially after the approval of China’s actions against demonstrating dissidents 
in the Tianamen Square of Beijing, which turned into a bloody massacre, which spread 
fear among the Monday demonstrators in East Germany that a “Chinese solution” 
awaited them at the hands of the Stasi and the Nationale Volksarmee (NVA).122 The 
change towards more freedom and liberalization in Eastern Europe was inevitable, but 
Gorbachev and his minister of foreign affairs, Eduard Shevardnadze, still aimed at 
retaining a socialist system and hoped for a gradual and slower process of change in order 
to influence changes in Eastern Europe in the Soviet Union’s favor.123 
While the East Germans were fleeing the GDR and continued their manifestations 
on the East German streets in October 1989, the SED Politbuero under Honecker 
commemorated the fortieth anniversary of the GDR with great pomp on October 6 and 7. 
Heads of state and governments from various socialist countries attended the celebration. 
Among them, most prominently, was Mikhail Gorbachev, who still envisioned a reform 
of the communist system in the GDR.124 Only days after the anniversary, Erich Honecker 
stepped down and was succeeded by Egon Krenz, while the masses on the street, 
encouraged by the anti-socialist and national developments in Poland with the advent of 
free elections, took over the agenda in the GDR, which led to the more or less accidental 
lift of the travel ban on November 9, 1989.125 When the masses headed to the border-
control posts and crossed the border into the FRG with the quiet assent of the Stasi 
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guards, this remarkable moment marked the beginning of the end of the GDR—a decisive 
step towards reunification, which came as a surprise to all participants in Eastern and 
Western Europe, as well as across the Atlantic. This moment also changed German-
Russian relations in a fundamental manner and began the eradication of the epoch of 
confrontation that reached back to June 22, 1941, and all the suffering in the decades 
since.  
C. RUSSIA AND A REUNIFIED GERMANY  
Despite Kohl’s warning about exaggerated expectations and strong opposition to a 
reunified Germany from London and Paris, as well as from Moscow, where “nerves were 
on the edge”126 (Gorbachev had warned Kohl not to question the territorial status quo 
which foresaw the Zweistaatlichkeit for Germany), Germany’s reunification came sooner 
than expected because no one could control the thrust of public will, and those in a 
position actually to influence events came to see the utility of a peaceful unification. 
While the decision-makers in Berlin and Moscow were literally overran by the situation, 
calls for the deployment of Soviet “intervention and blocking divisions along the border” 
of the GDR and the use of the NVA were brought up by hardliners in Moscow and within 
the SED in early November 1989.127 Gorbachev resisted these calls and affirmed Krenz 
on November 10 that the GDR had acted correctly by preventing bloodshed, although in 
reality, the Soviet Union had made the decision to open the border by renouncing the use 
of force to prevent it in the hours after the declaration of a generalized freedom of travel 
on November 9.128  
Receiving ambiguous signals from the Soviet Union and opposition from the 
European allies, but more or less with the support of the United States and President 
George Bush, West Germany’s Chancellor Helmut Kohl seized the opportunity and 
embarked on a unilateral approach in which the United States and the USSR followed 
along. In order to retain the initiative, and to avoid reacting to East German proposals, 
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Kohl presented a ten-point paper to the German parliament on November 28, 1989, to 
prepare the way for reunification. Kohl felt he needed to hurry, fearing that the Soviet 
Union could oppose any further rapprochement between the two parts of Germany.129 
Kohl did this without consulting any of his allies, which led to widespread skepticism in 
London and Paris about Germany’s new role, while the Soviets were outraged and felt 
betrayed. The fierce criticism included Soviet Foreign Minster Shevardnadze allegedly 
stating that “not even Hitler behaved in such a way,”130 as the Soviets interpreted Kohl’s 
approach as interference in the GDR’s internal affairs and opposed it. The United States 
under President George Bush and Spain were the only Allies of West Germany that 
supported a reunified Germany from the very beginning. None of the other key allies, the 
1945 victors (who retained their reserved rights for Germany as a whole in international 
law), France, Great Britain, or especially the Soviet Union were in favor of reunification. 
Although Gorbachev knew it was inevitable, reunification was not foreseen at that early 
time, and France and Great Britain relied on exactly that Soviet position, firmly opposing 
Germany’s reunification.131  
In its support of a united Germany, the Bush administration adhered to the 
statecraft of the last four decades against neutrality for Germany and pushed for 
continuous NATO membership. The United States outlined these parameters to Kohl 
before the chancellor met with Gorbachev in Moscow in February 1990.132 While the 
growing numbers of demonstrators on the East German streets chanted “Wir sind ein 
Volk” (we are one people), it became clear that Germany’s reunification became 
increasingly inevitable. Kohl’s visit to Moscow was a game changer, as Gorbachev 
generally accepted German reunification, with three preconditions. Stent notes that that, 
despite the importance and past dominance of the German question within Soviet Foreign 
policy, hardly any initiatives came from the Kremlin at this time, and Gorbachev at least 
knew that he depended on de-conflicted relations with the West, especially with West 
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Germany, as his reforms—Perestroika and Glasnost—could be successful only with 
outside help.133 The Soviet general secretary faced constant internal crisis and allegedly 
realized that West Germany was a “most promising partner to help with the 
modernization of the Soviet economy that he envisioned.”134 Thus, Gorbachev stated 
three preconditions for Soviet assent: (1) recognition of current borders, especially 
Germany’s East border; (2) substantial economic aid for the Soviet Union, including 
transition costs for Soviet forces in Germany; (3) and renunciation of NATO 
membership.135 According to Laird, it was also critical to Gorbachev to limit the 
Bundeswehr to 300,000 troops. In the end, a ceiling of 370,000 troops was accepted.136 
With the Soviets general acceptance of Germany’s self-determination, the way was free 
for intra-German negotiations on the internal terms of reunification. 
In the first democratic Volkskammer elections in March 1990, 49.8 percent of the 
East German population voted for the CDU and its conservative allies, thus legitimizing a 
fast path to reunification. The negotiations on reunification between the West and East 
German cabinets after the Volkskammer elections led to the Treaty of Unification August 
31, 1990, as a precondition for a unified Germany, which depended then solely on the 
approval of the four victorious powers.137 With Soviet leadership, foremost Gorbachev, 
having accepted reality, the Soviets used the 2+4 negotiations “to maximize the gains 
from West Germany.”138 
West German Chancellor Kohl had the coordinating role in setting the agenda 
and, according to Haftendorn, felt that Gorbachev’s position had not been finalized, 
recognizing the internal opposition in the Kremlin and the immense financial problems 
Moscow was facing.139 The Soviets were well aware that they could not stop Germany’s 
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road to unification but tried to exert leverage on external conditions, such as the veto of 
NATO membership and stationing foreign troops in Germany. During the negotiations, 
the Soviets asked for multi-billion credits, which the German government generally 
granted if the Soviets would regard the substantial German economic and financial 
support in the 2+4 framework as part of the solution to the German question. The Soviets 
repeatedly changed their position in regards to alliance membership. It was only after the 
28th Congress of the Communist Party, where Gorbachev was reelected as general 
secretary, and NATO’s London declaration of the end of the Cold War in which the 
Alliance offered dialogue and cooperation to the Soviet Union, that he agreed to 
Germany’s right to self-determination in the context of alliance affiliation. Thus, 
Gorbachev could save face and demand a bilateral German-Russian Treaty on 
Cooperation and Good Neighborly Relations, which detailed the stationing and 
repositioning of Soviet troops in the GDR, as well as additional financial support of 12 
billion Deutschmark.140 The treaties with Germany were very contentious in the Soviet 
Union and in the Supreme Soviet. Foreign minister Shevardnadse was faced with fierce 
criticism by the communist nomenklatura, which accused Gorbachev and him of “having 
sold out Soviet interests.”141 
The progress on the Treaty on Cooperation and Good Neighborly Relations 
between the Soviet Union and West Germany removed the last contentious obstacles 
towards finalization of the 2+4 negotiations. After West German Foreign Minister Hans-
Dietrich Genscher assured the Soviets that NATO would not be expanded eastwards into 
the territory of the GDR, and once issues about the Bundeswehr’s dual-use weapons and 
allied troop movements in the GDR had been clarified, the 2+4 Treaty was signed in 
Moscow on September 12, 1990; on October 1, the four powers declared the termination 
of their rights and responsibilities effected by reunification.142 On October 3, 1990, the 
flag of the Federal Republic of Germany was the only German flag hoisted in front of the 
Berlin Reichstagsgebäude, the current parliament of reunified Germany. 
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The German reunification was more than just a merger or an incorporation of a 
geographical region. It was the re-foundation of a completely sovereign nation state in 
Germany at the geographical center of Europe, changing the balance of power in 
Europe—”a seismic change in the European security system,”143 according to Angela 
Stent. Especially from a Soviet perspective, which had regarded the GDR as its “jewel in 
the crown of the Soviet Empire,”144 and the divided Germany as the price the Germans 
had to pay for the atrocities against the Soviet Union during the Second World War, the 
reunification questioned not only the status quo, but also the sacrifices made by the 
Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War.145 But the formal reunification did not 
automatically mean that the nation was really “one people,” as declared during the 
Montagsdemonstrationen (Monday demonstrations) on the East German streets. More 
than forty years of Soviet influence, as well as the longer period of the combined Nazi 
dictatorship and Soviet sponsored rule, “left its mark on the biographies of the people”146 
in the GDR.  
Despite the fact that Germans in the GDR never developed a real socialist 
identity, as propagated by the SED since 1949 and especially since 1961, after the 
reunification it turned out that East Germans had indeed acquired their own identity, 
influenced by Soviet occupation, political socialization, and isolation from the West—a 
fact not wholly appreciated by westerners who newly discovered the society of the ex-
GDR in 1990 for themselves.147 In addition, the economic and financial conditions of the 
reunification process, such as the introduction and exchange of the Deutschmark, was felt 
by critics and proponents of an alternate path to unity to be imposed by West Germany. 
Both sides had to make concessions, but in the East, most of the social achievements (the 
equality of women in the workplace, as well as a more egalitarian society not so burdened 
with materialism) during Soviet occupation and the GDR were destroyed in the manner 
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that the SED propagandist and doomsayers had predicted from 1958 until 1961 and 
thereafter to justify the wall.148 This different attitude was expressed by the 
differentiation in Ossis (East Germans) and Wessis (West Germans) in the 1990s. This 
phenomenon also played a role in the 2014 crisis as to the fate of Ukraine and the 
willingness among a significant percentage of the German body politic to embrace the 
argumentation of Soviet apologia, which will be further discussed in Chapter III, Section 
C.  
The perception of Germany’s reunification differed widely depending on where 
one stood on October 2, 1990, and was colored by what occurred in the decade that 
followed. While the people in unified Germany celebrated, critics in France, Great 
Britain, and Poland regarded the reunification with deep skepticism and fear for German 
revanchism and the return of an unhappy past that had seemed forever vanished by the 
post-1945 order. The people in the Soviet Union, however, were split in their opinion of 
Germany’s reunification. The divided Germany was perceived as a war trophy, and it 
resembled—in the Soviet perspective—the price that the Germans had to pay. The 
people, too, were divided on whether the Soviet Union had lost its war gains from the 
Second World War and whether the reunification should be perceived with satisfaction or 
anxiety.149 In Moscow, the old guard of government officials (the conservative 
Germanisty), who had ensured that two Germanys did not threaten the Soviet Union, felt 
betrayed by the events.150 The most prominent opposition member was Yegor Legachev, 
who voiced critique and opposition of conservatives in Moscow, especially the military 
establishment, calling for dealing with the threats of a united Germany and arguing that it 
would be a mistake and “unbelievably short-sided . . . if we did not see a Germany with 
huge economic and military potential looming on the international horizon. It is time to 
recognize the new danger.”151 
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For the Germans, reunification was a new beginning for a sovereign Germany that 
could finally proceed beyond the age of total war; for the Soviets, it was the beginning of 
the end of the Soviet Union. As the dynamics of Germany’s reunification acted as a 
catalyst for further geopolitical revision in central and Eastern Europe, and finally in 
1991 during the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Shevardnadze warned critics of the 
Soviet Union’s internal stability, stressing that “foreign policy is the continuation of 
domestic policy, and we should always bear this in mind.”152 The process by which the 
Soviet Union agreed to Germany’s reunification did have long-lasting impact and 
continues to influence German-Russian perceptions today. Soviet leadership was literally 
overrun by the events in East Germany, as the fall of the Berlin Wall was a fait accompli, 
before Moscow even realized it. The Soviets were on the sidelines of historic events, 
notwithstanding their important role; but as Stent put it, the Soviet representatives in East 
Berlin “were told of developments after, and not before, they took place,”153 thus 
reducing the role of the Soviet Union to a passive bystander. Reunification took place 
under the influence of Soviet internal unrest. Gorbachev was preoccupied with the 
situation in the Soviet Union and tried to retain power in the Kremlin. Moreover, 
Gorbachev “clearly believed that by making concessions to Kohl on unification, the 
Germans would become de facto supporters in Gorbachev’s efforts to maintain central 
control in the USSR”154 and reorganize the Soviet Union, calm internal tensions, and 
reshape the European order. The Kremlin’s calculation was that, “if German attitudes 
could be shaped to be supportive of long-term Soviet objectives, then unification was 
worth the cost.”155 With 350,000 Soviet troops still stationed in East Germany, and with 
operations in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius and in Latvia in early 1991 against the 
independence movement, the German government feared uncertainty that further 
disintegration of the Soviet Union would lead to uncontrollable military and political 
events that would threatened the stability of Europe.156 
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Despite strong German support for Gorbachev to maintain the Soviet Union, the 
independence of the Baltic States and other non-Russian republics in 1990–1991, as well 
as the increasingly fierce battle between reformers and anti-reformers in the Soviet 
Union, led to the political emergence of Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the August 
1991 coup against Gorbachev, staged by Soviet conservative anti-reformers. Although 
Gorbachev survived the coup, he could not survive politically because the Soviet Union 
had disintegrated. Thus, Gorbachev resigned on December 25 and handed the Kremlin 
over to Russian President Yeltsin, and the Soviet Union ceased to exist.157  
Russia’s rebirth and the dissolution of the Soviet Union had a major impact on the 
European balance of power, especially its security. The United States accelerated its 
retreat from its former primacy in European security to the Middle East, with the onset of 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the months prior to Germany’s unity in the fall of 1990. 
West Germany’s tradition of multilateral approaches paid off during the reunification and 
Germany’s engagement in the multilateral system (UN, NATO, OSCE, and EU) 
remained in place after unification, which was already being challenged by the crises in 
the Middle East and then on the Balkans with the violent breakup of Yugoslavia.158 
Meanwhile “Germany’s habit of self-restraint, which over the years had been used to 
compensate for the lack of sovereignty, became no longer necessary,”159 and the political 
leadership and elite saw no reason for radical foreign policy change in the first eighteen 
months of unity and beyond because the objective after reunification was continuity. The 
fact that disunity and chaos would eventuate in Southeastern Europe and the Middle East 
could, at first, be ignored in Bonn because of this political culture of reticence. 
Geographically, the end of the Cold War put Germany in the center of a Europe that more 
or less came to peace in the 1990s, while politically it became a bridging state between 
East and West. Germany’s interests in the Russian transformation was immense, as by 
January 1992 and until 1994 still more than 100,000 (Soviet) Russian troops were 
stationed in Germany. The coup in 1991 against Gorbachev and in 1993 against Yeltsin 
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worried German politicians because the respected treaties between Germany and the 
Soviet Union/Russia had not been completely fulfilled (e.g., the withdrawal of all troops 
from Germany). Germany, in strong support of Mikhail Gorbachev, was initially unaware 
of Yeltsin but quickly decided to support him in economic and political terms because 
Kohl realized that good relations with Yeltsin were imperative for the transition in 
Russia.160 
A united Germany and the new Russian Federation had similar challenges ahead 
of them. Though economically and socially very different, the foreign policy challenges 
shared similarities. Both countries were new to Europe in 1990 and 1991, in terms of 
their borders of; both countries were preoccupied with domestic policy issues; and both 
countries needed to redefine their foreign policies. Thus, both countries faced 
uncertainties in their future roles while the global system advanced with new centers of 
gravity in the Middle East and Asia.161 While Russia had to redefine its relationship to its 
closest neighbors—the former Soviet republics—Germany faced expectations from its 
allies to engage more in the questions of security in Europe, especially in regards to the 
crisis in the former Yugoslavia, where, due to the dissolution of the Yugoslav state, 
ethnic tensions had led to civil war in 1991. Germany had to balance between its efforts 
to eliminate any doubts on its Westintegration and post-1990 Ostpolitik. The diplomatic 
revolution of 1989–1991, however, had returned the fate of Zwischeneuropa to the fore 
and made Central European nations look westward in hopes of statecraft, a fact that led to 
the need to adjust the Western European security structure in an unexpected manner. 
Central to this in the Kohl cabinet was a desire to reconcile with Warsaw, modeling on 
reconciliation with Paris from three decades before. A major objective of Germany’s 
foreign policy was to diffuse any Russian concerns regarding the NATO and EU 
enlargement, thus integrating the former Warsaw Pact and Central European states into 
the western alliance and at the same time rethinking the use of military force in the face 
of rising conflict in southern Europe and the Middle East.162 On the one hand, Germany 
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engaged in promoting democratic security development in Central and Eastern Europe, 
while on the other hand, Germany recognized that it needed to spend more resources to 
internally stabilize Russia.163 Because Germany had recognized its special responsibility 
towards Russia due to the Soviet support of reunification, Russian politicians perceived 
Germany to be a bridging state that “had more understanding for Russia’s problems than 
did any other Western country.”164 Therefore, it is no surprise that Germany, with its 
vital interest of stability in Central and Eastern Europe after its own unhappy career as a 
divided, front state, argued in 1993 for NATO enlargement. A policy was advanced by 
German Minister of Defence Volker Rühe, who called not only for rapprochement but 
also for integration of former Warsaw Pact states.165 Russia had continuously objected to 
any NATO enlargement process as early as 1994, when President Yeltsin warned about 
the possibility of a “Cold Peace” in its West relations.166 Despite these early objections, 
once the Alliance accepted the decision for enlargement in late 1995, the triumvirate of 
Bill Clinton, Helmut Kohl, and Boris Yeltsin adjudicated the enlargement of NATO 
through the year 1999 in a way that is belied by 2014 propaganda to the contrary. It was 
after the second round of enlargement in 2004 that, as argued in the Ukraine case, Russia 
opposed the NATO enlargement, provoking a crisis in Russia’s West relations.  
Although Russia was less concerned with new policies in Central and Eastern 
Europe, their concern was to avoid any economical or territorial threat to Russia that 
would evolve from NATO membership, thus excluding Moscow from future security 
structures and decision-making.167  
German politicians under the Kohl administration claimed continuity as the 
guideline for German foreign policy after reunification, and they engaged within their 
multilateral framework to develop a European pillar of defense to support the U.S. efforts 
to adapt NATO to its new challenges, and to promote closer relations between Russia and 
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Euro-Atlantic structures beyond the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE).168 Nonetheless, the speed of change in the international system 
exceeded the formation of consensus in a united Germany in the early and mid-1990s, 
where the process of political adaptation to insecurity was rightfully slow and 
methodical. A significant milestone had been the 1994 adjustment to the mission of the 
Bundeswehr to include collective security under Article 24 of the Basic Law versus the 
strict Central European focus of Article 87a of the mid 1950s, as ruled by the Federal 
Constitutional Court. While the first years were characterized by domestic discussions on 
Germany’s new role in Europe, a “modified continuity” in foreign policy could be 
observed. A change became apparent only after 1998, when a socialist-environmentalist 
government coalition between the SPD and the party Die Grünen took over the German 
chancellery. With the global crisis—Germany was particularly concerned about the 
situation in the Balkans—Germany’s constitutional court (the Bundesverfassungsgericht) 
permitted the deployment of the Bundeswehr in the UN-mandated framework of 
international organizations in 1994. Thus, in the perspective of many scholars, 
Germany’s foreign policy moved from “modified continuity” to a matured self-conscious 
power.169 Although the new Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer promoted continuity, 
chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, in 1998, stood for change and pledged German troops for 
combat operations against Serbia to demonstrate to Slobodan Milosevic that Germany 
would not allow a rift within NATO on that question.170 Fischer explained the decision to 
intervene with the imperative “Nie wieder Auschwitz” (never again Auschwitz), referring 
to Germany’s historic past and its ambiguous relation with military power in the face of 
seemingly unending atrocities in Bosnia and then in Kosvo.171 However, in 1998 at 
Ramboulliet, Russia strongly opposed any military operation against Serbia because they 
regarded the unmandated operations as unlawful acts of aggression. Ironically, the lack of 
an UN mandate was due to Russia’s veto.  
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The Russian decision to veto a United Nations Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) on Kosovo in 1998–1999 was a disappointment for the West because, despite 
Russia’s internal situation, the external relations with the West had improved after the 
NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997 and participation of Russian troops in NATO-led 
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the 
idealistic perception of Russia coming closer to the European security architecture, which 
Germany promoted and favored, did not lead to Russia “link[ing] its fate to the 
institutional structure of the liberal democratic West.” Instead, such was compromised, 
and in 1999 it nearly led to a military confrontation at the Pristina International Airport in 
Kosovo between Russian paratroopers and NATO soldiers in which U.S. General Wesley 
Clark nearly precipitated a military confrontation.172 With Boris Yeltsin’s decline and the 
rise of Russian nationalists, such as Victor Zhirinovsky, who dominated the middle to 
late 1990s and gave the West and the Germans reason to worry about Russia’s future, 
western criticism of Russia on the Second Chechnyan War and the political division 
between Russia and the West over NATO’s Kosovo campaign complicated Russian-West 
and especially German-Russian relations decisively. The Russian opposition marked a 
partial resurgence of Russia after its weak performance in the wake of the Soviet Union’s 
disintegration, and subsequently its transformation from a communist system to a super-
presidential system, supposedly leading to a democracy.173 Yet, in the midst of NATO’s 
Kosovo operation, the alliance enlarged to include Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, 
and though the Russians may have disliked the event, they did nothing in any concrete 
way to stop such action, just as they did nothing concretely to oppose the NATO 
campaign in Kosovo against the dead-end Milosevic regime.  
Vladimir Putin’s rise and his successor Boris Yeltsin were widely welcomed by 
the Western world with the hope that a new leader in Russia would bring positive change, 
especially because “Russia looked dangerously close to becoming a failed state, . . . 
whose dangerous unpredictability rendered it a menace against which the West needed to 
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guard itself.”174 The new Russian president emerged from the conservative circles of the 
security-military-intelligence community, as a former foreign intelligence officer with a 
strong German expertise, and thus expectations were high for a changing Russia, which 
in 2000 was chaotic and collapsing.175 Putin centralized the state and reorganized the 
economy on a neo-mercantilist, post-communist order of state capitalism and was 
committed to the “normalization of Russia and its foreign policy as just another ‘normal 
great power.’”176 Therefore, Putin engaged with Germany and found in Chancellor 
Schroeder and his pragmatic approach to foreign policy a strategic partner, 
acknowledging the point that Russia needed partners in the West, while Schroeder was 
convinced that security and economic well-being in Europe could be achieved only 
through a strategic partnership with Russia.177 As the course of European unity advanced 
along with the rigors of globalization, along with the need to modernize the social market 
economy in trains, Germany’s economy became increasingly dependent on exports. It 
was no surprise, then, that Chancellor Schroeder turned to Russia, especially regarding 
energy security and commerce. Schroeder and Putin developed a pragmatic and friendly 
relationship, which characterized the foreign policy between the two countries. In the 
process of this bilateral relation, old east-west structures in a new personalized form 
reasserted themselves in the political economy of German-Russian trade. While the 
German economy’s Ostausschuss (the committee on Eastern European Economic 
Relations) lobbied for enhanced German-Russian relations, the two presidents created the 
Petersberger Dialogue in 2001 in order to promote a strategic partnership for economical 
and political cooperation beyond regular government relations and to draw Russia closer 
to Europe.178 German-Russian relations developed well, especially in the energy sector, 
with Germany becoming a major partner in energy trade. By concluding a German-
Russian pipeline deal in 2005, Schroeder permitted Europe’s increased dependency of 
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Russian gas and oil delivery, and by 2008 Germany was importing 36 percent of its gas 
and 32 percent of its oil from Russia; overall exports to Russia summed up to $36 
billion.179  
With Germany having become Russia’s largest trade partner, Schroeder tightened 
the German-Russian relations and refrained from criticizing Russia too harshly in public 
For example, he refrained from criticizing Russia’s concerning lack of democratic 
developments and Putin’s increasingly authoritarian presidency, even calling him a 
“flawless democrat.”180 In regards to foreign policy, Germany became more mature and 
self-conscious under Schroeder, compared to the first half of the 1990s. Germany started 
going the “German way” in terms of national interests in the midst of a changing world 
and European order, whereby the national effort at unity promised great payoffs in 
globalization and a new continental orientation. When Chancellor Schroeder declared the 
“German Way” in the context of the decision not to participate in the Iraqi invasion of 
2002–2003, this policy was a continuation of saying no to the old “out of area” dictum 
from 1955 onward. Nevertheless, such policy was put in hands with a populist, anti-
American election campaign especially aimed at the electorate in the five new federal 
states. Schroeder made common cause with the French and Russians in an open conflict 
with the United States, which considered the Iraq invasion a matter of national interest 
closely connected to the September 11 terror attack on the United States.181 The putative 
alliance between France, Germany, and Russia raised concerns among Schroeder’s 
critics, not only regarding the specific issue of invading Iraq, but also regarding future 
aspects of reliability as an ally, especially after Schroeder had pledged Germany’s 
unlimited solidarity in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington 
in 2001 and had supported not only the NATO decision to activate Article 5, but also the 
combat operations against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan with a limited German 
military engagement in the counter-terror campaign there.182 
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While Germany’s foreign policy towards Russia under Gerhard Schroeder had, at 
the cost of Atlanticism, become increasingly focused on the economy, the new German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel promised in 2005, after taking office in the Bundeskanzleramt 
(the office of the Chancellery) to refocus on value-based foreign policy, to distance 
herself from Moscow, and to repair the damaged ties with Washington, DC. However, 
Merkel did not revert from the export-oriented policy demanded by globalization and the 
prospect of Eurasian markets. Based on her origin in East Germany, she not only spoke 
Russian, but also reflected on the past experiences with the Soviets in East Germany. She 
was not a member of the Jungsozialisten (the young socialists) nor a veteran of the 
politics of the FRG in the 1960s and 1970s, with its anti-American stripe, as had been 
central to Schroeder’s statecraft in power. Merkel emerged from the Lutheran 
Bildungsbuergertum as a professor of physics in the GDR, the social class well 
positioned for power in 1990. Thus, she was neither idealistic nor naïve regarding Russia, 
as her predecessors had been.183 Nevertheless, Chancellor Merkel addressed such 
contentious topics as human rights abuses, but as with the case of the 2008 Georgian 
War, she acted rather in a reserved way to maintain a close dialogue with Russia, while at 
the same time addressing topics that the public expected her to address regarding Russia; 
however, the tone from Germany’s Chancellery and Foreign Office remained widely non-
committal.184  
The 2008 Georgian War came as a surprise to the West and has assumed special 
importance when seen from the perspective of 2014 and Crimea. Georgia had been a 
possible candidate for NATO membership, and although Germany and France opposed 
such accession, some progress could be observed in the transition of Georgia’s security 
structure, especially through participation in NATO-led operations, such as the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, where the Georgians had 
been as heavily committed as they had been in Iraq. Initially, Russia was criticized for the 
outbreak of war against Georgia, and relations between the West, NATO, and Russia 
                                                 
183Kundnani, Paradox of German Power, 80–81; Schöllgen, Deutsche Außenpolitik: Von 1945, 296. 
184Stephen F. Szabo, Germany, Russia and the Rise of Geo-Economics (London; New York: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), 28; Schöllgen, Deutsche Außenpolitik: Von 1945, 297. 
 53 
were suspended. An independent commission came to the conclusion that Russia’s 
account of the origins of the outbreak of war were true, and relations then recommenced, 
notably due to German behind-the-scenes political promotion.185 Additionally, the 
Caucasus was somehow far away and loom less central to the theme of European 
security, and the Georgian war slipped into forgetfulness soon after it happened.  
Wegren judged that President Putin, after his first two terms in office from 2000 
to 2008, was not a “risk taker or a president prone to reckless action”186 but was 
responsible for the concentration of power, for the rise of the siloviki (the men of the 
security branches, the intelligence services, and the military), which Putin recruited for 
the presidential administration, and for the resurgence of nationalist symbolism in favor 
of Russia’s interests.187 Moreover, in 2007–2008, the West endured a huge setback to its 
post-1989 forward momentum in its relations with Russia and the world economic crisis. 
In addition, the West had the perception of an increasingly aggressive Russia under Putin 
at the end of his first two terms, promoting exclusive interests at any cost to the West, in 
regards to blocking Kosovo’s independence, NATO’s plans for a missile defense system 
in Europe, or the invasion of Georgia, and usage of energy deliveries as instruments of 
threat; therefore, Dimitri Medvedev was seen as relief for a hopeful West when he 
became president in May 2008. The new Russian president aimed at modernizing the 
economy, countering corruption, and acquiring investments and technology from the 
West.188  
In Germany, the presidential–prime-ministerial castling, as Putin became prime 
minister in 2008, resulted in a “Medvedev Effect,” with the German public perception of 
Russia improving, which was supported by the US-Russian relations “reset” initiated by 
the new U.S. President Barack Obama in 2009, an event that was seen with much hope in 
Germany, whose citizens were at that time tired of the Bush administration and the Iraq 
disaster. In 2008, the Allensbach Institute found out that Germans were highly skeptical 
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about the Russians because “only a quarter of Germans liked the Russians while 35 
percent did not and 40 percent were undecided.”189 This image of Russians improved 
under Medvedev, who had a much better personal relationship with the German 
chancellor. However, Medvedev was only the crown prince for Vladimir Putin, as the 
West, and especially Merkel, had to learn in 2012. Merkel assumed power amid an 
erosion of democratic civil culture in Russia, after Germany had hoped to work 
furthermore with Dimitry Medvedev rather than return to a Putin-Merkel relationship in 
German-Russian relations.190 After facing a major financial and economic crisis that 
Medvedev handled, Putin promised a recovery of the Russian economy in 2012, when he 
retook the Office of the Russian President for his third term. The allegedly rigged 
presidential elections of 2012 resulted not only in a loss of Russian credibility in the 
Western world, but also in a significant reduction of substantive support, which isolated 
Putin’s regime more and more because it was also unable to rely on the emerging social 
classes in Russia: entrepreneurs, intelligentsia, and service workers.191 Thus, even more 
so than during his first two terms, Putin relied on the cadres of siloviki and the power-
oriented bureaucracy and security apparatus of government administration, which, to the 
shock and dismay of observers in the West, began to manifest more of the old bad habits.  
With Putin’s return, critics in the West, who were dismayed by the drift to 
authoritarianism in Russia, increasingly questioned the special relationship that Russia 
and Germany had enjoyed. Running counter to the “modern Germany’s strongly 
antiauthoritarian political culture,”192 the value and legitimacy of the German-Russian 
relations were challenged, even by the chancellor. The first signs of opposition in Russia 
were visible in 2012, when large demonstrations took place in the streets of Moscow 
against Putin and his allies. These demonstrations were more or less based on the model 
of the orange revolution that had brought change to Ukraine some years earlier, but even 
though it was considered the first time that the Russians had protested against Putin as 
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their leader, the opposition movement died down and became, due to increasingly strict 
regulations, non-relevant.193 Currently, the Russian president enjoys an approval rating 
of 86 percent, as shown in recent polls. In this context and with regards to the stagnation 
or reversal of democratic development in Russia, German Foreign Minister Guido 
Westerwelle argued in 2013, with regards to German-Russian relations and Ostpolitik, 
that despite commonalities, “there are also differences and many observers currently 
believe that what divides us [Germany and Russia] is growing at a faster pace than what 
we have in common. We are concerned about the treatment of political opponents and 
civil society. . . . We aren’t ignoring these concerns and differences.”194 These clear 
words resemble a change in tone to prior statements, as Germany has to balance 
constantly between the West and the East, between values and interests, according to 
Germany’s fate as a bridging state with a matured foreign policy based on its deep 
integration into the West—Westbindung and Ostpolitik revived.  
German-Russian relations are manifold on all levels of society and government. 
Germany and Russia’s common history affects the way in which the people are perceived 
and how politicians make decisions. In the context of German-Russian relations, certain 
key events are important to note, beginning with the fact that Soviet sacrifices made in 
two world wars continued to affect the Soviets until 1990 Russia today, which 
commemorates the seventieth anniversary of Soviet victory.195 The Cold War with 
Germany’s Ostpolitik and the German reunification are also key events, while parallel 
developments concerning Germany’s new beginning and the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union—and its domestic perception in Russia as defeat—is especially imperative to note. 
In this context, with regards to the Soviet short-term conditions of Germany’s 
reunification, Laird argues that “the Soviet leadership hoped to put in motion a long-term 
trend—the emergence of Germany as a lobby within Europe for the Soviet Union.”196 
Wettig points out that, during the Cold War, “the Soviet leaders have always found an 
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understanding partner in the West German Government . . . [and] Bonn has never ceased, 
even when it did not particularly suit the Soviet policy makers, in its endeavors to pave 
the way for the widest possible political dialogue between the countries of the West and 
those of the East,”197 a leitmotif even after reunification. Thus, Germany was in a more 
prominent position in regards to Russia, and enjoying a special relationship. 
German-Russian relations, however, have always been ambiguous and wavelike, 
misinterpreted often, but restrained by the fact that Germany and Russia are both part of 
continental Europe. It should not be underestimated that “intimacy, however, may breed 
not only on friendship, but also contempt or open hostility. Russia has had friends and 
partisans in Germany, but also bitter enemies,”198 or, as Szabo puts it, “proximity 
remains both a problem and an opportunity.”199  
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III. GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 
Since Germany’s reunification in 1990 and the end of the Cold War, the global 
security environment has changed dramatically, and with it has transformed the theory 
and practice of international relations. With technological advances and the widespread 
effects of globalization (that is, the process of increased global, transnational and 
transcultural communication, and commerce in all realms affecting people’s daily life), 
the execution of foreign policy has become much more complicated.200 Since 1989, the 
international system of states has shifted profoundly and today is prone, once again, to 
the constant shifting of national power and influence, which has lately (2014) been more 
than evident. These shifts determine the position of a nation state within the global 
system or its ability to assert its interests and sovereignty.  
Foreign policy execution is the nation state’s instrument to ensure its vital 
interests and values—survival, security and prosperity—in the constant competition with 
other nation states that has been going on since 1648, if not before. For Germany, this 
instrument underwent a diplomatic revolution after reunification in 1990. The reunited 
Germans had to learn to carry the burden of sovereignty, which comes along with 
enlarged responsibilities and growing expectations by allies and partners to do more 
while at the same time remaining within the boundaries of Germany’s painful memory of 
the epoch of defeat in total war and the aftereffects on political culture. Germany’s 
leading role and ability to shape international politics in Europe and beyond has 
developed during more than two decades after reunification. Germany has slowly 
regained power, economically as well as politically, partially by its deploying military 
force in a multilateral framework amid the turmoil that began in the early 1990s. The 
government in Berlin can now voice as well as strive for its national interests in a 
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globalized world, an upshot that signifies a normalization of foreign politics for a 
sovereign nation. However, with its geographical position in Central Europe, its defeat in 
two world wars, its national division during the Cold War, its post-heroic society and 
declared “normality”201 foreign policy decision-making in Berlin is complex and not 
often fully understood in Germany or among its partners.  
Too many today forget Germany’s geopolitical situation of being a nation in 
between, a fact that has historically contributed to Germany’s special path to nationhood. 
This path has and has not diverged from that of Germany’s western neighbors, who 
became national enemies, with tragic results, including repeated attempts by Germany to 
dominate Europe by force of arms, attempts which ended in horrible failure. National 
division was the result, in which the two German states had to manage the Cold War 
system of states to their respective interests amid the ebb and flow of the US-Soviet 
confrontation, as mentioned in Chapter II. German foreign policy since unification is 
deeply conscious of these facts, which are too easily forgotten in the confusion of the 
twenty-first century, where historical memory is either too short or simply non-existent.  
With the US’s pivot to Asia’s and Germany’s growing role in European politics in 
the wake of the 2008 world economic crisis, and with the forward march of globalization, 
one must understand the process of how Germany’s foreign policy became a reality, of 
the essential stakeholders, and of the domestic influences that shaped Germany’s policy, 
as directed by the Bundeskanzleramt and the Federal Foreign Office. Only with these 
essentials can one understand Germany’s relationship with Russia. Besides governmental 
stakeholders, foreign policy is influenced by public opinion with regards to domestic 
decisions, as well as by such special interest groups as the Ostausschuss der Deutschen 
Wirtschaft (the Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations), which strongly 
promotes German-Russian relations and opposes the sanction regime introduced in 2014 
after the Crimean annexation. Nevertheless, even the Ostausschuss had to acknowledge 
that German-Russian relations have undergone a negative trend, with 56 percent of all 
responding businesses in Germany predicting a negative development in Russia in a 
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recent opinion poll, as happened in 2013 when the German-Russian business climate 
index had fallen comparative to 2012.202 This fact severely undermines a core pillar of 
German-Russian relations and has an impact on Germany’s Russia policy. 
German foreign policy must be understood in the historical realms of the nation’s 
past, as well as in the context of its profound European interdependence, of which 
Chapter II provides a basic overview with focus on Germany and Russia. While a purely 
theoretical explanation based on the body of international relations theory does not 
sufficiently explain German foreign policy formation—the structures, dominant 
stakeholders, motives, procedures, and influences—a theoretical approach on terms and 
ideas of foreign policy is inevitable. This chapter initially provides a brief theoretical 
background on foreign policy formation, its stakeholders and powers, interests, and 
identity in the framework of international relations in order to understand foreign policy. 
These theoretical essentials elaborate on governmental decision-making in German 
foreign policy while explicitly addressing such main actors as the Bundeskanzleramt, the 
Auswaertiges Amt (Federal Foreign Office) and the Bundestag (parliament) before 
outlining the parameters of contemporary German foreign policy and an analysis of 
Germany’s Russia policy. The chapter closes with a discussion of the role of civil society 
in foreign policy and includes non-governmental stakeholders, such as media and think 
tanks in Germany, as well as German-Russian interest groups, such as the Ostausschuss 
of the German economy. 
A. UNDERSTANDING FOREIGN POLICY 
Foreign policy, as part of international relations or world politics, has been 
extensively researched and theoretically founded for more than a century, if not longer. A 
theory’s objective is to explain and simplify reality in order to understand the processes, 
be able to contribute an answer to contemporary questions, and provide solutions; 
however, as Waltz emphasizes in the remits of international politics, “a theory . . . always 
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remains distinct from that world [reality].”203 Three main perspectives prevail in theories 
of international relations—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—while the realist 
paradigm has had the most influence amongst scholars and their approach to world 
politics so far.204 Notwithstanding that other, especially constructivist, approaches have 
gained explanatory significance since the end of the Cold War with the furthering 
democracy and multilateral institutions, this section does not go into detail on the 
differentiation of theories of international relations; rather, it aims to provide a theoretical 
background on foreign policy formation in general. Acknowledging the fact that foreign 
policy formation does not take place in a vacuum leads to the assumption that, if the 
respective international relations environment changes, then so does the policy formation 
and, accordingly, its explanatory theory. German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier summarized the situation during his newest term in office in 2013: “My office 
is the same, but the world is not. . . . . Crises have moved closer to European borders.”205 
In regards to Europe’s current state of affairs in the years 2014–2015, a return to realist 
approaches, where the struggle for power and survival is central, is likely to resurface in 
the face of a Russian threat to Europe’s eastern border and the post-1989 European order 
of states.  
1. Essentials on Foreign Policy 
Foreign policy is generally understood as the entirety of state activity undertaken 
to realize the state’s interests concerning its power, economy, culture, and above all 
security vis-à-vis its international partners and neighbors. Consequently, political 
scientist Helga Haftendorn, a leading scholar of West German foreign policy during the 
Cold War, defined foreign policy “as a process of interaction in which the states try to 
realize their goals and interests in competition with other states.”206 Jaeger and 
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Beckmann added the organizational aspect by defining foreign policy as the 
implementation with regards to contents and organizational regulation of the relations of 
a state-centered society to its environment.207 Henry Kissinger offered a more traditional 
and simple approach, assuming that if a domestic system and its policy is stable, then 
“foreign policy begins where domestic policy ends,”208 a corollary to Moltke’s idea as to 
the relationship of war to politics. Kissinger’s distinction also implies that domestic goals 
and international goals are separate, which was true for past centuries, but today, due to 
increased globalization and its transnational relevance, the distinction between foreign 
policy goals and domestic policy goals is rapidly disappearing.209 While trans-
nationalization reaches back as far as the Westphalian system of 1648 and the five great 
powers that became heirs to this new order in the wake of wars of religion, the effects of 
globalization are unprecedented in their sweep and breadth (e.g., significant technological 
progress). There has also been a significant change in the face of war and the nature of 
weapons, which poses a challenge for German foreign policy in keeping the 
technological standard of its military capabilities, which have suffered from decades of 
under-investment in the peace dividend from 1989.210  
The two main factors that determine foreign policy are the internal and external 
factors that affect foreign policy formation. While internal factors are societal 
preconditions, preferences, or specific decisions made in connection with domestic issues 
within the country, external factors are the stimuli that foreign nation’s actions generate 
on the system.211 The dynamic linkage between the external and the internal factors 
require decision-makers to engage continuously in two-sided considerations when 
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making foreign policy decisions, probably leading to foreign policy change in the 
respective country.  
While change or adaption is a constant character of governmental foreign policy, 
it is necessary to understand the extent to which foreign policy change is undertaken, as 
one nation’s change in foreign policy will always have consequences for other countries, 
forcing them to adapt or change their foreign policy. In this regard, Hermann defines four 
levels of change in foreign policy for theoretical classification: (1) adjustment change, 
which adjusts the level of effort or widens the scope of recipients while retaining 
procedures and objectives; (2) program change, which affects the methods and 
instruments; thus, procedures change while retaining objectives; (3) problem/goal 
change, which changes the overall objective and replaces it; and (4) international-
orientation change, which changes the entirety of a nation’s foreign policy approach.212 
The factors that determine and influence a foreign policy change are multidimensional. 
Although the degree of institutionalization and the support of actors affect change, the 
domestic significance of an issue also influences the likelihood of foreign policy change. 
Hermann explicitly stated that “restructuring or transforming the economic system also 
can be a source of foreign policy change.”213 Based on the definition of foreign policy, 
Hermann proposes a seven-stage decision process a government goes through to change 
its foreign policy214: 
1. Initial policy expectations 
2. External actor/ environmental stimuli 
3. Recognition of discrepant information 
4. Postulation of a connection between problem and policy 
5. Development of alternatives 
6. Authoritative consensus for choice 
7. Implementation of new policy 
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2. Stakeholders of Foreign Policy 
In the international system, the units (states) interact with one another without a 
higher authority because “the prominent characteristic of international politics . . . seems 
to be the lack of order and of organization,”215 which Waltz describes as anarchy. This 
idea implies that the states also define the order of international politics through their 
interactions. Although the international system constitutes the environment in which 
foreign policy takes place, it is the different actors that execute foreign policy. In Waltz’s 
realist approach, nation states are units on the same level because, even though each 
sovereign state varies widely in size, power, capabilities, wealth, and form, they all face 
the same tasks, though they may not have identical abilities to execute them.216  
Gareis concludes that, despite the rise of non-governmental organizations in 
international politics or intergovernmental organizations such as the European Union, the 
nation state remains the dominant actor in the international system.217 Based on the 
Westphalian system in the epoch from 1648 until 1815, a European rational-bureaucratic 
state developed and, confined to its territory, became the authorized actor on the 
international stage, actions described as Staatskunst (statecraft) to assure and safeguard 
power and territorial integrity through diplomacy, alliances, or military actions.218 In the 
classical sense of the era from approximately 1740 until the 1880s, the term state 
encompassed, in addition to government, society, which was politically diverse according 
to the prevailing regime, and the national territory. In most democratic systems, 
Staatskunst is performed by what was formerly a small circle of government officials and 
cabinets by the political leadership, as outlined in the constitution.219 Within the 
government, it is predominantly the executive branch that determines foreign policy and 
is responsible for it, while, in former times, parliaments usually did not have any 
substantial influence in shaping foreign policy besides their parliamentary control rights 
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and the power of the purse. This fact especially applied to Germany in prior to 1945 
when the strength of the legislative versus the executive was either non-existent or very 
weak indeed (e.g., during the first German Republic).  
Among the broad spectrum of structures in executive branches, the power to 
shape and decide foreign policy resides with but a few power centers within the executive 
branch.220 Personalizing the power centers, foreign policy is formed, decided, and 
executed by the head of state and government—in Germany, the Bundeskanzlerin,as well 
as the minister of foreign affairs and the minister of defense,—supplemented by such 
additional ministries as economics or development and trade, as well as small advisory 
circles.221 Thus, the governmental top-level executives act on behalf of the nation state 
and represent the state as an actor in international politics.222 With the systemic relevance 
of governmental top-level executives in foreign policy, the personal attitudes and 
characteristics of decision-makers are of importance. However, the actual level of power 
differs depending on the established political system with restraints in a democracy, such 
as coalition agreements or separation of powers with checks and balances, compared to 
an authoritarian, dictatorial system, where a small circle of decision-makers could enjoy 
nearly unlimited power.  
In the contemporary international system, states are not the only actors, although 
they remain the dominant players. Contributing to and participating in international 
relations are also such international governmental organizations as the UN or regionally 
defined EU, OSCE or NATO and their subunits, as well as such non-governmental 
organizations as the International Committee of the Red Cross or Doctors without 
Borders. In addition, private actors, such as large transnational corporations (e.g., Google, 
Gazprom), or even private persons like the co-founder of Microsoft, Bill Gates, or 
terrorist groups and groups of organized crime, are increasingly exerting influence at the 
international level.223 These international relations, or external relations, are formally 
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separate to foreign policy but could be part of it, ideally the aim at achieving the same 
objectives as the governmental executive branch.224 
3. Power, Interests, and Identity 
In the disorder of the international system, states aspire towards hegemony to be 
able to pursue their interests and dictate their norms and values for the international 
system, which is possible only if the state is powerful enough to prevail.225 However, any 
power projection automatically leads to countervailing power because states are in a 
constant struggle. In order to survive in a realist understanding and to safeguard against 
any external aggression, power—often expressed as military, economic, financial, 
cultural, or technological power—is the relevant factor.226 Max Weber defined power as 
taking advantage of every chance to get one’s way in a social relation, even against 
resistance.227 According to Weber’s perspective, states are in constant relation to each 
other; thus, power is expressed in the ability of one state to persuade another state to act 
in such a way that the state would not have acted otherwise. Consequently, in the 
anarchic system of international relations, power is the ability to assert the state’s 
objectives and interests against competing interests to the benefit of the state.228  
The father of modern U.S. realism theory, Hans Morgenthau, argues a realist 
perspective such that each state seeks maximum power according to his concept of 
interest defined in terms of power; however, adjacent theories usually define more than 
one interest.229 If foreign policy is generally understood as the entirety of state activity 
undertaken to realize the state’s interests, then a state needs to define its interests, or at 
least its guiding principles, such as values and norms. Therefore, Wilhelm concluded that 
perception and implementation of the state’s own interests vis-á-vis its environment, 
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becomes the main subject for foreign policy relations; hence, the actors will behave 
purposively.230 National interest can also be influenced by ideology or history, as 
evidenced by the Federal German case with regards to Westbindung from 1949 onwards, 
or by Russia’s national interests with regards to retaining an alleged superpower status in 
the present and recent past despite the collapse of the USSR in 1991. In this context, 
foreign policy is the manifestation of the state’s means-ends relation in order to pursue 
the objectives as defined in interests. 
The national identity of a state plays an important role in foreign policy because it 
defines the self-perception of a nation state and thus influences foreign policy formation 
and its underlying interests. National identity can force national interests and foreign 
policies to change when the national identity and proclaimed foreign policy interests 
collide. Bloom argues that if the population generally identifies with the nation, as should 
be the case in a contemporary democratic nation state, then a tendency amongst citizens 
evolves to defend or to enhance the shared national identity, which means that “the mass 
national public will mobilize when it perceives either that national identity is threatened, 
or that there is the opportunity of enhancing national identity.”231 This implies, according 
to Bloom, that “the state, in terms of its foreign policy decisions, may trigger, manipulate, 
appropriate—or be manipulated by—the national identity dynamic.”232 
B. GOVERNMENTAL DECISION-MAKING IN GERMAN FOREIGN 
POLICY 
Germany’s international political position—its national and international 
parameters of foreign policy and conditions, as well as the expectations to act—have 
changed significantly overnight, when, on October 3, 1990, Germany reunited and 
became a sovereign nation, free of formal occupational oversight by the victors of World 
War II. Yet the institutions of national policy remained essentially the same, as these had 
been crafted in the years 1948–1949 in the rubble of defeat and attained their strength in 
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the decades from 1949 until 1989. With the end of the Cold War, not only Germany’s 
position has changed but also the situation of the European continent and the world order 
in turn. During the Cold War, Federal Germany’s foreign policy was determined by the 
perception of the constant military threat in the East—beyond the “Iron Curtain”—while 
the objectives of Germany’s foreign policy were the peaceful resolution of national 
division, the prevention of nuclear war, the perseverance of territorial integrity, and the 
perpetuation of hard-won political independence while firmly embedded in the Euro-
Atlantic West.233 To ensure these objectives and at the same time reassure its partners, 
Federal Germany engaged in multilateral institutional approaches, such as within NATO 
and its integrated military command structures or the European Union. The defeat in two 
world wars, the weak Republic of 1919–1933, and national division had long-defined 
Germany’s semi-sovereignty until reunification in 1990. For a very long time, these 
conditions set the distinctive characteristics of German foreign policy, which led West 
Germany to adopt a foreign policy role for what became later known as a civilian power 
“committed to deepening European and transatlantic integration, enhancing cooperative 
and multilateral conflict resolution, and resorting to force only as a last resort—and 
strictly within the framework of the United Nations.”234 Such an idea, made popular after 
1990, and especially after 2001, could mark a special German path distinction from the 
British and French, to say nothing of Americans and the Russians, all of whom were less 
reluctant to use military power in their national interests. The integration into a 
sovereignty that limited the regimes of multilateral approaches was for West Germany, 
and then for a united Germany, the modus operandi for its foreign policy during the Cold 
War. The best means of overcoming the legacy of defeat was the path not really taken by 
German statesmen either before 1914 (Schaukelpolitik) or aside from Locarno in 1925, 
that is, a firm grounding of Germany in collective security and collective defense as these 
institutions emerged through the 1960s within the international system of the Cold War.  
Moreover, multilateralism became the core idea of German Foreign Policy, which 
Gareis defines as a pattern of action in which the actors assure one another to orientate 
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their foreign policy behavior according to common norms and regulations, and to do so 
even if that meant following regulations and norms not in-line with their objectives and 
interests.235 With respect to Germany’s apparently weak power in May 1949 and with the 
foundation of the FRG, a multilateral approach was the most promising way to regain 
international acceptance and influence, but also to show the world that West Germany 
could be trusted again.236 This policy assured the survival of the new FRG in the blast of 
the Cold War; united the French and West Germans via the Saar, Ruhr, and Lorraine 
industrial regions; laid the foundation for a common market; and secured the role of the 
U.S. as a balancer to the UK and France, who otherwise might drift away from Central 
Europe. The policy also assured prosperity, which, with the security of NATO, allowed 
West German democracy to consolidate in a way that had not been possible in the 1920s. 
Germany’s multilateralism became manifested in the country’s foreign policy maxim 
“‘Never alone’ and ‘never again’”237 This leitmotif had been broadly embedded in the 
German public during the Cold War, and is still valid, even twenty-five years after 
reunification.  
Eberwein und Kaiser argue that a successful “foreign policy must be based on a 
broad public consensus . . . as many [foreign policy] decisions today have repercussions 
for both foreign and domestic policy.”238 Among united German society and its 
governmental elites, a strong reservation against the assumption of new tasks and 
responsibilities in the area of foreign and security policy manifested itself, based on 
experience with Germany’s unilateral approaches in the twentieth century. Thus, the 
critical public thoroughly scrutinizes every foreign policy decision in Germany, 
especially in the remits of usage of military force, in politics, population, and media 
along the lines of Germany’s foreign policy culture.239 This phenomenon was present at 
the creation of the Bundeswehr with the decade-long fight in domestic politics over what 
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was called “rearmament,” but the argument was really about the foundation of an army in 
a democracy integrated into an alliance. Foreign policy culture can be understood as the 
“‘totality of the historically grown, (foreign) politically important, and over time 
relatively stable attitudes and modes of behavior of society’ vis-á-vis foreign policy.”240 
The foreign policy culture in post–World War II Germany has been shaped “by the 
experiences of National Socialism, war, and defeat,”241 and consolidated itself in the 
concept of “civilian power” among the political elites and broader population. At the 
same time, the FRG built up its military forces and discussed the use of nuclear weapons 
as part of NATO’s Strategic Concept MC 14/3 during the Cold War from 1968 on—
hardly the instruments of a civilian power. However, the political culture the concept of 
civilian power (peaceful conflict resolution and cooperation), and its subsequent foreign 
policy identity of multilateral engagement is still valid today. Maull and Risse, among 
others, argue that after reunification in 1990, Germany’s foreign policy followed a path 
of continuity, and relevant changes happened slowly and in small steps with the 
employment of instruments, such as the Bundeswehr, while the overall concept of civilian 
power remained in place and is the basis of Germany’s strategic culture when seen in 
contrast to other great powers, especially since 2001.242  
In light of the growing complexity of foreign policy formation in the last decade 
(with the growing intensity of crises), an overall coherent and transparent guiding 
strategy defining national interests and foreign policy values is still missing in Germany. 
One looks in vain for an account of the policies and instruments required for the coherent 
implementation that is rooted in accepted societal and political preferences. The soon-to-
be revised Weißbuch (White Book) on security policy and the future of the Bundeswehr 
from the year 2006, is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense, with the participation 
of the other governmental resorts. Along with Germany’s partners, society and academic 
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circles explain the role of the Bundeswehr, its raison d’etre, and its capabilities.243 In 
contrast with somewhat similar documents in the UK or the United States, this work is 
especially significant, even if it receives far less attention than it deserves. Germany’s 
foreign policy is rooted in these decentralized and federal structures of the political 
system, including its society. Thus, knowledge about the role of the main foreign policy 
actors of the federal German government helps one understand the formation of German 
foreign policy and its limits. Such knowledge, however, is often suffocated in partisan 
political debates, and extreme political positions arise from the unhappy legacy of the age 
of total war and especially its effects on domestic politics.  
1. Role of the Bundeskanzleramt and Ministerial Authority 
The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (the Grundgesetz) as the 
constitution, provides the federal government, in Article 32, with the primacy of foreign 
policy, stating, “Relations with foreign states shall be conducted by the Federation.”244 In 
addition, in Article 73, the Basic Law foresees exclusive legislative power for the 
federation in matters of foreign affairs, thus giving the federal government the main 
responsibility for the formation and execution of German foreign policy.245 Among the 
different ministries and agencies on the federal level, the traditional institutions of foreign 
policy in Germany—the Federal Chancellery, the Federal Foreign Office, and the Federal 
Ministry of Defense—are the main actors. Their interactions and the formation of policy 
are guided by several principles. First, the principle of chancellor authority, which, 
according to Article 65 of the Basic Law, gives the Chancellor the power to “determine 
and be responsible for the general guidelines of policy,”246 and thus enables the dominant 
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position of the chancellor in the federal government. The dominant role of the Chancellor 
is supplemented with the principle of ministerial authority, which explains that “each 
Federal Minister shall conduct the affairs of his department independently and on his own 
responsibility. The Federal Government shall resolve differences of opinion between 
Federal Ministers.”247 A strong position in governmental decision-making is held by the 
cabinet, which is composed of the chancellor and the federal ministers and which is 
responsible for all relevant matters of foreign and domestic policy, and among whom 
contentious issues are discussed, which is understood as the principle duty of cabinet 
authority. It is worth mentioning that most of the decisions are not being prepared in the 
collegial body of the cabinet but in consultative political sub-bodies of the cabinet, where 
only those who have an interest in the topic are involved.248 The practice of these 
principles, based on the Basic Law, gives the executive branch a strong position, which 
has been confirmed by the Federal Constitutional Court multiple times.249 With two 
exceptions in 1960 and in 1982, Germany has always had coalition governments of the 
leading parties from left center, to center, to right center since the first Adenauer cabinet 
from September 20, 1949, until present. This fact affects the decision-making process 
within the federal government significantly. The coalition principle affects all other 
principles like an overarching superstructure, as federal governmental policy decisions 
need to take into account the diverging interests and positions of more than one political 
party.  
The Bundeskanzleramt (federal chancellery) supports the chancellor in 
performing constitutional duties while acting as head of the federal government and is 
thus an import steering and coordinating body interlining the implementation of the 
principles of chancellor, ministerial, and cabinet authority. In the first years of the FRG, 
all power was concentrated in this office, and slowly, in the 1950s, the FRG regained the 
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tools of statecraft and the personnel to go with such policy. The chancellery needs to have 
oversight and expertise knowledge of all relevant ministerial and governmental plans and 
actions in order to educate the chancellor at any given time and ensure a coherent and 
unified position of the German government. Therefore, the Bundeskanzleramt’s 
departmental structure is a mirror of the various federal ministries—as is the case in the 
other leading western democracies—enabling the Bundeskanzleramt to be “geared to co-
ordinating issues falling within the area of more than one ministry.”250 Within the 
departmental structure, the 2nd directorate-general has the responsibility to prepare and 
coordinate all matters regarding foreign policy, which includes defense and security 
policy. The directorate-general is manned mainly by experts, diplomats, and officers from 
the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defense, while the head of the 2nd directorate-
general—usually a senior diplomat from the Foreign Office— is the chancellor’s foreign 
policy advisor.251 The Bundesssicherheitsrat (Federal Security Council) is located within 
the 2nd directorate-general, also one of the cabinet’s political sub-bodies. The Federal 
Security Council meets secretly and consists of the chancellor, and the ministers of 
foreign affairs, defense, interior, finance, justice, economic affairs, and development aid, 
as well as the head of the office of the chancellery; in addition, the chief of defense and 
the government spokesperson have advisory seats.252 However, the Federal Security 
Council has lost significance in that, presently, it deals mainly with arms exports, while 
important foreign-policy decisions are made in smaller, more informal circles, which 
consist of at least the chancellor, the head of the office of the chancellery, and the 
ministers of foreign affairs, defense, and interior.253 
Keeping in mind the authority of the chancellor, the definition of the general 
foreign policy guidelines, the limitations of power in favor of the ministries 
responsibilities, and the available resources within the Bundeskanzleramt, the chancellery 
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relies on the specialized ministries. Foremost of these entities is the Federal Foreign 
Office. In this regard, Siwert-Probst summarizes the main task of the chancellery as one 
“to co-ordinate points of view by maintaining the closest possible contact with ministries 
. . . to recognize and reconcile differences of opinion in good time and . . .whenever 
necessary, reiterate the chancellor’s stated guidelines.”254 
2. The Federal Foreign Office and Primacy of Foreign Affairs 
While the traditional institutions of foreign policy are still the dominant actors in 
Germany’s foreign policy formation, the number of other specialized ministries engaged 
in international, bilateral, or multilateral relations in favor of German interests has grown 
significantly in light of globalization, trans-nationalization, and the end of the Cold 
War.255 Moreover, because of the federal structure at the heart of government, foreign 
relations are nurtured not only on the federal level, but also on the state level. The State 
of Bavaria, for example, maintains a network of international representative offices in 
twenty-three countries across the globe in view of its own particularistic heritage, but also 
because German aerospace, as well as such firms as Audi and BMW, have a significant 
world presence. While this fragmentation of foreign policy strengthens the role of the 
chancellor, it poses a challenge to the Federal Foreign Office and the traditional primacy 
in foreign affairs, which is characteristic of how foreign relations have changed from the 
time of Metternich and Bismarck until the present. In this context, the difference between 
foreign relations and foreign policy is important, as the latter is ideally the coherent 
implementation of defined national goals and interests in competition with other states. 
Andrea and Kaiser argue that, with the increase in foreign relations of specialized 
ministries and their relevance for the foreign policy interests, “each specialized ministry 
has de facto become a foreign ministry for its respective sphere of competence.”256 
Hence, the question of whether the primacy of foreign affairs still resides mainly with the 
Foreign Office needs to be addressed.  
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The Foreign Office, under which the Foreign Service with its global network of 
embassies and consulates operates, is increasingly less capable of coordinating and 
guiding foreign policy in all aspects. This ministry has thus developed into a cross-
sectional body that shares expertise and interacts with other specialized ministries.257 To 
enhance its expertise and to take into account the wide spectrum of foreign relations, 
which affect foreign policy, more than 25 percent of personnel at Germany’s embassies 
and consulates are not diplomats from the Foreign Service but officials from other federal 
ministries.258 In 2001, Andreae and Kaiser stated that the primacy of foreign policy still 
rests with the Foreign Office, Oppermann and Hoese believed in 2007 that only in the 
realms of peace- and security policy, policy in the UN, and policy concerning Germany’s 
engagement in the multilateral alliances or organizations (as well as concerning 
armaments verification and armaments export, human rights, and international law) does 
the Foreign Office still hold the central responsibility.259 However, the position of the 
foreign minister hinges on the primacy of foreign affairs for the Foreign Office. Without 
this primacy in the cabinet, no unified German position can be put in hand. The 
procedural rules of the federal government—as with other nations—foresee that only 
after having contacted and informed the Foreign Office may a representative of a foreign 
country be received, and all negotiations with other countries may be conducted only 
with the approval of the Federal Foreign Office, which can decide to participate in any 
negotiations.260 
Regarding the central authority of the chancellor in the cabinet and the 
fragmentation of foreign policy among multiple actors on multiple levels, Siwert-Probst 
comments that “foreign policy is ‘managed’ or ‘administered’ rather than ‘formulated’ by 
the Foreign Office.”261 Much of the setting of priorities and the power in foreign policy 
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formation rests on experience and personal leadership characteristics of the chancellor 
and the foreign minister together, while “the Foreign Minister remains fundamentally 
responsible for German foreign policy.”262  
In Germany’s coalition governments, the junior partner in the cabinet and in 
parliament designates the foreign minister. Such was true in the 1960s and remains true 
today. Currently, Frank-Walter Steinmeier from the Socialist Party (SPD) is in his second 
term as foreign minister, having taken over the office from former Chancellor Schroeder 
from 2005 to 2009. He has not only expertise in foreign policy but also rich experience of 
a particular kind in view of the present crisis and its background. Upon arrival in the 
Foreign Office in December 2013, Steinmeier initiated a review of the Foreign Office and 
the Foreign Service (“Review 2014”), which was published in February 2015 with the 
concluding objective “to ensure Germany’s place as a leading European Nation that is 
willing to shoulder responsibility worldwide for a peaceful and free international 
order.”263  
3. Parliament: The Role of German Bundestag and Bundesrat in Foreign 
Policy 
The executive branch of the government has a strong position in foreign policy 
decision-making, while the legislative branch—the parliament (Bundestag)—exerts its 
influence via the checks and balances: the parliamentary provisional rights. This 
institution distinguishes the Federal Republic of Germany and is prone to much 
misunderstanding in those nations unused to a parliamentary democracy (i.e., the United 
States). Usually the government and the parliamentary majority stem from the same party 
and are part of a coalition; thus, approval for foreign-policy decisions can proceed 
without friction.264 While the responsibility for foreign policy rests with the federal 
government, the parliament has such specific powers as ratification of all international 
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treaties and allocation of the federal budget for the ministries. In addition, a two-third 
parliamentary majority is required for all aspects where further transfer of sovereignty to 
the EU is foreseen.265 The Bundestag and its members of parliament have no right of 
initiative in the remits of foreign policy and thus can accept or reject only the laws that 
are presented for parliamentary decision. Nevertheless, if the representation at the state 
level in the Bundesrat (the second parliamentary chamber in Germany) does not equal 
governmental majority representation, then the opposition can exert participatory control 
of the government’s actions.266 
The Bundestag has multiple non-legislative instruments of parliamentary control, 
which is especially useful for opposition in the parliament. The instruments include the 
possibility to cite members of the executive to testify before the Bundestag or its 
subcommittees to explain government policy or to set up committees of inquiry if 25 
percent of the members of parliament agree to do so.267 Concerning the deployment of 
the Bundeswehr and the 1950s–1980s dilemma between Article 87a and Article 24 of the 
Basic Law, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled on July 12, 1994, that a parliamentary 
decision needed to be taken on request by the government to engage militarily in the 
framework of multilateral institutions, the Article 24 interpretation of the mission of the 
Bundeswehr. Parliament has no rights to amend the request and initiatives. The 
Bundestag can only accept or deny the military deployment, which necessitates that 
government cooperate and inform the members of parliament, which also goes along the 
parliamentary groups.  
In Germany, members of parliament usually focus on specific fields of expertise 
and normally remain in that domain throughout their political career. A foreign policy 
expertise is confined to certain members of the legislative who specialize in this field. In 
the Bundestag, it is the parliamentary groups (Bundestagsfraktionen) that coordinate the 
relevant positions amongst members of parliament, the party, and its leadership, and 
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whether the party is represented in the government, with the respective ministries.268 This 
fact implies that when the government wants to pursue its foreign policy objectives 
successfully, it needs to coordinate with the parliament, while contentious issues in a 
coalition government will be dealt with via the coalition committee. A legislative period 
is four years; therefore, a certain fluctuation of members of parliament is common, which 
leads Ruehl to question the expertise of some members of parliament in light of the 
formal competencies of the Bundestag, “which often exhibits serious deficits.”269 
Consequently, in a democracy and not only limited to Germany, experts of specific 
topics, such as relations with Russia, are rare.  
The 18th Bundestag, elected in September of 2013, consists of five political 
parties: the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its sister party the Christian Socialist 
Union (CSU), which form one parliamentary group; the Social Democratic Party (SPD); 
the Green Party; and the party Die Linke, the latter being the political successor of the 
former East German Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands 
[SED]). After having had a grand coalition with the SPD from 2005 to 2009, where 
Chancellor Merkel already worked with Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, a 
coalition with the Free Liberal Party (FDP) from 2009 to 2013, Chancellor Merkel 
formed another grand coalition government with the SPD in 2013. While the party leader 
of the SPD, Sigmar Gabriel, who is also the vice chancellor, took over the Ministry of 
Economics and Technology, Frank-Walter Steinmeier once again took over the Federal 
Foreign Office. 
Out of the twenty-three committees of the current legislative period, several 
permanent parliamentary committees are of significant relevance concerning foreign 
policy towards Russia, namely, the Committees on Affairs of the European Union, 
Budget, and Foreign Affairs. These committees, each which concentrates on its 
specialized area of policy, consist of the members of the five political parties according to 
their relative representation in the Bundestag. The committees confer on all bills and laws 
that might have an impact on their defined area of policy and attempt to find a majority 
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decision before it gets admitted for vote to the plenary.270 In addition, the German 
Bundestag entertains a variety of parliamentarian groups engaged in international 
relations between the respective parliaments, such as the German-Russian Parliamentary 
Friendship Group, which is currently chaired be CDU Member of Parliament Bernhard 
Kaster, and which acts as a catalyst for dialogue between the Russian State Duma and the 
Bundestag. 
The strong position of the executive versus the legislative branch in the realms of 
foreign policy has been confirmed multiple times by the Federal Constitutional Court.271 
However, in the public sphere and in the political decision-making process, the 
Bundestag and the Bundesrat are important actors in foreign affairs if it comes to 
governmental accountability, legitimization, and broad public support and understanding.  
4. “German Foreign Policy Is Peace Policy”—Norms, Interests, and 
Parameters  
Germany’s foreign relations and affairs unfold in a continental and global 
environment that has changed dramatically over the last twenty-five years. A diffuse, 
unpredictable, and increasingly unstable security environment, which affects Germany’s 
interests and parameters for foreign policy, has replaced the former bipolarity of the Cold 
War. In the past couple of years, in turn, the parameters of the 1990s have changed 
severely in the wake of the U.S. war on terror, the global economic crisis, and mounting 
security crises around and in Europe, as well as the shift of global power to Asia and 
away from the Euro-Atlantic axis.272 After the publication of the results of Germany’s 
foreign policy review in 2014, the Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote that the gauges of 
German Foreign Policy “close partnership with France within a united Europe and a 
strong transatlantic alliance in terms of both security and economic co-operation—have 
withstood the test of time, and will remain a cornerstone of our approach,”273 as they 
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have since 1949 when the FRG first formulated a foreign policy with the still occupation 
powers.  
German foreign policy is rooted in the normative foundation of the Basic Law of 
1949, which has stood the test of time in a remarkable way. Article 26 of the Basic Law 
obliges the federal government to ensure the maintenance of international peace at all 
costs and limits arms export, making any infringement an unconstitutional and thus 
criminal offense.274 In order to cooperate and pursue multilateral approaches, Article 24 
provides for the possibility to transfer sovereignty rights to international organizations in 
order to “bring about and secure a lasting peace in Europe and among the nations of the 
world.”275 Lastly, the Basic Law binds all state authority to the universal 
acknowledgement and protection of human rights in Germany and abroad.276 Based on 
these norms, the Federal Foreign Office stresses that “Germany’s foreign policy is value-
oriented and interest-led . . . [while its] foreign policy agenda revolves around Europe, 
the transatlantic partnership, working for peace, new players and managing 
globalization.”277  
Currently, one of the biggest beneficiaries of a free and global economic 
market—a characteristic of the current international system—Germany and its 
multilateral approach is based on accepting the rules, and acting within the constraints the 
international system yields success. And yet, such statecraft has well advanced German 
national interests, which itself have changed since unity in 1990 in the face of domestic 
and international forces. Economic development after reunification (that is, the 
imperative to modernize all of Germany amid the unification of Europe) and the advent 
of globalized capitalism has made Germany increasingly dependent on free trade, 
unrestricted exchange of people, material, ideas, and information with other nations, 
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including demand-driven access to other markets, and international trade routes. 
Therefore, Germany’s primary interest is a status quo of a stable and secure environment 
of western-oriented values and institutions, which means “a strong Europe and a liberal, 
rule-based international order with free and open states and societies. Germany’s 
overriding strategic goal must therefore be to preserve, protect, and adapt this world 
order.”278  
Thus, Germany’s power, role, and scope in the international system is determined 
by its capability to grow continuously and to remain one of the world’s leading 
economies in some union with America and Asia; hence, Szabo argues that the political 
leaders in Germany are primarily concerned with aspects of economic prosperity and 
competitiveness, and less with global security issues.279 In a realist paradigm, the 
interests and power materialized in economic strength assure Germany’s survival in an 
anarchic and competitive world, as Germany defines its national interests in terms of 
power, not in the form of military capabilities, but in economic strength in a generally 
peaceful world of more or less ideological consensus. In this fashion, the so-called long 
lines of Germany’s traditional foreign policy characteristics—multilateralism, European 
integration, and transatlantic partnership—are still valid in 2015, but with different 
accentuation because Germany’s has become increasingly self-confident in Europe and in 
the World, while the world order itself shows significant signs of disintegration or a 
violent and inevitable reordering.280 
Germany’s evolving self-confidence was paralleled by the discussion of whether 
its foreign policy changed after 1990, embarking on an individual path in foreign affairs, 
or whether the continuation of traditional German foreign policy characterized by a 
culture of restraint as a civilian power dominated Germany’s approach to the world as 
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visible since the 1950s. After the ground-breaking decision in 1999 to deploy the 
Bundeswehr in Kosovo without a UN-mandate (the use of German special forces after the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11 in New York), it was especially Chancellor Schroeder’s 
declaration of a “German Way” in the context of opposition to the Iraqi invasion in 2003 
and the abstention in the United Nations Security Council on the Libya resolution in 2011 
that allegedly showed Germany’s new self-confidence. These steps also led to 
perceptions, by friends as well as critics, of this nation of the “paradox of German 
power”281 and caused frowns in partner governments. Considering the changed 
environment in which Germany found itself after 1990, Pradetto explains that trying to 
harmonize foreign policy traditions of the old Federal Republic with the new 
requirements emerging particularly “in the area of military operations . . . may . . . give 
the impression of controversial foreign policy discussions.”282 While the 2002–2003 
decision by former Chancellor Schroeder about Iraq and the 2011 decision to abstain 
from a UN Security Council vote on Libya, driven by former Foreign Minister Guido 
Westerwelle, should be seen in the light of domestic politics, these decisions nevertheless 
had profound consequences for Germany’s reputation as a power and ally. The manner in 
which Schroeder opposed the U.S. plans for invading Iraq and the fact that Germany 
allied with Russia and France caused the most significant and deep rupture in US-
German relations since 1945. But the German “special way” (Sonderweg) was also a 
renunciation of the traditional multilateral approach for Germany, as Schroeder was 
“prepared to act without reference to multilateral institutions,” as he declared that 
Germany would not participate even if there would be a UN Security Council 
resolution.283 While Risse and Kundnani point to a shift in Germany’s identity as a 
power, they also refer to the changing global environment affecting the transatlantic 
relations, “as Germany and the U.S. were no longer as important to each other as they 
were during the Cold War.”284  
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The diverging interests in the depth of the transatlantic relations and the rift 
between the U.S. and Germany recovered somewhat after Angela Merkel in 2005 and 
Barack Obama in 2008 took over office in what has proved essentially to be a false hope. 
The WikiLeaks scandal, the revelations of Edward Snowden about U.S. signals 
intelligence, and the possibility that the U.S. National Security Agency targeted German 
citizens, as well as a revulsion against such U.S. firms as Google and Facebook, have 
gathered since 2008 and harmed relations. Particularly in light of the unsolved NSA 
scandal, the US-German relations remain burdened, and a fraction of German public 
opinion engages in anti-American campaigns that would make Honecker proud. 
Germany’s Westbindung has been weakened by selective decisions, and the once-
prominent commitment to multilateralism transitioned from “reflexive” to “selective” 
multilateralism in the first decade of the twenty-first century.285 Germany will always opt 
for a multilateral approach where it deems necessary but will act bilaterally when it does 
not. Admittedly, despite Germany’s economic power, it is increasingly less capable of 
acting unilaterally.286 The advent of the crisis in Ukraine in 2014, however, poses a test 
of such policy that allows few of the luxuries of choice that might have been said to exist 
to opt out and or to shift burdens, as happened in the period from 1990–2011.  
Nevertheless, Germany’s foreign policy after reunification has been dominated 
more by continuity than by significant change from the alliance cohesion of an earlier 
epoch or the emphasis on continental interest narrowly defined, although change occurred 
mainly in the employment of instruments, such as military force, which probably 
signifies the most relevant change.287 Moreover, in the sense of “German foreign policy 
is peace policy”288 and its reliance on economic power, Szabo concludes that “stability, 
predictability, and reliability of Germany’s reputation as a stable economic partner are 
paramount. In this sense, risk aversion, already a deeply embedded trait in the German 
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political culture, is reinforced.”289 Under Angela Merkel, Germany’s international role 
has changed again, and the discussion about a change in traditional pillars of German 
foreign policy went silent. Within foreign policy, the chancellor uses Germany’s new 
self-confidence and powers to mediate between Russia and the West, primarily the US, 
thus acknowledging Germany’s bridging function in Europe.290 Whether intended or not, 
with the crisis in Ukraine and the advent of Russian irredentism by force of arms, 
German statecraft must master a problem of singular difficulty for which old formulas of 
general peace and ententé are unworkable. So far, Merkel’s foreign policy aims to 
strengthen the European integration amid domestic and international sources of violent 
disintegration, and she argues that a more cohesive European policy, especially defense 
and security policy, will be key to an enhanced transatlantic partnership. However, 
keeping German core interests in mind, increasingly defining national interest in terms of 
economic power, and applying it to try to retain a stable international order, meant, 
according to Maull, that Germany’s enthusiasm for “exports had eroded its civilian power 
identity”291 with a neo-mercantilist policy that could not entirely turn a blind eye to 
organized conflict and violence.  
In 2012, the Foreign Office introduced the term Gestaltungsmacht (a power that 
shapes the international order, a vague reference to Bismarck and Willy Brandt, the 
efficacy of which has been put to perhaps too rigorous a test in Ukraine) in the context of 
broadening Germany’s relations with rising powers like China, India, and Brazil, with the 
objective to strengthen Germany’s economy and prospects for export as inner-European 
demand declined in the wake of the financial and Euro crises. This aspiration to ride the 
upward tide of globalization characterizes the will to widen the zone of stability and 
economic growth around Germany’s center and beyond. Promoting its own source of 
power may explain Germany’s support of the EU’s extension towards Eastern Europe, 
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even if such policy lately antagonized Russia. In the end, Germany’s foreign policy finds 
itself caught between export-driven Realpolitik and value-based Moralpolitik.  
Balancing between Real- and Moralpolitik, Germany’s current foreign policy is 
aiming at “the preservation and continued adaptation of this free, open, and peaceful 
order. [However,] in future, Germany will have to invest more than it does now to 
preserve this beneficial status quo.”292 In this regard, Foreign Minister Steinmeier 
already clarified the noticeable deficits in German foreign policy concerning crisis 
management, in particular, in regards to the 2014 Ukraine crisis, the changing global 
order with the retreat of U.S. power, and Germany’s unexpected and challenging position 
within Europe. Steinmeier promised to address these trials of policy in what are 
uncharted waters.293 To avoid possible misconceptions and enhance cooperation over 
confrontation according to its foreign policy culture, Germany’s Russia Policy is an 
important part of German foreign policy and has an important impact on the nations 
power leverage itself as a civilian power with the additional aspiration to be a shaping 
power.  
5. Germany’s Russia Policy 
Germany and Russia are fated to share close, interdependent relations. After 1990, 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who enjoyed a close relation with Mikhail Gorbachev and later 
with Boris Yeltsin, prioritized Germany’s Russia policy in order to ensure the complete 
withdrawal of Russian troops from Germany and to avoid any obstruction of the domestic 
post-reunification developments in Germany. After 1998 and under the Gerhard 
Schroeder cabinet, Russia policy became a high-prioritized policy area even more in view 
of the different world view of the socialist chancellor, which had been declared a 
Chefsache, meaning determination through the chancellery, or rather, the chancellor 
himself.294 When Vladimir Putin took power in the Kremlin in 2000, Schroeder and 
Putin developed close personal relations that strongly affected Germany’s policy towards 
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Russia under the SPD-Green coalition government. It is argued that the close personal 
relations of Putin and Schroeder came because of similar personal backgrounds because 
both politicians’ families were from the poor, working social class, both had earned 
degrees in law, both had worked their political way up towards the highest echelons of 
political power, and both shared a barely bridled affection for the trappings of showy 
wealth and the good life.295 Schroeder’s decision to declare a Sonderweg (a special 
German way) in 2002–2003—contradictory to its traditional multilateralism as well as 
Atlanticism—and thus oppose the U.S. invasion of Iraq welded Putin and Schroeder’s 
friendship even closer.296 The clear prioritization of a “Russia first” approach during the 
tenure of Kohl and Schroeder was intensified by Schroeder’s pronounced personalization 
of Germany’s Russia policy. In its own way, this policy was a clear rejection of Kohl’s 
bond to Clinton, which stood in the tradition of Adenauer’s role with the United States in 
the first years of the FRG. Schroeder’s statecraft was even more pointedly of an eastern 
orientation than that of Willy Brandt in the epoch 1969–1974.  
During his term as chancellor, social democrat Gerhard Schroeder employed a 
Ostpolitik revived—a modification of the successful and traditional Ostpolitik under 
Willy Brandt and others—and “change through rapprochement” became “change through 
trade,” as the SPDs thought that enhanced economic relations would automatically lead 
to political and societal change in Russia.297 In this regard, Kundnani calls Ostpolitik 
revised an illusion, as the reference to Brandt’s Ostpolitik, even a modified Ostpolitik, 
neglects the fact that while change through rapprochement did not aim at ideological 
change, change through trade did exactly that.298 Moreover, the slogan Wandel durch 
Handel (change through trade) is usable for any continuation of trade in any political 
situation in order to justify commercialism under any circumstance.299 Wandel durch 
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Handel can also signify a rupture with statecraft and its traditions since 1945, and the 
return to a less wholesome variant from the epoch prior to 1914 or even in the epoch 
1939–1941. 
Thus, it came a no real surprise that the slogan Wandel durch Handel only paid 
off in economic terms for those firms positioned to profit most. For example, in Russia, 
instead of democratization reforms, an increasingly authoritarian, centralized, super-
presidential system based on the security apparatus emerged in the midst of oil-lubricated 
prosperity, and “frustration about the ongoing lack of domestic reforms and the lack of 
progress in establishing rule of law and transparency is [still] growing.”300 Despite the 
fact that Germany’s Russia policy under Schroeder was internationally criticized and 
even perceived by some Eastern European nations (e.g., Poland) as a threat, Schroeder 
defended the growing ranks of critics of Putin when the chancellor described the Russian 
president as “a ‘flawless democrat’ despite his increasing authoritarianism,”301 and 
stressed the strategic partnership between Germany and Russia.  
Although the Green Party held the Federal Foreign Office in Schroeder’s coalition 
cabinet, then-State Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier acted as the secretary of the 
chancellery, where the German policy towards Russia was conceived for execution, 
considering it was declared a Chefsache. Steinmeier was one of the architects of 
Schroeder’s Russia policy and continued in Merkel’s first cabinet as foreign minister, 
pursuing, on the basis of Schroeder’s Russia policy, a path termed “modernization 
through interdependence,” which continued to aim at the economization of German-
Russian relations amid the rigors of globalization with a Eurasian continental focus.302 In 
May 2008, as the world economy began to collapse, Foreign Minister Steinmeier laid the 
foundation for a modernization partnership during a speech addressing academics in 
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Yekaterinburg. He proclaimed a German-Russian modernization partnership with a 
European dimension, certain that, by offering such a modernization partnership, Russian 
society, the government, and the state would become more open, transparent, and guided 
by rule of law. Such policy would create more opportunities for German-Russian 
exchanges.303 However, with the sudden Georgian War in August 2008, a caesura 
happened. With the world economic crisis and the apogee of U.S. power, a change of 
climate had taken place that few expected and which represented a crisis for the policy of 
transformation through trade whereby persons close to policy makers ignored how the 
advocates of power and empire were assuming new power in the Kremlin. The SPD 
foreign minister stopped talking about a modernization partnership, and the CDU stated 
in its election program that Germany “want[s] relations with Russia to be as close as 
possible, but that the depth and breadth of relations depend on Russia’s behavior and 
willingness to meet its international obligations and play by the rules.”304 Despite 
criticism of Russia’s military operations into Georgia, which went very well and put a 
huge hole in U.S. ideas about the further course of NATO enlargement and which made 
calls for Russian compliance with international law, Germany and the majority in the 
West returned to “business as usual” in their relations with Russia within mere 
months.305 
Overall, in the first Merkel cabinet of 2005–2009, Germany’s “Russia policy 
remained relatively unchanged during the first Grand Coalition, with Merkel emphasizing 
the importance of Russia and Russian energy,”306 while observing prevailing constraints, 
such as her East German origin and the coalition agreement with the SPD, which favored 
close relations with Russia as part of the spirit of the times and the legacy of Schroeder’s 
policy. Merkel had grown up in the Baltic lands of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, in the 
former GDR, and spent her childhood under the influence of German Lutheranism, as 
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well as the natural sciences in education, amid the communist East German 
establishment. Despite claims that she became accustomed with the communist 
establishment prior to 1989, she nonetheless conforms to a kind of personality that came 
to prominence in 1990 as something new in German politics: She was a leading woman, 
and, at the same time, she was a person who revived traditions of statecraft from former 
times. Most significant, however, was Merkel’s experience with the dominant Soviet 
security and military presence in the GDR until 1989. Perceived by those with limited 
insight as a reserved thinker with a doctorate degree in physics and characterized as a 
pragmatic politician, Merkel differentiates herself from her predecessor, Schroeder, with 
what can be described only as Prussian virtues, as she “does not put herself in the 
limelight as her predecessor and thus does not embody the power she bear.”307 This 
character trait should not be mistaken for weakness. After all, to Moltke is ascribed the 
ideal—to be more than you appear—which could just as easily be Merkel’s motto as 
well. Nevertheless, with Merkel’s chancellery, the “uncritical times of Gerhard Schroeder 
[were] definitely over,”308 as concerned the bilateral bond between Berlin and Moscow. 
Merkel repeatedly addressed the lack of democratic reform in Russia, which presently 
became retrograde (with the revival of repression), and she called for guaranteeing 
human rights and rule of law while carefully balancing her words.  
While a special relationship with Russia was maintained during the first Merkel 
cabinet, especially due to Steinmeier’s initiatives from the Federal Foreign Office, the 
coalition with the liberal FDP after 2009 finally led to an end of the special status of 
Russia in the German government, and a sober tone replaced the comfortable and friendly 
tone that had been characterizing Germany’s hopeful Russia policy under Kohl and 
Schroeder.309 On a personal level, Merkel avoided meeting Russian Prime Minister Putin 
and sought to support his successor Dmitri Medvedev, as the latter was regarded as the 
embodiment of the “New Russia,” a Russia that would modernize and engage in 
democratic reform. Because the new Foreign Minister Westerwelle (FDP) did not 
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emphasize the German Russia Policy and tried to engage with Russia’s smaller 
neighbors, the influence of the Federal Foreign Office concerning Russia Policy declined 
during 2005–2009. The chancellery, and partially the Bundestag, exerted more influence 
in this regard.310 However, German policy towards Russia had not been a top priority for 
the chancellor during the Christian-Liberal coalition from 2009 to 2013, as in addition the 
expertise in the Bundestag and the government decreased, and the emphasis of policy 
shifted to the Euro crisis.311 Meister concluded that Germany and Russia conferred about 
the same topic but had diverging interests and priorities, which led to increased bilateral 
misunderstandings. For example, while “German decision-makers support reforming 
Russian politics through economic cooperation, the Russian side is above all interested in 
economic cooperation and investment,”312 as well as technology transfer. The lack of 
reciprocity on the Russian side, which was one of the core foundations of the German 
approach, leads to a dilemma and casts a shadow on the state of Germany’s relations with 
Russia, which have been continuously worsening since the Georgian War of 2008 and the 
world economic crisis of the same year.313 
In 2012, Germany’s Russia policy under Merkel suffered another major setback 
when Putin became, for the third time, Russian president and swiftly and without 
hesitation destroyed all hopes of reform that were invested in Medvedev. The latter 
became Russian Prime Minster, but he was only a shadow figure to be seen pliantly 
receiving orders from the boss—a perfect castling for Putin. This sudden and unexpected 
move for the West augured no good for anyone. After the 2012 return of President Putin, 
Merkel increasingly questioned the value of partnership with Russia, a country that 
opposed western democratic values and in the beginning was faced with rising protests 
among the population in Moscow.314 This upswing of protest became fateful for both 
sides. Trenin argues that Germany’s Russia policy must be more balanced, as “interests 
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are as important as values.”315 Thus, it is not a question of a value-first Moralpolitik or a 
value-less Realpolitik, but rather of Moralpolitik and Realpolitik; however, to pursue both 
puts German decision-makers in a constant moral dilemma. While representatives of 
German businesses committed to eastern markets, especially via the Committee on 
Eastern European Economic Relations, put pressure on the government to avoid harsh 
criticism of Russian politics, many representatives of non-governmental organizations 
and media criticized the chancellery for taking a too-soft approach and for not supporting 
Russian society sufficiently.316 Such stresses and strains are perfectly normal in 
diplomacy, but given the imperative for trade in statecraft, such policy has shifted the 
balance to economic interest groups with an eastern orientation—an old phenomenon 
with an unlovely past.  
With the 2013 federal elections, a new grand coalition between the SPD and the 
CDU/CSU was formed, and Frank-Walter Steinmeier became, for a second term, 
Germany’s minister of foreign affairs in Merkel’s third cabinet. While the CDU/CSU–
SPD coalition agreement addresses a renewed push for a German-Russian modernization 
partnership, the agreement also calls for Russian compliance and continued commitment 
to rule of law and democratic standards while emphasizing that “security in and for 
Europe is only achievable with and not against Russia.”317 
However, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and Putin’s irregular war in East 
Ukraine has led circles of Berlin’s foreign policy elites to the painful realization that “the 
‘strategic partnership’ has proven never to have existed; the ‘modernization partnership’ 
did not get off the ground; [and] . . . the political ‘special relationship’ has come to an 
end.”318 The sum of this failure of policy is a diplomatic revolution that shifts a major 
burden onto Berlin. This event further marks a parting of the ways for the post-1989 and 
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post-9/11 idea that war is no longer a feature of European politics, the breakup of ex-
Yugoslavia notwithstanding. Germany’s Russia policy, guided by an Ostpolitik revised, 
needs to make pressing decisions in light of a moral dilemma between a value-based 
Moralpolitik, embedded in the West, or a German Sonderweg, an interest-guided 
Realpolitik. Moreover, a critical person must ask whether the endless recitation of Egon 
Bahr’s heroic story with Willy Brandt (from the construction of the wall in 1961 until the 
collapse of same in 1989) is appropriate in what is plainly a new era, the rules of which 
are hardly evident, and the violence of which is more toxic and aggressive than might be 
said to have existed in the thermonuclear-dominated stability of the high Cold War that 
allowed the FRG to act as it did from 1969 until 1989. The return of Machtpolitik under 
Putin heralded itself in 2008, became dominant in 2014, and has meant a rupture in 
Germany’s existing statecraft.  
C. CIVIL SOCIETY AND FOREIGN POLICY 
In a historical context, the fate of a divided Germany during the Cold War was 
significantly interlinked with international politics because the survival of the nation 
depended on the protective umbrella of its Western Allies in NATO. This fact gave the 
West, especially the United States, important, leading roles in integration for what turned 
out to be great success in German national interest in 1989, and which, since 9/11, has 
unfortunately lost meaning for many Germans. Until reunification, Germany’s foreign 
policy towards Westbindung and Brandt’s Ostpolitik aimed at overcoming the European 
division with a repeat of what had been a remarkably peaceful diplomatic revolution and 
non-violent revision of the European order. In this regard, foreign and domestic policy in 
Germany were deeply interconnected because matters of foreign policy, especially 
towards the Soviet Union and East Germany, directly affected the lives of all Germans. 
Exemplary are the unpopular, but equally necessary, foundations of the Bundeswehr in 
1955 and the NATO-double track decision in 1979, which both faced strong civil 
opposition in both East and West Germany. Despite the deployment of military forces 
outside of Central Europe in 1994, civil society in Germany still remains highly skeptical 
of the use military force as an instrument of foreign policy and prioritizes diplomatic 
means and civilian instruments, as the use of military force is seen as last resort.  
 92 
Societal influence on foreign policy formation depends on public media as an 
intermediary because the public lacks other resources of information and requires the 
media to inform the public in order to form an opinion and participate in the political 
decision-making process via the electoral vote.319 This implies that foreign-policy 
decisions have an impact on domestic affairs and can be summarized as “all politics are 
local.” Although the public has only indirect influence on foreign policy formation via 
the electoral vote, its opinion is an important scale for the measurement of governmental 
politics.320 In Germany, civil society is still affected by the burdens of the Cold War and 
national division, where West Germans were influenced by a democratic political system 
with a free market, while East Germans were socialized under a communist political 
system with a planned economy and a strong secret-police presence. However, in spring 
2014, amid a world order of growing violence and economic turmoil, the interest in 
foreign policy in Germany was high, wherein 68 percent of the populace were strongly 
interested in foreign policy.321 
1. German Civil Society after Reunification 
Germany’s identification as a civilian power can be seen as a Leitmotif of public 
opinion (despite a rearmed FRG), not only since reunification, but since the founding of 
West Germany in 1949.322 The division of Germany led to the creation of two different 
characteristics of national identity. In the GDR, the people and their identity were 
influenced by Soviet domination and political socialization, isolated from the 
cosmopolitan forces of the West—a fact not wholly appreciated by West Germans who 
newly discovered the society of the former GDR in 1990 for themselves and had great 
trouble fully understanding what they found there.323 This different attitude was 
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expressed by the differentiation in Ossis and Wessis in the 1990s and plays an important 
role today because Germany is split over the Ukraine crisis. This fact notwithstanding, 
today the nation is led by two especially prominent former citizens of the GDR, the irony 
of which is noteworthy and the meaning of which would require its own analysis. 
An opinion poll conducted in April 2014 showed that 49 percent of the German 
population foresees a median position for Germany between Russia and the West, while 
45 percent foresee a Germany embedded solely in the West.324 The desire for a third path 
is a corollary of the old notion of a German special path (a German singularity) because it 
is adapted to the present. It is not an especially new phenomenon because it was present 
in the Weimar Republic, in the Third Reich, and in the Cold War in various iterations. As 
such, this idea operates in civil society in various forms, especially among those critical 
of a western orientation, or a western European orientation.  
The glory of the centrality of Germany and the residue of the Cold War is 
confirmed in a recent study from the Pew Research Center, showing that, in East 
Germany, only 44 percent of the respondents are in favor of stronger relations with the 
U.S. than with Russia, while in the West, 61 percent of the respondents favor strong 
relations with the U.S. rather than with Russia.325 This phenomenon plays a role today in 
the Ukraine crisis since 2014 as to the fate of Ukraine and the willingness among a 
significant percentage of the German population to embrace and argue for Russian 
apologia. In this context, the political editor for the German weekly newspaper Die Zeit 
complains that there has been a spike in accusations made against him that he is “anti-
Russian, . . . [and] having been steered in that direction by American interests.”326  
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The generational change in Germany is also important to note in this regard 
because it is mainly the elder East German generation that favors pro-Russian attitudes 
and increasingly regard western integration and close relations with the U.S. with 
skepticism as Cold War patterns of conflict possibly remerge in Europe. Bittner recalls 
the emotional challenges for the East German population during the reunification process 
and argues that, while Polish society has transformed from within since 1980, the East 
German societal system was just replaced by West Germany’s, while the sensitivity lies 
in the fact that one “will never know what it is like to have the values . . . [the East 
Germans] grew up with thrown on the scrapheap of history”327—a factor not completely 
taken into account by many in the West.  
Opinion polls show that the younger generation, the post-reunification generation, 
is more willing to engage internationally in order to protect human rights, though not 
necessarily with military force. In this context, the older generation beyond 60 years is 
especially wary of military operations abroad, with 90 percent in favor of reducing the 
Bundeswehr deployments.328 Angela Merkel, born in 1954 and brought up in the GDR, 
signifies, like Schroeder, a generation that has no direct World War II memories and thus 
“marks ‘the advent of a third postwar generation’ as Henry Kissinger described it: ‘less in 
thrall to the emotional pro-Americanism of the 1950s and 60s, but also not shaped by the 
passions of the so-called ‘68 generation’, which formulated harsh critiques of the US.”329 
However, anti-American emotions are on the rise, which, while partially based on 
Germany’s divided identity character, is gradually increasing in light of the ongoing NSA 
affair, which 12 percent of the Germans regard as most important event in US-German 
relations in 75 years.330  
 Kundnani concludes that the increasing anti-American sentiments in the broad 
German public are contributing to possible foreign policy shifts, citing the 2003 Iraq War 
and the 2008 economic crisis in addition to the NSA affair, leading some Germans to 
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state that “they no longer share values with the United States, and some say they never 
did.”331 Such a revival of anti U.S. attitudes recalls the epoch of 1917–1918, as well as of 
1941–1945 and the anti-US propaganda of the German right and left in the Cold War. 
Nevertheless, despite the current rift in US-German relations over free trade or the NSA 
eavesdropping in Germany, 62 percent of Germans regard the U.S. as a reliable ally, and 
57 percent favor stronger ties with the US, while 60 percent want Germany to engage in 
the Ukraine conflict in close relation with the U.S. and Western partners.332 
German civil society, due to its legacy, has had a difficult relationship with its 
military since 1949. As such, civil society assigned the Bundeswehr only a “secondary or 
tertiary role to force as the measure of national or international power.”333 However, 
during the Cold War and with conscription in place, integration into civil society and 
acceptance was hardly in doubt. With the factual abolishment of conscription on July 1, 
2011, the fear arose that the Germans would distance themselves even more from the 
Bundeswehr, which would led to diverging development between society and German 
military and which would have implications for foreign-policy decisions.334 With 
Bundeswehr operations in Afghanistan and an increased number of civilian and German 
casualties, the Germans’ difficult relations with foreign policy hard power became more 
strained. Gauland wrote that it was not only the skepticism, disinterest, and rejection of 
the Bundeswehr, but especially the “refusal to think at all about the necessity and 
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consequences of military force,”335 attributing the German population a “diffuse whole 
body pacifism,”336 and neglecting global reality. Twenty-five years after reunification, 
the German public seemed to have transformed “Never again Auschwitz” to a modified 
“Never again War” theme to cater to a self-perception of being a peaceful, post-heroic 
society.337 With the Ukraine crisis and the Russian annexation of the Crimea closing in 
on its first anniversary, 51 percent of Germans think that the crisis does affects each 
German citizen’s life, while only 30 percent dismiss any influence of the current crisis on 
their life, which remains to be seen.338 
2. Think Tanks and Mainstream Media on Foreign Affairs  
As shown in previous chapters, foreign-policy decision-making takes place in 
small, elite circles in Berlin that are fitted into the mass of opinion in a process of debate 
and democratic give-and-take, which can get quite polemical. While Germany enjoys a 
wide spectrum of media outlets, its foreign policy expertise, especially in relations to 
Russia, has declined significantly since 1990, as such well-known and respected weekly 
newspapers, such as Die Zeit or the business-focused Handelsblatt, no longer maintain 
their own correspondents in Moscow.339 This trend arises specifically from changes in 
priorities since 1989, as well as the decline of excellent journalism, generally, as a 
consequence of the media phenomena of the twenty-first century.  
Mass media such as TV, radio, and Internet do play a major role in politics in that 
they shape public opinion with what content presented and how, especially in public 
television, which retains a reasonable level of debate when compared to neo-liberal, 
English-speaking news outlets and with the collapse of intellectual inquiry since 2001. 
                                                 
335Alexander Gauland, “Diffuser Pazifismus: Warum sich die Deutschen mit Gewalt so schwer tun” 
[Diffuse Pacifiscm: Why the Germans have such a hard time with violence.], Der Tagesspiegel, July 23, 
2012, accessed May 13, 2015, http://www.tagesspiegel.de/meinung/diffuser-pazifismus-warum-sich-die-
deutschen-mit-gewalt-so-schwer-tun/6907386.html.  
336Ibid.  
337Kundnani, Paradox of German Power, 69. 
338YouGov, “Umfrage: Große Hoffnungen auf besseres Verhältnis zu Russland” [Opinion poll: Great 
hopes for better relation towards Russia], February 9, 2015, accessed May 13, 2015, 
https://yougov.de/news/2015/02/09/umfrage-grosse-hoffnungen-auf-besseres-verhaltnis-/.  
339Meister, “Reframing Germany’s Russia Policy,” 3. 
 97 
While the Internet is generally unrestricted in terms of content and availability, German 
TV can be divided into public broadcasting (with main channels ARD and ZDF) and 
privately funded channels (such as SAT 1, RTL, or special interest formats). As the 
public gets its information from media, it is noteworthy that the public channels devote 
15–20 percent of its program time to political news coverage, while private channels have 
decreased the political coverage from 11 percent in 1987 to only 5.5 percent in 1997.340 
This phenomenon symbolizes the triumph of markets in the public sphere, the results of 
which need little explanation, especially from the viewpoint of a security-policy 
professional. With the availability of the whole Internet reaching beyond national borders 
and the possibility of everyone posting articles and comments, journalistic objectivity is 
in decline, and polemics of the most primitive sort has made an astonishing comeback, as 
it was with the worst of yellow journalism of the late nineteenth century. In foreign 
affairs, where people cannot personally witness evolving events like war and peace, 
which might be possible with domestic events, the media plays a very central role in 
shapin public opinion. This effect can be exploited by those wholly unconcerned by 
democracy and checks and balances as propaganda campaigns in the Internet, which is 
becoming increasingly common in the current Ukraine crisis. The Ukraine crisis occurred 
a hundred years after the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914, and with it revived the most 
vicious and calumny-laden practices from a century ago, all of which are ideally suited to 
flourish in the digital free-for-all.  
Therefore, unsurprisingly, critics in Germany and abroad have denounced the 
press as a “liar press” (Luegenpresse). For example, pro-Russian protesters, referring to 
the Ukraine crisis, accused the West German-based media of failing to analyze post-
communist Germany correctly. Such enraged critics also rebuke analyses of 
contemporary Russia, partially based on individual socialization under the communist 
system in East Germany.341 Little to no shame adheres to those who wield Luegenpresse, 
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since this term is straight out of the Nazi Lexikon, a fact that sparks indignation if one is 
cheeky enough to point it out in the heat of debate.  
In this regard, it is a thin line for the average German citizen to differentiate 
between objective news coverage and state-backed “information” with propagandistic 
tendencies, such as witnessed by the Russian state-backed TV station RT (formerly 
Russia Today), which is also available in Germany and Great Britain.342  
The small circles, where foreign policy is discussed on a professional level, are 
primarily located in Berlin, close to the decision-makers. While in the U.S. capital a wide 
spectrum of think tanks on foreign policy exist, in Berlin “there is only one think tank for 
foreign policy which meets U.S. standards, the German Institute for International and 
Security affairs (SWP).”343 In addition, the German Council on Foreign Relations 
(DGAP) and the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) have extensive 
expertise on Russia, for example, in Stefan Meister, who changed from the DGAP to the 
ECFR in 2013, and Hans Kundnani.344 These institutions, however, have been 
overshadowed by the last quarter century of more or less European unity, as well as an 
emphasis on the Middle East, in which German expertise looms less prominent in public 
life than in European security.  
The major political parties represented in the Bundestag support political 
foundations, which are interlinked with the parties, but also with parliament itself. These 
foundations, with their own research and policy branches, are further linked to the 
chancellery and federal ministries because they engage significantly in international 
policy analysis and act in concert with foreign policy.345 Founded in the late 1950s as a 
                                                 
342The Guardian, “Kremlin-Backed RT to Launch UK TV News Channel,” Guardian, October 28, 
2014, accessed May 13, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/oct/28/kremlin-rt-uk-news-
channel-russia-today; Carsten Luther, “Das hat uns gerade noch gefehlt” [Just what we always needed], Die 
Zeit Online, November 19, 2014, accessed May 10, 2015, http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2014-11/rt-
deutsch-russland-propaganda-luegen.  
343Mueller-Haerlin, “Angela Merkel’s Foreign Policy,” 4. 
344Szabo, Germany, Russia, 57–59. 
345Sebastian Bartsch, “Political Foundations: Linking the Worlds of Foreign Policy and 
Transnationalism,” in Germany’s New Foreign Policy: Decision-Making in an Interdependent World, eds. 
Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 206. 
 99 
means to strengthen West German democracy during the Cold War, the political 
foundations have created outreach program with projects in most countries across the 
globe promoting democracy and free markets, such as the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 
(KAS), the political foundation of the CDU, named after the first German post-war 
chancellor. While Russia and the former Soviet satellites were not accessible until the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, the region became a priority for all German political 
foundations since then in order to promote political and economic development through 
dialogue and individual projects, guided by the principle of “strengthening Germany’s 
bilateral relations through intensive dialogue between elites.”346 Because the funding for 
all political foundations has severely been cut since 1992, some foundations were forced 
to give up permanent representations abroad. Nonetheless, with the priority in the former 
Soviet region, the KAS has maintained its Moscow office since 1990 but is facing 
increasing pressure by the Putin government. For example, recently the project leader of 
the KAS-sponsored EU-Russian dialogue was denied entry to Russia and was informed 
about a travel ban into Russia until 2020 without any given reason.347 In addition, the 
SPD-affiliated Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, as well as the KAS, have been searched and 
computers have been seized by Russian law enforcement in the wake of a State Duma 
adopted law that defined nearly all foreign non-governmental organizations as illegal 
foreign agents.348 Despite the fact that the allegations against the German political 
foundations were dropped after the intervention of the German Federal Foreign Office, 
police raids caused a feeling of insecurity among Russian civil society and German 
political foundations.  
Less a think tank but rather an import platform for the global strategic community 
is the Munich Security Conference, which was founded by Ewald von Kleist at an 
international Wehrkunde conference in 1963 in order to engage with civil society amid 
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the creation of the Bundeswehr, the integration into NATO, and the promotion of 
peaceful conflict resolution focusing on the transatlantic dimension.349 The annual 
security conference has grown into the German key forum in addressing international 
security challenges, usually with a high number of representatives from the highest level 
of decision-making, including head of states and governments. This event in the Bavarian 
winter offered the mise en scene for the shift in German-Russian relations in 
presentations by Vladimir Putin that at first garnered little notice. The event finds a 
medial echo in the German press and resembles an opportunity for strategic discussion 
amongst the experts, but also for possible political statements aimed at the public in 
Germany. In 2014, Germany’s President Joachim Gauck, as well as Defense Minster 
Ursula von der Leyen and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, used the Munich 
Security Conference to collectively call for a stronger role in international politics with 
more responsibilities in terms of hard and soft power for Germany. In 2015, German 
Defense Minister von der Leyen not only explicitly pointed at Moscow’s intervention in 
Ukraine, but in this regard also called for unmasking the “pseudo-historical attacks on the 
integrity of the Ukraine.”350 
3. German-Russian Interests Groups and Their Influence 
Besides the academia, think tanks, and mass media, specialized interest groups in 
society, culture, and economy exert a significant influence on Germany’s Russia policy, 
groups that resemble an additional organized link between society and the government 
while promoting their individual interests. Opperman and Hoese understand interest 
groups in this regard as “institutionalized and permanent social merger whose primarily 
objective is to influence the formation and implementation of universal political decisions 
in their best interest.”351 Based on the weight of economics in German-Russian relations, 
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it comes as no surprise that the economic lobby—itself a long-standing and significant 
part of German politics for more than a century—plays a significant role in developing 
Germany’s Russia policy, leading Szabo to conclude that “German business remains the 
key driver of German policy toward Russia.”352 The Ostausschuss der Deutschen 
Wirtschaft (Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations), described as “a 
powerful lobby that exercised a significant influence on German policy towards 
Russia,”353 is the main lobbyist group and represents the German private economy and 
industry. Based on customs again reaching back more than a century, titans of industry 
and trade are engaged in inside lobbying—to influence the political decision-making 
process via the political establishment directly, but also through outside lobbying—
shaping the public opinion, especially by supporting German businesses that invest in 
Russia. Voicing the ideas and concerns of a large portion of the German economy, the 
Ostausschuss, founded in 1952, encompasses the Federation of German Industries, the 
Association of German Banks, the German Insurance Association, the Foreign Trade 
Association of the German Retail Trade, and the German Confederation of Skilled Crafts. 
Its ranks are further composed of over two hundred companies from the German 
Mittelstand (mostly family-owned, mid-size companies) to stock list major corporations, 
such as the car manufacturers Daimler, Volkswagen, the Deutsche Bank, or Lufthansa.354 
The Ostausschuss organizes a wide array of conferences, facilitates dialogue between 
Russia and Germany, and continuously promotes economic opportunities, but it has also 
been funding “research and pro-Russian lobbying at one of Germany’s leading think-
tanks, the German Council on Foreign Relations,”355 writes former DGAP researcher 
Stefan Meister, criticizing the cooperative Russia policy.  
In its own introduction, the organization Petersberg Dialogue, initiated by former 
Chancellor Schroeder and President Putin, states on its website that the “Petersberg 
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Dialogue was founded in 2011 as German-Russian forum for discussion and promotes the 
understanding and an open dialogue of both countries between all areas of the civil 
societies.”356 The Petersberg Dialogue is patronized by the German chancellor and the 
Russian president and conducts annual bilateral conferences in Russia or in Germany. In 
2014, the annual conference was postponed, and it has been put on hold since then in 
light of the Ukraine crisis, although the German government’s Russia liaison, Gernot 
Erler, announced that the dialogue would be continued, though he did not say when.357 
The Petersberg Dialogue faces multiple criticisms, as Szabo points out, that the forum 
would promote a “business ueber alles”358 (business above all) strategy, avoiding 
contentious issues, such as rule of law or human rights. Another criticism is that the 
attendees are selected by the Kremlin, thus ensuring that acritical dialogue cannot take 
place and reducing it, in Meister’s assessment, to a “‘dialogue’ that legitimizes the 
Russian status quo.”359 
Besides the Ostausschuss and the Petersberg Dialogue, several other interest and 
lobby groups exist, such as the non-profit organization German-Russian Forum, as well 
as regional initiatives. Meanwhile, the Ostausschuss remains the most significant interest 
and lobby group concerning Germany’s Russia policy. According to Opperman and 
Hoese, the success of lobbying, especially inside lobbying, depends on privileged access 
to the highest level of political decision-making—a unique characteristic of the 
Ostausschuss, which unites the elite leadership of the German economy.360 
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IV. CASE STUDY: THE ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA 
When Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed the Federal Assembly on 
March 18, 2014, about the annexation of the Republic of Crimea and the city of 
Sevastopol as new Russian entities to the Russian Federation, he made clear that “in 
people’s hearts and minds, Crimea has always been an inseparable part of Russia. This 
firm conviction is based on truth and justice and was passed from generation to 
generation, over time, under any circumstances, despite all the dramatic changes our 
country went through during the entire 20th century.”361 It was a shock that few in Berlin, 
Paris, and Washington had anticipated, and the subsequent approval of the law, formally 
annexing Crimea and Sevastopol, shattered the core entente of Russia’s relations with the 
West, especially with the United States and Europe. Most troubling regarding the fate 
of peace in Europe, however, has been Putin’s blow to the statecraft of Germany. 
With the record of German-Russian relations in mind—periods of heights and depths, or 
rather, of cooperation and confrontation having followed each other—the 2014 Ukraine 
crisis and annexation of Crimea has constituted an event of singular importance unseen 
since 1989 or even 1945. One cannot refute its consequences for the region, and for 
Europe as a whole, as well as for the rest of the world. Even as the June 2015 Russian 
statecraft attempts to return to a friendly normalcy amid the ongoing war in eastern 
Ukraine, initiated with a shaky ceasefire, the system of international power on the meta-
level in Europe seems shaken and in a daze, which may last for years to come. This 
generalization is especially applicable in terms of the German-Russian relations, 
personalized in the respective regimes of Chancellor Merkel and President Putin. 
Although branded by some critics partly as Russlandversteher (Russian Firsters), guilty 
of a knee-jerk apologia, public opinion in Germany has shown a clearer attitude as the 
crisis matured and became more severe throughout the course of 2014. The results of the 
2015 Pew Research concluded that more than 50 percent of Germans favor a tough 
position against the Kremlin over stronger economic ties with Moscow, which only 35 
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percent support.362 On the other hand, according to Russian opinion polls of the Levada 
Center, in February 2014, 60 percent of Russians saw President Putin in a positive 
light,363 and in March 2014, 58 percent of Russians backed military operations in Crimea 
and other Ukrainian regions.364 By spring 2015, one year after the annexation, a vast 
majority of 85 percent of Russians regarded the annexation of the Crimea as 
irreversible.365 
In accordance with Putin’s March 2014 speech, for many Russians, Crimea and 
its history has had a highly symbolic relevance since the time of Catherine the Great, as 
Russians have always perceived the Crimean peninsula as “fundamentally Russian.”366 
Indeed, Putin’s 2014 annexation was the second formal annexation by Russians, as 
Catherine II, in pursuit of extending her sovereignty and the rule of Russian power to the 
South, formally annexed Crimea in 1783. After the raid on Moscow by Crimean Tartars 
in 1571, and thereafter continuous raids by Crimean Tartars until 1783, the annexation 
ended the raids on Russians in the southern territories. Russian rule over Crimea 
following Catherine II’s reign enabled the establishment of the Black Sea Fleet and 
opened possible Russian access to the Mediterranean via the Dardanelles and the 
Bosporus Strait—a long-time Russian strategic goal. This southern thrust into Ottoman 
Europe and into conflict with western powers ultimately also led to the Crimean War of 
1853–1856, which ended in a humiliating Russian defeat.367 One hardly need mention 
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the role of the Black Sea littoral in the Russian Empire until 1918, or its role in German 
strategy in Operational Barbarossa and the Axis attempt to destroy the USSR.  
When Nikita Khrushchev (who advanced through the ranks of the Ukrainian 
communist party to become secretary-general of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union) transferred Crimea back to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954, the 
USSR seemed destined to endure, and the resolution of nationalities problematique in the 
frame of Soviet governance made its own sense in the epoch of post Stalinism manifested 
by Khrushchev. Only the most fanciful Ukrainian nationalist might have imagined that 
Ukraine would be independent one day and therefore would not align under Moscow’s 
future control. While arbitrariness most likely was not on Khrushchev’s mind, the exact 
reasons remain contested, although it is assessed that infrastructural and economic 
factors, such as the missing land connection to the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic, led to the decision.368  
During the Cold War, within the Soviet Union, Crimea had become not only a 
well-known holiday destination, but also  the setting of several novels in Russian 
literature and the 1823 poem by Alexander Pushkin “The Fountain of Bakchisarai” (“The 
Fountain of Tears”), which made Crimea prominent and supported the Russian idea that 
Crimea, since the dawn of national consciousness in former times, had always been an 
integral part of Russia.369 The general Russian perception of Ukraine as “Little Russia” is 
widespread among Russian nationalists and especially those who have revived Pan 
Slavic, romanticist dreams of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, this perception 
contested by Ukrainians, who addressed “Russification” as a threat to their national 
identity. Even before 1991, the nationalities policy of the USSR since the 1920s had 
fostered the “existence of a Ukrainian ‘parliament,’ a Ukrainian cabinet of ministers, a 
Ukrainian version of the Soviet flag, even separate Ukrainian membership of the United 
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Nations.”370 This policy comprised further the move of the capital from the Russian-
dominated Eastern city of Kharkiv to the city of Kiev in Western Ukraine in 1934.  
By 1989, 73 percent of people living in Ukraine were ethnically Ukrainian, while 
22 percent were ethnically Russian and dominated the eastern and southeastern parts of 
Ukraine. Such a mixture of nationalities was typical in Tsarist Russia because the same 
was true in all the multinational empires of Eastern Europe. This ethnic distribution did 
not, however, correlate with the attendance of language schools, as “47.5% of 
schoolchildren studied in Ukrainian language schools, . . . [and] 47% in their Soviet-
Russian counterparts. In Galicia, the number in Ukrainian language schools was around 
90%, in the Donbas it was less than 10% and in Crimea zero.”371 The people in Crimea, 
and especially the Crimean Tatars, who had been widely deported in 1944 because of 
their alleged collaboration with the Germans during World War II, have been ruled by 
different nations as a result of war, “from the Russian Empire to the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire to Poland to the Soviet Union,”372 and now again Russia. When in 1954 Crimea 
became part of Ukraine, no Ukrainian cultural institutions existed at all in Crimea; thus, 
the dominant cultural identity that evolved until 1991 was described by Andrew Wilson 
as “Russo-Soviet . . . [with a] Russian majority that inhabited Crimea in 1991.”373  
Ukrainian independence had been an objective since the interlude of such 
freedom from Tsarist rule in the wake of the Central Power victory against Russia in 
early 1918. This sentiment was especially rooted in the Western parts of Ukraine where 
existed a Polish and Habsburg tradition, and was especially prevalent in the dissident 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s when the Soviet KGB ensured that half of the 
political prisoners in the Soviet Union came from Ukraine.374 In 1991, after the 
Ukrainian parliament chose national independence with an overwhelming 346 to 1 vote, 
the population confirmed the vote on December 1, 1991, with the 90.3 percent majority 
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the decision to secede from the Soviet Union, even with 54 percent in Crimea favoring 
Ukrainian independence.375 Due to the turmoil in Moscow and the weak Soviet position 
in 1991 after the attempted coup in Moscow, the Ukrainians gained the opportunity to 
declare independence—an opportunity the former chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme 
Soviet, Leonid Kravchuk, executed August 24, 1991. Regarding Ukraine’s legacy since 
1917 and in the Soviet Union, it is noteworthy that Ukraine in “its post-war boundaries 
had never existed as a national unit or achieved effective independence,”376 one source of 
the current conflict’s origin. This signifies why it is difficult “east of Kiev and west of the 
Volga . . . to identify who is a Ukrainian and who is a Russian” after multiple centuries of 
interaction.377 
Whether Crimea belongs to Russia by dint of international law, the peninsula has 
a major strategic relevance for Russia, especially for the Russian Navy. The Black Sea 
Fleet, which has been in the harbor of Sevastopol since the first annexation of Catherine 
II in the eighteenth century, has been the hallmark of world power and the capacity of 
Russia to exert its influence in the international system of states against the old empires 
and then against NATO in the 1970s with the rise of the Soviet fleet. The Russian-
Ukrainian agreement for the lease of Sevastopol and other military bases in Crimea was 
supposed to end in 2017 and had been on the diplomatic agenda between Moscow and 
Kiev for quite a while. Only with the election of well-known Victor Yanukovych in 2010, 
and a subsequent reorientation towards Moscow, was a new lease agreement signed in 
April 2010, which prolonged the usage of the bases for another twenty-five years (until 
2042) and which narrowed Ukraine’s NATO membership probabilities.378 With the 
Russian 2014 annexation, the future of the Black Sea Fleet has been secured, and former 
Ukrainian limitations on the fleet size are not applicable anymore. The Russian defense 
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minister announced in 2014, shortly after the annexation in March, that Russia plans to 
strengthen the Black Sea Fleet by thirty additional vessels by 2020.379 
Former Ukrainian Prime Minister Victor Yanukovych was on the presidential 
election ballot in 2004 when the Russian-backed candidate for the office of the Ukrainian 
president lost to Victor Yushchenko in the so-called Orange Revolution, a continuation of 
the spirit of 1989 closer to Moscow than in the capitals of Central Europe, which meant 
less to Russian ideas of great power and power overall. After the first round of elections 
in October 2004 led to a close tie between Yanukovych and Yushchenko, “authorities had 
decided that Yanukovych was going to win”380 and declared 49.5 percent of the votes in 
favor of Yanukovych versus 46.6 percent for Yushchenko. Massive allegations of 
electoral fraud initiated large-scale protests with more than five hundred thousand people 
protesting the outcome of the elections peacefully in a carnival-like atmosphere centered 
around Kiev’s Maidan Place. Under pressure from the public, the Ukrainian Supreme 
Court, on December 3, 2004, condemned the elections and ruled that a third round of 
elections would be held on December 26, 2004. Victor Yushchenko won with 51.2 
percent of the votes.381 However, Yushchenko appointing Yulia Tymoschenko as 
Ukraine’s first female prime minster did not lead to unity but to accusations of 
corruption, which created severe divisions among the parties of the Orange Revolution. 
Consequently, the Ukrainian political establishment became preoccupied with internal 
affairs of power and influence instead of addressing the enormous consequences of the 
economic and financial crisis in 2008. Despite the pro-Western ambitions under 
Yushchenko’s presidency—with NATO membership aspirations and the development of 
closer relations to the European Union, Ukrainians voted for Victor Yanukovych in 2010 
because they were tired of scandal-ridden internal political affairs, the nation’s stagnation 
in the rigors of the free market, and the debris in eastern Europe after the world economic 
crisis. Ukrainians voted for the pro-Russian candidate in light of the Ukrainian economic 
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decline, but also under the impression of the Russo-Georgian War of 2008. For the 
Kremlin, the 2010 change of government in Ukraine—and thus the end of Ukraine’s 
Orange Revolution—meant a chance for rapprochement with the West because the 
United States had acknowledged the elections in Ukraine as free and fair, thus signaling 
Moscow to accept the electoral outcome.382 
Moscow had openly supported status quo candidates in Georgia and Ukraine. 
Therefore, the so-called “color revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine came as a shock to 
the decision-makers in the Kremlin. These shocks automatically defined the Russian 
position as opposition to the new governments, especially because President Putin had 
personally promoted Yanukovych’s first presidential bid in 2004.383 In light of the 
former Soviet zone of influence—the “near abroad”—Putin saw a red line overstepped 
with Yushchenko’s announcement to aspire to NATO membership, which was answered 
by NATO at the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest and led to the declaration, pushed by 
the Bush Administration, that “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic 
aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become 
members of NATO.”384 The tide had turned, and Russia’s quasi-silence, or more or less 
passive acquiescence, to the course of NATO enlargement since 1995 turned to violence 
and aggression.  
Only months after NATO’s 2008 Bucharest summit, Russian troops intervened in 
the Georgian province of South Ossetia, claiming to protect Russian citizens, which had 
their residences in South Ossetia, and sparked the Russo-Georgian War. Russia’s decisive 
action in Georgia caught the West by surprise, but it did not lead to a change of foreign 
policy towards Russia, as most nations, including Germany, after condemning the 
Russian intervention, went back to business as usual.385 Georgia was too far away, and 
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the world’s attention was presently mesmerized by the collapsing stock exchanges and 
the ongoing situation in Iraq.  
In Crimea, the number of Russians had been growing over the years, especially 
between 1994 and 2004 when Russia had given citizenship to Ukrainians in Crimea.386 In 
2008 after the Russo-Georgian War, Allison wrote that the Russian modulation of post-
Soviet borders in the Caucasus had a threatening connotation for political leaders in Kiev, 
who rightly feared that Moscow might use the Russian population in Crimea as a pretext 
for coming “to their ‘defence’ in some future crisis. Such a move would partly stall the 
withdrawal of the Black Sea fleet from Sevastopol or more broadly to impede Ukraine’s 
progression to NATO membership.”387 The close geographical neighborhood, the 
personal interlinkage between Ukrainians and Russians, the cross-border trade and cross-
cultural relations between Russia and Ukraine (where the East Slavic culture has its 
roots), makes independent Ukraine, among the former Soviet republics, the most 
important country for Russia. In addition, the strategic geographical and political position 
between Russia and Europe, but also between Russia and the Mediterranean Sea, assigns 
Ukraine (in the Russian perspective) the function of “either a bridge between Russia and 
Europe or a wall dividing them, [but nevertheless] Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation will 
always have profound effect on Russia’s relations with its Western neighbors.”388 With 
the 2014 annexation of Crimea, Putin has proven that he is more willing and capable than 
he was in 2008 to take strong measures—including all aspects of irregular and covert 
warfare—to ensure Russian national interests in the near abroad; the question currently at 
hand is whether the Russian decision to wreck the relations with the West was worth this 
course of action. 
The following chapter IV outlines major actors and the parameters of Russian 
foreign policy, focusing on the relevance of the near abroad, as well as relations to 
Ukraine. The chapter further interprets the aims of such policy to point out some factors 
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of Russian foreign policy formation, despite its opaqueness, before evaluating the events 
that led to the annexation of Crimea, depicting the international and German reactions to 
the annexation, and in the end, elaborating on whether Putin’s power-play decisions pay 
off. 
A. RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
When Vladimir Putin succeeded Boris Yeltsin as Russian president in January 
2000, the country was “chaotic and collapsing,”389 and preoccupied with its domestic 
challenges. In the minds of the Russian people, Putin came at the right time: Russians 
were longing for an authoritarian president like him to bring order, stability, and 
international recognition back to Russia and its society.390 Within the constitutional 
structures of the Russian presidential system, Putin started in 2000 “to restore the 
effectiveness of state power in all spheres of life . . . eliminating the centers of power that 
had begun to compete with the Kremlin for resources and political influence.”391 This 
push to power included the regional governors, the State Duma, the oligarchs, and 
independent parties and organizations outside the Kremlin’s control. The president 
started his redefinition of the center-periphery relations in times when the Russian 
economy recovered and began to prosper due to increasing oil prices, which affected 
Russia’s approach to international affairs. 
Russian foreign policy can be seen only in the context of the Soviet Union’s 
disintegration since 1989 and its earlier legacy as a European and Eurasian great power, 
starting from the medieval times of Kievan Rus and through the 1980s. While from 1945 
until 1989 the world was characterized by the bipolarity of the two super powers—United 
States and Soviet Union—the rump of Russia as heir to the USSR faced severe domestic 
turmoil in post-Soviet times, beginning in the early 1990s. This turmoil led to the 
perception that Russia was internationally weak. Russians themselves were aware of their 
diminished power as the U.S. emerged dominant, acknowledging as late or early as 2008 
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that Russia was not a superpower, but it nurtured the aim to become so again, a fact 
obscured prior to 2008.392 A challenging process of Russian self-definition at home and 
abroad finally led circles around Putin to “the determination to restore Russia as an 
independent international actor whose interests remained distinct from those of the liberal 
capitalist West.”393 In the wake of all that followed, from the Georgian War to the 
Ukrainian War in the seven years since 2008, there has been widespread consensus in 
Russia that one central goal of Russia’s foreign policy is to regain and retain the ability to 
act as a great power within a global order; Russia sees itself as having a dominant role in 
the direct vicinity of the post-Soviet region.394 This decision constitutes a diplomatic 
revolution that puts the post-1989 European order into question and poses an existential 
challenge to German foreign and security policy, which has long-assumed that no such 
post-imperial ambitions might operate from Moscow.  
1. Major Actors in Russian Foreign Policy: The Dominant Role of the 
Kremlin and the Siloviki 
Russia’s Constitution of 1993 states in Article 80 that “the President of the 
Russian Federation shall be the Head of State,” and Article 86 determines that the 
President shall “govern the foreign policy of the Russian Federation . . . [and] hold 
negotiations and sign international treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation.”395 
The strong position of the president includes, besides governing foreign policy, several 
principal responsibilities, such as to “determine the basic objectives of the internal and 
foreign policy of the state, . . . . approve the military doctrine, . . . direct the foreign 
policy, [and act as] the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.”396 The 
presidential powers are tightened by the possibility of ruling by decree, which 
encompasses the same power as laws until confirmed by the legislation, thus giving the 
president the power to rule and enact laws besides or in parallel with the State Duma, 
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something that was not as necessary under Putin’s aligned Federal Assembly as during 
Yeltsin’s presidency.  
Putin learned his own acute lessons from the Yeltsin legacy, and in order to act 
with the support of the Russian legislation—having been strongly influenced by Yeltsin’s 
Presidency—Putin engaged in aligning the Federal Assembly to his ends in a kind of 
presidential authoritarianism not unlike De Gaulle, but also in a profoundly different 
spirit than the Fifth Republic in the 1960s. By bringing United Russia in line with the 
decisions of the Kremlin and re-introducing the functions of bureaucratization, as well as 
the career function of the party, Putin succeeded in dominating the main parliamentary 
party of the Duma. Party membership in United Russia rose immensely, as the party was 
to facilitate the entry of state officials into political representative institutions across 
Russia at all levels.397 United Russia became an instrument of Putin’s power structure, 
especially because most members of the inner circle closest to the president are not 
members of the party, having consolidated their power positions, and thus are not in need 
of additional protection through the party affiliation, which is supposed to signal loyalty 
to the authorities—that is, to Putin.398 Although, the majorities in the Duma were 
changing with the subsequent Duma elections, in the sixth Duma as of December 4, 
2011, Putin keeps a stable majority with 53 percent for United Russia until 2017 as a 
result of the latest parliamentary election.399 Additionally, one of the first reforms Putin 
engaged in when he came to power was a reform of the Upper House—the Federation 
Council—where two representatives from each federal region were elected. However, as 
the Constitution did not define the selection process, the Kremlin proposed to appoint the 
respective members of the Federation Council, as opposed to electoral representation or 
personal representation by the elected regional governor.400 The change was adopted in 
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July 2000 when the governors lost their automatic representation and weakened another 
important check on presidential power, while at the same time the Kremlin increased its 
access to security organs, achieving the full federal control over all military, police, and 
security organs in the regions by 2002.401 This coup de main left the regional governors 
at the disposal of the Kremlin and undermined the legitimacy of the Federation Council; 
thus, it is no surprise that since then, “the Federation Council has voted . . . for all of the 
president’s initiatives,”402 granting President Putin ultimately the central decision-
making power in foreign policy as well in domestic affairs. 
Although the president is head of nation state, the prime minister is head of the 
government, which encompasses a number of federal ministries, but also multiple federal 
agencies, like the Federal Migration Service. However, all security- and intelligence-
related agencies, such as the Federal Intelligence Agency or the Federal Security Agency, 
report directly to the president.403 The prime minister, currently the former president, 
Medvedev, is also appointed by the president and confirmed by the State Duma. The 
prime minister’s role in foreign policy is not as strong as the president’s; nevertheless, he 
oversees the actual implementation of domestic and foreign policy, as well as of financial 
and monetary policy, prepares the federal budget, and is responsible for the rule of law 
and ensuring human rights. With the centrality of presidential powers, Putin, since 2000, 
has repeatedly stated that “he himself, the president—as foreseen in the Constitution—
determines the country’s foreign policy.”404  
Mankoff argues that it is difficult to determine who exactly makes foreign policy 
in Russia, due to the fact that, in 1991, Russia had to start from scratch to develop its 
foreign policy institutions and underwent a time of weakness. The upshot of this period 
has been the centralization of decision-making power in the Kremlin by small, elite 
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circles.405 These elite circles have been increasingly dominated by the appointments of 
siloviki, that is, those quite at odds with a western orientation and with no love for the 
ideal of checks and balances. Loyalty and personal trust in and to Putin and vice versa 
also seemed to be why why Putin relied heavily on keeping like-minded people around 
him, the so-called siloviki, the men of the security branches, the intelligence services, and 
the military who since 2000 have done their best to restore their power lost in the years 
since 1991.406 While Putin reduced the power of the Oligarchs in politics, the siloviki 
remained the most relevant and largest part of Putin’s inner “circle of trust,” as even 
senior officials without the “force ministry background” within the presidential 
administration were not admitted to the exclusive decision-making circle in Putin’s 
immediate vicinity.407 The strong relations between newly generated wealth and the 
power circle around the Russian president, which were set up by the oligarchs under 
Yeltsin’s administration in the 1990s, was taken over by the siloviki, making them the 
new and powerful elite in Moscow, in particular because the expanded authority to the 
secret services after 1991, which include the task to “suppress political dissent at home,” 
has not been recalled.408 Under Putin, the siloviki representation among the Russian 
political elite has risen constantly, and after 2008 reached 67 percent within the ranks of 
the national leadership and 32 percent average across the executive and legislative 
branches.409  
The Duma Committee of International Affairs, headed by Alexander Pushkov, a 
member of United Russia, does not play a significant role in actual foreign policy-making 
in Russia but supports the views and the implementation of the Russian president. In a 
similar role, the Russian “Foreign Ministry has also become rather peripheral in terms of 
setting a strategic course,” as Putin’s Foreign Ministers Igor Ivanov and Sergei Lavrov, 
the latter since 2004, have not articulated their own strong charismatic views on Russian 
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foreign policy. Under the rigidity of Putin’s reign in the Kremlin, “Lavrov’s role has been 
principally to implement the concepts developed”410 by the President and his closest 
advisors. The last player in foreign policy in Moscow is the Federal Security Council, 
whose importance has reemerged under the current chairman, former director of the FSB, 
Nikolai Patrushev.411 As part of the presidential administration, the Federal Security 
Council is responsible for drafting policy to defend “the vital interests of individuals, 
society and the state against internal or external threats. The Council also helps determine 
a uniform state policy on security and helps ensure the President’s ability to carry out his 
constitutional duties.”412 Under the chairmanship of the siloviki Patrushev, the Federal 
Security Council is also responsible for overseeing the work of the “entire national 
security bureaucracy on behalf of the presidential administration,”413 basically making it 
the control and strategic planning muscle of the Russian President.  
To conclude, with the increasing authoritarian political structures in Russia since 
the second incumbency of Putin, and increasingly massing of decisive powers in the 
president, Putin can exercise his powers nearly unchecked by parliament, as long as the 
siloviki, his “circle of trust,” supports the president and their widespread appointment to 
function in the system supports the “managed democracy.” Despite the 2011 protests in 
Moscow’s streets, which appeared to herald a kind of Orange Revolution in the 
metropole, the dominant role of the Kremlin and the elite circles of siloviki remain 
currently uncontested, if not ameliorated among rising nationalism in regards to the 
Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea. 
2. Parameters and Interests of Russian Foreign Policy 
The past is witness to Russia’s former status as a great power, which was only 
challenged and changed through the defeat in Crimea in 1856, the Russo-Turkish War in 
1876, the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, and, most 
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significantly, the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. Nonetheless, from the time 
of its victory over the Swedes in the Northern War through World War II, Russia and the 
Soviet Union were part of the five great European powers, which then became the bi-
polar order of the Cold War.  
As victor of World War II and a superpower during the Cold War, Russia played 
an important part as a global power, able to shape international order through its 
participation, power, and energetic defiance of the United States and its European and 
Asian allies. The historic subsequence of enormous influence and power, followed by 
total defeat or collapse in 1989–1991, is perceived by observers of Moscow as one reason 
for the inherent fear of Russia’s political elite for Russia’s survival and territorial 
integrity.414 After the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, new independent nations evolved 
around Russia, which depend substantially on Russia, especially in terms of trade and 
energy. These nations also contain a large number of Ethnic-Russians residing in these 
countries. This issue mirrors the multinational character of Tsarist Russia and later the 
Soviet Union, but also the classic Eastern European multinational empires, which expired 
in 1918–1919 with a catastrophic legacy in the years 1919–1989.  
 In retrospect, Russia’s foreign policy has not always been as violent or as 
truculent as is has grown to be in the last couple years. Too quickly forgotten since 
Crimea is the fact that Putin, in his first term as Russian president, understood the 
“importance of social and economic recovery as a prerequisite for the more active foreign 
policy.”415 The Kremlin engaged in pro-west and pro-US rapprochement, and even spoke 
about closer relations to the European Union until mid-2001.416 However, with the 
western critique of Russia’s brutal warfare in Chechnya, and as Putin and Medvedev 
believed at the time that the U.S. tried to exploit the Russian accommodation in order to 
strengthen the U.S. position in relation to Russia, the Kremlin chose a more aggressive 
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path, which temporarily peaked in the Russo-Georgian War of 2008.417 The Russians 
also exploited the apparent retreat of the U.S. from the post-2001 offensive against global 
terror because the Russian side understood the institutional limitations of NATO 
enlargement and the failings of this policy in the security sector of those states (e.g., 
Georgia) under the eye of Moscow.  
Russia’s claims for its core sphere of influence—the near abroad—coincides with 
the former Soviet republics, or, as Medvedev has defined, “Russia’s ‘traditional sphere of 
interests’ more broadly to include neighbor states with which it has traditionally had 
close relations.”418 After the events of the Russo-Georgian War in August 2008, then-
President Medvedev, in a TV interview on August 31, 2008, named five principles that 
would guide Russian foreign policy action in the future, defining “privileged interests,” 
which was confirmed in the 2009 National Security Strategy to 2020, stating that 
Russia’s interest “was the protection of Russian citizens in the so-called ‘near 
abroad.’”419 Two of these principles reflect the Russian considerations and aspirations for 
regional dominance in that “Russia considers it a priority to protect Russians wherever 
they may be . . . [and] Russia has privileged interests in certain regions.”420 This ideal, 
along with its associations with Pan Slavism, the Holy Alliance, the Comintern, and the 
Warsaw Pact, cannot help but unsettle Russia’s neighbors within easy reach of the 
reviving Russian military power.  
The influence of the siloviki was obvious in such a policy, calling for a 
prioritization of dominance in the post-Soviet region over multilateral approaches in 
international relations with countries outside the former Soviet Union. Regarding Ukraine 
and Georgia, the assertion of Russia’s privileged interests could be interpreted as a 
message to the West not to interfere in what had once been a Europe between the great 
powers laden with explosive instability. After NATO’s Bucharest summit in 2008, where 
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the prospect of NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia was announced, Putin stated 
that Russia “view[s] the appearance of a powerful military bloc on our borders . . . as a 
direct threat to the security of our country.”421 However, neither Russian use of force as 
against Georgia in 2008, energy crisis and cut-offs with Ukraine, nor trade embargos 
have led to a stronger Russian influence in the near abroad, but on the opposite 
“reinforced local elites’ desire for greater distance from Moscow.”422 This phenomenon 
has become only more intense in the wake of the Crimean annexation.  
The declared Ukrainian will to aspire to NATO membership, especially in the 
midst of the domestic turbulence that led to the Maidan protests in 2013–2014, was 
perceived by the Russians as threatening in a new quality of urgency. While Russia was 
basically compensated by the West for the first round of NATO enlargement in 1999, the 
second round in 2004 ignited heavy opposition among the Russian elite, especially within 
the military, in that the Baltic States were a core part of the former Soviet Union. This 
fact led Yeltsin to declare that the accession of the Baltic States into NATO would 
overstep a red line.423 Paralleling naïve hopes that Russia would overcome its anger 
about NATO’s enlargement, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov warned that Russia would 
not easily accept permanent deploying of missile defense infrastructure. Consequently, 
when Poland announced the bilateral agreement between Warsaw and Washington to 
host an interceptor system for missile defense and Patriot air defense units on a rotational 
basis in Poland, a Russian general allegedly threatened Poland indirectly with the 
possibility of nuclear retaliation.424 Mankoff argued that, by ignoring Russian objections 
about NATO enlargement eastwards, the second round of NATO ascension prepared the 
path to the Russo-Georgian conflict in 2008.425  
The new Russian Military Doctrine, published in 2010, mirrors the belief among 
the Russian elite that continued NATO enlargement is perceived as an omnipresent 
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danger. While differentiating between dangers and threats (the latter being the 
developmental consequence of the first), the doctrine defines the external military 
dangers as “the desire to endow the force potential of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) with global functions carried out in violation of the norms of 
international law and to move the military infrastructure of NATO member countries 
closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including by expanding the bloc.”426 
Russian politicians since 1997, but even more since Putin’s assumption of power, have 
repeatedly spoken out against NATO enlargement or further development of missile 
defense, and even responded with decisive actions like with the military intervention in 
Georgia in 2008 or the confirmed deployment of mobile short range ballistic missile 
(SRBM) systems Iskander to Kaliningrad in 2013.427 NATO’s enlargement is seen not 
only as a military threat, but also as a competitor over trade relations in Eastern and 
Central Europe because meeting the preconditions for NATO accession will 
automatically lead to an alignment of values and interests, but also to technical 
modernization, from which Russia would be excluded. 
A similar perception can be observed in Russia concerning the European Union. 
Even before ten former post-Soviet sphere nations had joined the EU,428 the Kremlin 
feared that the European Union’s approach would undermine Moscow’s influence; 
however, the EU was not perceived as posing a threat to Russia’s ability to exert 
influence and power in the region.429 In 2003, the EU introduced the European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which was supposed to replace the bilateral approach to a 
unified strategy for eastern and southern neighbors. Russia refused to become part of the 
ENP in 2003, and Moscow condemned the Eastern Partnership in May 2008, explicitly 
aimed at six nations, foremost Ukraine, out of fear of losing Russia’s sphere of influence 
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to a newly Europeanized adjacent realm.430 With heightened controversy about Ukraine 
between Russia and the EU, it becomes ultimately a litmus test for the post-Soviet order 
in Eastern and Central Europe in that “Russia . . . remains wary of what it sees as 
attempts to reorient these states away from Moscow.”431 Since Yeltsin’s presidency, 
Russian politicians have believed in their “right to participate in decisions affecting east-
central Europe’s security.”432 In this regard, the former British ambassador in Moscow, 
Sir Roderic Lyne, predicts that “Russia would exert itself mightily, risk a great deal and 
pay a high price to prevent Ukraine from becoming, as Russians would see it, a platform 
for American power.”433 Russia perceives that “both the EU and NATO sometimes 
appear merely tools of an expanded, aggressive West that has not fully broken with the 
Cold War-era logic of containment and continues to see Russia as a potential danger.”434  
The current basic goals of Russia’s foreign policy are stated in the “Concept of 
the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2013,” which states that Russian foreign 
policy aims to ensure “the security of the country . . . and securing its high standing in the 
international community as one of the influential and competitive poles of the modern 
world”435 while actively promoting international peace based upon international law in 
order to establish a “democratic system of international relations . . . [and create] 
favorable external conditions for a steady and dynamic growth of the Russian economy 
and its technological modernization.”436 The concept also addresses tensions in the near 
abroad by defining the promotion of “good-neighborly relations with adjoining states and 
helping to overcome existing and prevent potential tensions and conflicts in regions 
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adjacent to the Russian Federation,”437 which is one of the goals of current Russian 
foreign policy. At the same time, it mentions protecting of “rights and legitimate interests 
of Russian citizens and compatriots residing abroad.”438 The protection of Russians in 
the near abroad, as stated by Medvedev in wake of the Russo-Georgian War and as 
written in the new foreign policy concept, has been used to the Russian intervention in 
Georgia’s provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia circa 2008, and has been cited in the 
enduring Ukraine crisis from 2013 onwards.  
Russia’s foreign policy objective remains “the enhancement of competitiveness in 
order to promote its global influence and ensure the stability of the system.”439 In other 
words, by retaining regional dominance in political and economic terms, Russia wants to 
take its place at the table in order to ensure stability at home and influence abroad and 
thus shape the order of business in the near abroad. At the same time, Russia would be 
able to modernize Russia’s economy as competitive on a global scale and employ the 
instruments of soft and hard power. With the current path of Russia foreign policy having 
culminated in the annexation if Crimea, supported by propagandistic media campaigns 
and “fueled by revisionist nationalism, a newly resurgent Russia appears determined to 
keep Europe and the United States out of its ‘near abroad,’ all while doing business with 
the West.”440  
3. Domestic Influence on Foreign Policy in Russia 
The precondition for Mankoff’s assessment of foreign policy formation in 
Russia—that “a narrow elite may make foreign policy, but the wider public constraints 
the range of choices available to that elite”441—is based on the consumption and 
availability of objective information as found in modern societies with sophisticated 
media on the western model. With the instruments to project and exercise power 
internally and externally, especially in the context of the capabilities of the security 
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services, the Putin administration reversed the development of the open media landscape 
in Russia after 2000. While under Yeltsin, Russian media was developing according to 
Western editorial standards of independence, including private ownership with prospects 
of advertising revenues. But the Putin administration began interfering in the editorial 
work, as well as using coercion to change media coverage according to the guidance of 
the Kremlin. After media coverage of the Kursk submarine catastrophe, the terrorist 
attack on the Dubrovka Theater, and the Beslan school attack in 2004, which suggested 
deficiencies in the executive branch, the government secured full control of all three 
major TV channels in Russia by the end of 2004.442 The example of the TV channels in 
Russia, which play an important part in the political development of a nation, effectively 
show the use “as tools to shape public perceptions in a way best suited to the Kremlin’s 
goals,”443 thus leading Ryabov to conclude that the authoritarian media environment in 
Russia reversed the function of the media to the same role it had in the Soviet Union: “the 
government’s propaganda apparatus,”444 ensuring a content population that supports 
governmental decisions and promotes the popularity of the Russian President. As in 
former times, “any real or imagined problem can be spun by Russia’s ‘political 
technologists,’”445 the equivalent of western “spin doctors.” 
However, the development of a Russian middle class centered in Russia’s major 
cities led to the desire for more liberalization and critique of Putin’s increasingly 
authoritarian reign, but also for a higher standard of living. After the 2011 presidential 
elections, large protests against the government erupted in Moscow and other major cities 
as allegations of election fraud arose.446 It is in these large cities where the younger 
generation increasingly advances with social media and better paid jobs than in Russia’s 
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rural regions, and where living conditions differ significantly from the larger cities. The 
latest protests in Russia, which erupted over the election fraud, have been the outcry of a 
minority, according to Evans, who concluded that “in Russia today those that are most 
dissatisfied with the Putin regime have not yet linked up with the majority of the Russian 
people.”447 As recent opinion polls in Russia show, a strong majority backs Russia’s 
aggressive foreign policy, with approval rates having risen from 69 percent in 2012 to 83 
percent in 2014 in favor of Putin’s foreign policy.448  
A major domestic factor, if not the major factor, is the Russian economy. After 
the Russian gross domestic product (GDP) fell 50 percent from 1990 to 1995, inflation 
spiked and unemployment rose. While Russia acquired enormous debt, the recovery of 
the economy coincided with Putin’s rise to president.449 Due to high oil prices, which 
peaked at more than 140 U.S. dollars (USD) per barrel in July 2008, the Russian GDP 
increased by an average of about 6.7 percent annually between 2001 and 2007; however, 
that was mainly achieved by the export of oil and gas, representing 20 percent of Russia’s 
economic performance.450  
The economic recovery and decline in Russia’s debt enabled a more assertive 
foreign policy and opened up opportunities for enhanced military reform that had been 
underway since 2008. In operationalizing the national interests, the military reform is 
supposed to ensure the provision of adequate tools for hard-power foreign policy, and as 
such, the reform is a “direct reflection of what the government has made Russia’s 
national interests. The reforms call for the military to modernize, specialize and 
professionalize. The military will need to be able to respond quickly to small-scale or 
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specific threats.”451 Because the military has been equipped with a vast amount of new 
armaments and has enjoyed multiple defense budget increases, state media is using the 
Russian military to portray Putin as a strong man, claiming publicly that no other country 
has superiority over Russia.452 For the domestic message, it is important for Putin to be 
portrayed and perceived as the strong man in Russia in order to not be contested, but 
especially in order to unite the population behind the Kremlin’s foreign policy, which 
uses the paradigm of nationalism and xenophobia to get the masses mobilized for a 
common Russian cause, as determined by the Kremlin.453  
After oil prices became stable at more than 100 USD after January 2011, which 
only enhanced Russia’s position, the price fell rapidly to less than 60 USD at the end of 
2014, threatening Russia’s economic development and its internal stability in the face of 
rising prices and inflation. Contemporary foreign policy has to consider the domestic 
sphere while a population worries more and more about its future, with 80 percent of 
Russians believing that the standard of living will decline and the economy 
deteriorate.454 However, when asked to name the primary reasons for the economic 
situation in Russia and the increases in prices, 45 percent attribute the problems to the 
rise in the price of oil; another 33 percent hold the sanctions of the West responsible; and 
only 23 percent name Russian foreign policy regarding Crimea and Ukraine. However, 
despite increasing challenges to Russia and especially to its economy in the wake of the 
Crimea annexation, 83 percent of Russians think favorably of President Putin and trust in 
his foreign policy decisions.455 
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B. EVOLUTION OF EVENTS IN THE UKRAINE CRISIS OF 2014 
When Leonid Kravchuk declared Ukraine’s independence in 1991, nationalists in 
Russia were already questioning the legal grounds of Khrushchev’s 1954 transfer of 
Crimea to Ukraine—a question that in 1992 led to an unsuccessful initiative in the Duma 
to declare the transfer illegal. Currently, however, a new initiative to denounce the 
legality of Khrushchev’s decision is being prepared in the Federal Council, in which 
Putin enjoys comfortable support.456 Interestingly, in 2011, Wipperfuerth reported on 
rumors that, after the NATO Bucharest summit in April 2008, Putin had announced his 
demand for the transfer of Crimea to Russia, if Ukraine joined NATO.457 Three years 
after the publication of the book, Crimea was annexed by Russia; however, it was in the 
wake of the events of Ukraine’s government toppling after the decision not to sign an EU 
association agreement that sparked public protest, not an issue related to NATO, as 
Yanukovych had already taken NATO membership off the table.  
In the fall of 2013, just short of the EU summit in Lithuania, the Ukrainian 
economy was in distress. The economy had been in recession since 2012 with a declining 
GDP, leading to an average 0 percent GDP change in 2013, a federal budget that could 
not be met, while external debt rose from 76.6 percent in 2012 to 81 percent in 2013, due 
to weak demand and limited access to European capital markets, as well as a risk of 
failure to implement domestic macroeconomic reforms.458 Shortly after Yanukovych’s 
Party of the Regions abstained in the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament) from a law 
that would have allowed imprisoned former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko to receive 
medical treatment in Germany, a government decree was issued halting negotiations with 
the EU on an association agreement, which was supplemented by an agreement for a 
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola 
Azaraov is said to have justified the decision in order to “ensure the national security of 
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Ukraine . . . and to restore . . . lost trade volumes with the Russian Federation.”459 This 
statement comes in light of Russian import restrictions for Ukrainian goods that were 
temporarily imposed in summer 2013 and the announcement by the Russian oil and gas 
corporation Gazprom to deliver only resources that had been paid fully in advance.460 
The news of Yanukovych’s decision to halt the EU association agreement ignited 
spontaneous protests of pro-Euro and pro-West factions within the Ukrainian population 
in the center of Kiev on November 21, 2013. When Ukraine did not sign the long-
announced and planned association agreement at the EU Eastern Partnership Summit 
from  November 28–29, 2013, the protests on the Kievan Independence Square had 
grown to several tens of thousands of peaceful demonstrators calling for the Yanukovych 
administration to step down and proceed with the closure of the EU association 
agreement. In Europe, the decision was received with disappointment, anger, and 
confusion, but encouraged democratic opposition to the decision, as the European 
Council stated in the joint declaration after the event that “the participants of the Vilnius 
Summit take note of the decision by the Ukrainian Government to suspend temporarily 
the process of preparations for signature of the Association Agreement and Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area between the EU and Ukraine. They also take note of the 
unprecedented public support for Ukraine’s political association and economic 
integration with the EU.”461 As the number of protesters grew into the hundreds of 
thousands by December, it became obvious that neither the Kremlin, nor the Ukrainian 
government, nor the German chancellery had expected such a fierce, large, and enduring 
protest, which occupied the Maidan in Kiev and was the nickname “Euromaidan.”462 
During that time, Russia engaged heavily in Ukraine in support of the Yanukovych 
regime, offering additional loans without any preconditions, as opposed to the EU that 
made the release of Tymoshenko a precondition for the EU-Ukraine agreement, or 
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renegotiations on gas prices for Ukraine. Responding to Russia’s enhanced engagement 
amid the Euromaidan protests, Chancellor Merkel and Radek Sikorski, the Polish Foreign 
Minister, criticized Russian interference and rejected the idea of a bidding war about 
Ukraine’s future direction (East or West), adding that the EU would be “more attractive 
in civilisational and economic terms.”463 Merkel added that the EU respects these 
decisions and will continue to offer the closing of the EU association agreement, rather 
than interpreting Ukraine’s decision as a decision for postponement.464 The West’s hopes 
gained traction as, despite calculations by the Ukrainian government and the Kremlin, the 
protests centered around the Maidan in Kiev did not lose momentum, but strengthened 
and repeatedly turned into violent clashes with riot police. With continuing back-and-
forth diplomacy between Brussels, Kiev, and Moscow, negotiations on the EU 
association agreement continued, in which the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, 
and Poland—the Weimarer Triangle—took the lead in mediating an acceptable 
solution.465  
While the occupation of the Maidan continued, the beginning of the Olympic 
Games in Sochi, Russia, on February 9 were paralleled by a calmer situation in Kiev until 
February 18, when violence again erupted and led to bloody clashes, culminating in the 
morning of February 20 when snipers engaged protesters and eighty-eight people were 
killed within forty-eight hours.466 The outburst of violence started when Yanukovych 
tried to push a set of laws through the Ukrainian parliament, which would criminalize 
public demonstrations—laws similar to those that Putin introduced over the course of 
several years. The bloodshed led to mass defections amongst Yanukovych’s allies in the 
Verkhovna Rada, where the Party of the Regions actually enjoyed a majority, and 
consequently pressured Yanukovych to engage in negotiations with the Ukrainian 
opposition mediated in the presence of the foreign ministers of the Weimarer Triangle 
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and Vladimir Lukin, the envoy of the Russian President, during the night of February 
20.467 The negotiations resulted in an agreement on new nationwide presidential elections 
at the end of 2014, as well as other concessions by the Ukrainian government and the end 
of active violence in Kiev. During the signature procedure of the truce on February 21, 
the majority of security and police forces began to withdraw from inner Kiev after 
parliament had adopted a resolution in the wake of the bloody Euromaidan Thursday, 
calling for all forces of the Interior Ministry to return to their barracks. Although this 
order was not given by the president, the forces withdrew, which caught Yanukovych 
completely by surprise.468 Although Yanukovych’s February 21 getaway to the Eastern 
Ukraine city of Kharkiv had not been a panicked reaction to the recognition that all his 
supporters, especially the Party of the Regions and the security forces, had lost any trust 
in him and therefore abandoned him, the Ukrainian president later sought refuge in 
Russia.469 Multiple sources reported that Putin and his circle of trust agreed at that time 
to get Crimea back, allegedly stating on the night from February 22 to 23 that the 
Russians “have to start the work on Crimea’s return into Russia.”470 
After the police in Kiev declared its cooperation with the Euromaidan protesters, 
the Ukrainian parliament on February 22 voted unanimously to remove President 
Yanukovych from office, to hold early presidential elections May 25, and to abolish 
Russia as the second official language in Ukraine. These decisions automatically 
overturned the truce signed on February21, as the proposed government of unity in 
Ukraine was never set up and constitutional reform, foreseen for March to September 
2014 in Ukraine, would not have been possible in light of early elections.471 This effect 
was exploited by Russia, as it perceived the ousting of President Yanukovych as a coup 
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d’etat staged by the West within Russia’s declared sphere of privileged interests and 
causing the final rift between Russia and the West.472 While the Verkhovna Rada voted 
to appoint former parliamentary Speaker Olexander Turchynov as Ukraine’s interim 
president, Moscow denied the new government any recognition, arguing that Victor 
Yanukovych would be the only legitimate president of Russia and calling to fulfill the 
deal brokered on February21.473 Russian fear for the safety of ethnic Russians in Ukraine 
was additionally fueled by the parliament’s hasty decision to abolish Russian as a second 
official language, a law introduced by Yanukovych only in 2012 to strengthen the 
Russian minority in Ukraine, which resembled only 17 percent of the population.474 In 
the aftermath of the transition from the Yanukovych regime to the new interim 
government, resistance movements were formed in Eastern Ukraine, largely dominated 
by ethnic Russians and supported by Yanukovych when the removed president appeared 
in a TV statement on February 28, sent from the Russian city Rostov-on-Don, where he 
stated, “I want to remind everyone that I remain not only the single legitimate president 
of Ukraine, but also the supreme commander in chief.”475 
Despite Putin and Merkel agreeing to do anything to maintain the territorial 
integrity of Ukraine in a telephone call on February 23, opposition to the new 
government and the Euromaidan movement in Kiev emerged in the eastern and 
southeastern parts of Ukraine, allegedly claiming to defend Ukraine from the 
ultranationalist and neonacists that had overthrown the legitimate government in Kiev. 
The large Russian military exercises (with reportedly more than 35,000 troops) held in 
late February close to the Ukrainian-Russian border virtually covered the back of the 
emerging opposition movement in eastern and southeastern Ukraine and gave a clear 
message to the Ukrainians, whether it was intended or not.476 In Crimea especially 
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opposition became fierce when protesters took over the Crimean parliament in 
Sevastopol by force on February 27 and raised the Russian flag.477 The members of the 
Crimean regional parliament voted in a closed parliamentary session—in the presence of 
intimidating pro-Russian gunmen—on a referendum of independence to be held on May 
25 and appointed Sergey Aksyonov as the new Crimean prime minister.478 On February 
28, unidentified armed soldiers, perceived to be Russian forces without any identifying 
insignias, blocked the Crimean airports of Simferopol and Sevastopol, and together with 
Crimean self-defense forces, seized the main administration buildings on the 
peninsula.479 The rapidly evolving events in Crimea were paralleled on February 28 by 
proposals in the Duma to adopt a bill that would facilitate the accession of foreign 
territories to the Russian Federation after a popular referendum was taken.480 All over 
Crimea, armed groups of “Little Green Men”—a reference by journalists to the color of 
the uniforms and unconfirmed origin of the soldiers—and pro-Russian self-defense 
militias took positions around Ukrainian military installations and critical infrastructure, 
taking charge of the whole of Crimea. The Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta called the 
involvement of Russian troops—most probably belonging to the 13,000–15,000 soldiers 
of Russia’s Black Sea fleet legally stationed in Crimea—a “tragicomic masquerade . . . 
[as] the little green men will turn into Russian troops very soon.”481 Despite sufficient 
photographic evidence, Russian personal combat equipment, Russian registered military 
vehicles, and the highly organized and professional appearance of the Little Green Men, 
Putin “promise[d] again that there [were] no regular Russian soldiers active in Crimea” 
when he spoke to Chancellor Merkel on February 28  on the telephone.482 
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With the progressing military situation in Crimea and increasing doubts about the 
explanation of the unidentified armed gunmen to be self-defence militias, on March 1 the 
Duma authorized the Russian president to deploy Russian forces inside Ukraine.483 As it 
became increasingly obvious that Russia was interfering in Crimea on a large scale, 
NATO, as well as the G7 leaders and the EU, called upon Russia to adhere to the basic 
principles of the UN Charter and the 1997 Black Sea basing agreement. In a telephone 
conference between the German Chancellor and the Russian President, Putin admitted 
that the forces in Crimea were directly linked to Russian troops, whereas Merkel 
censured Russia, saying that the “unacceptable Russian intervention in Crimea violated 
international law, especially the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, in which Russia 
pledged to respect Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty in its existing borders.”484 
Additionally, the idea of an OSCE observer mission was brought forward. After the 
telephone conversation with Putin, it became clear that the chancellor and German 
Foreign Minister Steinmeier both felt “deceived and lied to by the Russian president,”485 
convincing them to prepare a tougher approach towards the Kremlin. 
On March 6, the EU discussed a sanction regime towards Russia in the context of 
its involvement in Ukraine. The new Crimean government decided to bring forward the 
referendum on Crimea’s status from May 25 to March 16, which parallel the Ukrainian 
presidential elections.486 The failure of German-led mediation between Russia and the 
West on March 5 at the foreign ministerial level, and the new timing for the illegitimate 
referendum, sped up the EU process to agree on sanctions. Initially, due to the reluctance 
of Germany, Italy, and France, EU leaders only wanted to talk about suspension of 
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diplomatic contacts, but due to the rescheduling of the Crimean referendum, the EU 
nations agreed to a three-tier sanction system, with economic sanctions in the last tier; 
however, even EU officials were surprised by Germany’s tougher stance in that, as 
Merkel believed, “one must show Russia that its behavior has consequences.”487  
On March 11, after the Crimean parliament had voted for its independence in 
preparation of the referendum and to bypass Ukrainian constitutional law, the West 
unisono condemned the referendum as illegal and called upon Russia to restrain its 
intervention. On March 12, during the European Parliament discussion about the situation 
in Crimea and Ukraine, a Green Party member of the European Parliament, Rebecca 
Harms, stated that the EU had a strong tool at hand and pointed out that “45% of Russia’s 
trade is with the European Union,” adding that the EU would not engage “in some kind 
of military conflict. Make it clear to Russia, if they want to isolate themselves, then that 
is what is going to happen.”488 While the U.S. and the EU prepared sanctions, including 
“travel bans and visa restrictions as well as asset freezes on Russian officials who the EU 
decides were associated with the incursion into Crimea,”489 the violence in Eastern 
Ukraine increased, especially in the industrial cities of Donetzk and Luhansk, which are 
dominated by ethnic Russians. In Germany on March13, the chancellor gave a policy 
statement to the deputies of the Bundestag, where she stressed several important key 
points concerning the situation in Crimea. Commenting on comparisons of the situation 
in Kosovo 1999 and the 2014 Crimea situation, Merkel rejected the “shameful 
comparison . . . [as] Russia’s actions in Ukraine undoubtedly represent a violation of 
fundamental principles of international law. They would not be relativised by other 
international law violations.”490  
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A United Nations resolution draft to encourage nations to disregard the results of 
the planned Crimean referendum was vetoed by Russia in the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) on March 15. In the referendum held on March 16, the Crimean 
population was asked whether they sought an accession to Russia, which the Crimean 
parliament had already endorsed on March 11, or to return to Crimea’s 1992 constitution 
of autonomy within Ukraine.491 Under the intimidating influence of more than fifteen 
thousand Russian soldiers, armed pro-Russian self-defense forces, and armed Cossacks 
that have surrounded all Ukrainian military troops in Crimea, 96 percent of the people 
voted for accession to the Russian Federation, although the results were later called into 
doubt.492  
After having recognized Crimean independence on March 17, Putin delivered a 
sweeping blow to the West in his speech on March 18 and elaborated on all accusations 
made toward Russia in connection with the Crimean situation, especially on the 
accusations of violations of international law, stating, with reference to Western 
interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, that “they [the West] say we are violating 
norms of international law. Firstly, it’s a good thing that they at least remember that there 
exists such a thing as international law—better late than never,” while continuing to deny 
any breach of international law.493 With an appeal to Germans, Putin reminded the 
audience of Germany’s strong will to reunite, which the Russians have poignantly 
supported, thus expecting that “the citizens of Germany will also support the aspiration of 
the Russians, of historical Russia, to restore unity.”494 Based on the Russian president’s 
request, on March 18, 2014, the Federal Assembly adopted a constitutional law to grant 
accession to Crimea and the city of Sevastopol as new entities of the Russian Federation. 
With that, Russia mastered the formal annexation of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol in 
an Anschluss-like operation. 
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After the referendum and the annexation by Russia, the EU and the United States 
executed the first round of sanctions on Russians officials and high-level Ukrainians who 
took part in the land grab. In the first week of April 2014, armed pro-Russian protesters 
seized government buildings in the Eastern parts of Ukraine, igniting new fears for 
separatist threats to Ukraine’s stability after the loss of Crimea. In a 2015 TV 
documentary, Putin made clear how determined the Russian president was regarding the 
operation to take over Crimea. When Putin responded to the question of “putting Russia’s 
nuclear weapons into a state of combat readiness . . . Putin said: We were ready to do 
this. [Crimea] is our historical territory. Russian people live there. They were in danger. 
We cannot abandon them.”495 However, with the U.S. and Germany feeling deliberately 
deceived by Putin, which was only reinforced after Putin openly admitted that the “Little 
Green Men” had been under Russian command, the general consensus in the West was, 
that unlike 2008 when the West and Russia returned to business as usual after a short 
time, this time “Russia must pay a high prize for its seizure of Crimea.”496 
C. INTERNATIONAL AND GERMAN REACTIONS TO THE RUSSIAN 
ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA 
After the change of government in Kiev and the ousting of former President 
Yanukovych, the West hoped to have calmed the situation in a highly divided Ukraine. 
However, after pro-Russian protests turned violent in eastern and southeastern Ukraine, 
and especially with the pace of events advancing in Crimea, supported by the massive 
intervention of the “Little Green Men,” an initial international paralysis could be 
observed, even if only briefly. In recognition of Russia’s dominant role in the sphere of 
influence, efforts for consultations and mediation were widely used in an approach to find 
a solution with Ukraine and Russian leadership that continued to deny having an active 
role in the events in Ukraine.  
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The international pressure and expectations towards Russia gradually increased 
the closer the announced Crimean referendum came. However, multiple sessions of the 
UNSC in New York and constant back-and-forth diplomacy in Europe—led by Germany 
and France and supplemented by the United States—did not achieve satisfactory results 
with Moscow. Thus, after the annexation of Crimea, the EU and U.S. sanctions of the 
first level were imposed on Russia, which included twenty-one Russian and Ukrainian 
officials who were involved in the violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, while the 
United States acted against high-level Russian politicians in terms of visa restrictions and 
freezing financial assets.497 In the direct wake of the Crimean annexation, the United 
States and Canada imposed additional sanctions aimed at Russia’s economic leaders, 
while Canada halted any military cooperation with Russia.498 The G7 leaders announced 
on March 24 that Russian membership (G8 format) would be suspended, and the 
upcoming G8 summit in Sochi, Russia, was called off, while the United States added 
more individuals and companies to the sanction list.499  
In Germany, Joe Kaeser, the chief executive officer of Siemens (a major 
technology and engineering group), met with President Putin on March 26 as a sign of 
support and referred to the crisis in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, as “short-term 
turbulences,” to which Kaeser would not pay much attention, hoping that the economic 
relations between Russia and Germany would not be further strained.500 Kaeser stated 
two weeks later that he regretted the word choice. However, the discussion about 
imposing stronger sanctions if Russia would interfere with the May 25 presidential 
elections in Ukraine were severely influenced by the Ostausschuss, who urged the 
chancellery not to follow tougher U.S. sanctions, which included not only persons, but 
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also Russian energy and arms companies.501 Although the German public attitude 
towards Russia had declined in early 2014, it was still divided over the question of how 
to address Russia, as only 38 percent of Germans favored economic sanctions, 19 percent 
favored the suspension of Russia’s G8 membership, but only 40 percent foresaw a 
stronger role for Germany.502 
When a Russian-made surface-to-air missile system (known as SA-11) shot down 
a Malaysian Airlines Boeing 777 bound for Kuala Lumpur over the eastern Ukrainian 
separatist area, all 298 passengers and crew aboard were killed. That event changed 
European attitudes. Among the dead were one hundred and ninety-six Dutch passengers, 
given that flight MH17 originated in Amsterdam. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that 
popular attitude, especially in the Netherlands and Germany, changed dramatically, and 
calls for tougher sanctions against Russia were voiced. Although only 40 percent favored 
a stronger role for Germany after the annexation of Crimea in March, this figure jumped 
up 19 percent by the end of July to 59 percent, while 80 percent of the Germans blamed 
Russia for the increased violence.503 The exact crash site was within the combat zone 
between Ukrainian forces and pro-Russian separatists, and the recovery operations were 
severely hampered. Russia denied any involvement in the incident and explained that 
Ukrainian fighter jets shot down the airliner. Russia’s obstructing behavior in trying to 
bring the responsible persons for the slaughter of the passengers to justice and its denial 
tactics—seen not only in the MH17 incident, but throughout the Ukrainian crisis—led to 
additional rounds of sanctions on July 25 and 30 with nations like Australia, Japan, 
Norway, and Switzerland joining the sanctions against Russia.504 
Despite the increasingly tougher sanctions regime against Russia, Germany 
always endeavored to make “it clear that the door to partnership with Russia remains 
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wide open.”505 Merkel and Steinmeier agreed on a triad of principles in Germany’s 
approach towards Russia in light of the Ukraine crisis: keep an open communication 
channel with Russia, enhance sanctions, if required, and maintain assistance for 
Ukraine.506 Over the course of 2014, with intensive fighting in eastern Ukraine, several 
sanctions were added to the list, which were supposed to remain in place for at least a 
year before they would be put on the table for reevaluation.507 
So far, sanctions have been considered tough; and along with the political blame 
and continuous demands at the Kremlin’s address to exert its influence towards lasting 
peace in Ukraine, they show an impact on Russia. In Germany, the sanctions are 
paralleled by the cancellation of Russian-German governmental consultations and the 
silent support, of opposition from the Ostausschuss after the tragedy of MH17, especially 
in that economic bilateral trade relations will be affected. According to the Federal 
Foreign Office, “in 2015, bilateral trade declined by 35 per cent compared with the 
previous year, to EUR 7.74 billion. In January and February 2015, German exports to 
Russia fell by 34 per cent, to EUR 3.07 billion, and Russian exports to Germany declined 
by 36 per cent, to EUR 4.66 billion.”508 This is a sign not only of the effects of the 
sanctions, but also of the general trend in German-Russian trade relations that the 
Ostausschuss tried to withstand. At the end of 2014, more than a third of German 
business engaged in operations in Russia planned to cancel projected investments; and on 
the societal side, numerous consultation projects and cooperation forums have been put 
on hold because “trust in Moscow has evaporated.”509 A consequence of the serious 
disruption in German-Russian relations is characterized by the significant emigration of 
Westerners out of Russia. For example, the number of Germans, who are among the most 
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important foreign investors, living in Russia declined by 31 percent between January 
2014 and January 2015.510 
However, Russian Prime Minster Medvedev stated in April 2015, after one year 
of an increasingly tightening sanctions regime in response to Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea, that the sanctions have “done ‘meaningful’ harm to the economy, but that it was 
a price worth paying,”511 estimating the loss for Russia’s economy at 26.8 billion USD. 
Medvedev’s statement came one week after President Putin talked about the Russian 
economy in a TV appearance, where he concentrated on the state of the domestic 
economy after the ruble had lost 50 percent in 2014 (although it has since rebounded by 
30 percent).512 Nevertheless, Putin’s long elaborations on the state of the domestic 
Russian economy are seen as a sign of the vital importance of the topic to the Kremlin. In 
light of these figures, Moscow has to realize that “the desire for cooperation with Russia 
has dropped during the Putin years and the demand for Germany to stand up to Russia 
has increased.”513 On the other side, Putin is well aware of the fact that whatever 
sanctions are to come in the future, they “will only go as far as Berlin permits.”514 In this 
regard, it should be noted, that the sanctions from November 2014 are directed against 
key players of the separatist movements in Ukraine, not directly at Russia. 
German scholar Ulrich Kuehn has criticized the current sanctions, saying that they 
lack a clear objective and asking whether the goal is the withdrawal of Russian forces 
from Ukraine, including Crimea, or regime change in Moscow?515 Kuehn, arguing to 
understand the Russian perspective, assessed that either is unlikely to be achieved with 
the current course of action. This opens up the question on what alternative options the 
leaders of the West had at hand during the fast development leading to Crimea’s 
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annexation. A military option was never on the table in the United States or Europe, and 
least of all in Germany, where the chancellor ruled out any military engagement early on 
during the crisis, but for a small part to an OSCE mission, which in the end was not 
executed. Through Moscow’s military involvement in Crimea, Putin challenged the 
universal validity of the Westphalian system of states and violated not only the UN 
Charter, but also the Budapest memorandum of 1994, as well as the 1975 Final Act of the 
CSCE. Consequently, as Putin’s forceful change of borders required an answer by the 
democracies of the West, only various possibilities of sanctioning Moscow were 
available.  
While economic sanctions usually target a country and its economy as a whole, 
the initial sanctions on Russia were interpreted as “smart” sanctions in that they targeted 
selected individuals that bore responsibility for the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of 
Crimea, instead of the whole of Russia.516 These sanctions work in several ways: they 
signal to Russia that the West perceives Russia’s course of action as violating 
international law, which is the foundation of twenty-first century statecraft (at least, that 
is what Western politicians believed to be the modus operandi since the end of the Cold 
War); they penalize the perpetrators of international relations, as well as anyone striving 
to repeat such a coup de main; and they aim at the diplomatic players to coerce the 
Russian leadership to change its course and respect Ukrainian territorial integrity, 
renounce the annexation of Crimea, and play by the universally validated rules of 
international relations.517 
Some critics of sanctioning Russia argue that the sanctions are “a demonstrative 
act that allows leaders to make a moral statement, without actually influencing 
developments on the ground.”518 However, such criticism disregards the indirect effects 
of sanctions and especially the reasons behind imposing sanctions. Although the effects 
of the imposed sanctions on the Russian economy were considerable, the indirect effects, 
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causing an atmosphere within the Russian economy of uncertainty and mistrust, were 
more painful.519 This has severe impacts on the economic stability and flow of foreign 
investments. As German foreign policy has been caught between interest-led Realpolitik 
with Russia in terms of economic interdependency and valued-based Moralpolitik, the 
evolution of sanctions against Russia were well considered by those in power. Even 
before the MH17 disaster, Merkel and Steinmeier had used the same language in their 
public appearances, deliberately showing unity in the crisis, although criticism was heard 
(especially within the SPD) regarding the penalizing approach to Russia. Critics of the 
grand coalition’s approach were found in the party Die Linke and in the “Russian-Firster” 
sections of the SPD, such as the former state premier of Brandenburg, Matthias Platzeck 
(SPD)—now chairman of the German-Russian Forum—who called for Germany to 
endorse the annexation as a means of appeasing the relations with the Kremlin.520 
Platzeck’s comments drew significant outrage in Germany, even within the SPD, because 
his close SPD friend and current Foreign Minister Steinmeier responded by stating that 
he repeatedly made clear that the annexation “is a clear violation of law which we cannot 
endorse nor recognize,” adding that Germans have to “stand by our common European 
position which is that we don’t accept what has happened and we don’t accept Europe’s 
borders being changed again 70 years after the war.”521 The international and German 
reactions to the annexation of Crimea started with selective and targeted sanctions but 
grew as the course of events in Ukraine unfolded. Reactions from the international 
community and Germany emerged piece by piece and could only be reactive to the events 
as they happened. In case of the Russian annexation of Crimea, according to Chancellor 
Merkel and her Foreign Minister Steinmeier, “‘the strength of the law’ must be defended 
against ‘the law of the strong.’”522 
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D. DOES PUTIN’S POWER PLAY PAY OFF? 
In Kissinger’s realpolitical perception, “the statesman manipulates reality; his first 
goal is survival; he feels responsible not only for the best but also for the worst 
conceivable outcome.”523 So far, Putin’s course of action has shown mixed results, but in 
Kissinger’s perception, Putin achieved “survival”—his own as well as Russia’s—as the 
annexation of Crimea boosted his approval rating, peaking at 88 percent in October 
2014.524 At the same time, however, the “worst conceivable outcome” can be seen in the 
current state of Russia’s economy: despair. Putin, despite Russia’s enormous currency 
reserves, has to decide which course to take to pursue his foreign policy objectives. 
Moscow’s current strategy of power politics—Realpolitik at its best—is costly for the 
country in that it is implemented at the cost of Russia’s economic development and 
international standing. If the Kremlin’s major objective of a stable economy is to be 
achieved, the president has to take into account that “prosperity cannot be built in 
isolation . . . it comes from able management of interaction with other countries, creative 
exploitation of the opportunities such interaction provides.”525 
Thomas Graham, writing in 2009 about Russia’s sources of insecurity, states in 
his conclusion that “the [Russian] leadership needs to bring the country together, to instill 
a sense that all citizens are bound by a common fate, and to mobilise the elites and the 
rest of the population for this ambitious undertaking. Only in this way can Russia’s 
leaders ensure the country’s survival and territorial integrity, and achieve the great power 
status they believe is their country’s due.”526 Through Russian actions in Ukraine, 
supported by nationalist, pan-slavist rhetoric, Putin has united the population to the 
common fate of Russia’s great power ambitions and has drawn the elites closer to him. 
With their assets abroad frozen (due to the sanctions), the elites will become more 
dependent on the Kremlin. Evidence of Putin’s domestic success is shown in an opinion 
poll from December 2014, where 67 percent of Russians agreed that “the main 
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motivation behind the West’s policy on Crimea and eastern Ukraine was hostility and a 
wish to seize the moment to exert pressure on Russia . . . [while] only 12 percent 
associated the West’s actions with the idea that Russia had annexed foreign territory and 
violated international law.”527 
With military reform well underway since 2008, the Russians have significantly 
increased the operational expeditionary capabilities, and foremost its command and 
control structures, including a huge modernization program, aiming at higher flexibility 
and regional deployability. The massive military exercises in 2014 and the Crimean 
operations are sufficient proof of the enhanced abilities since 2008. In terms of the 2010 
Russian Military Doctrine, Putin’s actions are actually in line with the clear statement 
“that Russia’s near abroad will remain in Russian interests, economically and 
politically.”528  
Putin’s power play had two unintended consequences: first, in search of 
alternative partners, the sanctions would drive Russia closer to other bilateral partners, 
such as China or India; and second, the targeted sanctions have made the Russian 
government the main source for “profits for many oligarchs”529 and those among the one 
hundred and sixty targeted individuals, uniting the elite circles around the president. The 
high approval rates for Putin show that the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent 
Russian course of action in eastern Ukraine, reported by a vast media propaganda 
campaign, have led to broad support for Putin’s regime based upon ultra-nationalist and 
anti-Western attitudes.530 Multiple scholars argue, therefore, that the Russian annexation 
of Crimea was about a Ukraine reluctant to accept Russia dominance, “to ensure Russia’s 
influence in its neighbor, to regain the “empire’s jewel,” and to ensure Putin’s main 
objective: to legitimize and safeguard his authoritarian reign.”531 In this regard, Putin can 
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also score domestic success, despite having destroyed the rules of engaging with the 
West. 
Berlin has long been Russia’s strongest asset in Europe when it came to mediating 
of diverging interests between the West and Russia, but also in terms of economic 
relations. Putin maintains strong connections to Germany because, besides his time in 
East Germany as a former intelligence officer in the KGB, he speaks fluent German 
(having attended a German school in Russia), and considers former Chancellor Schroeder 
a personal friend; he referred to returning to Dresden and Saxony, where he spent his 
KGB time, as “returning home.”532 The personal relations between Chancellor Merkel 
and President Putin, however, have changed significantly, as now the meeting 
atmosphere is being described as “cold and businesslike.”533 Merkel has even 
commented that hearing “Putin speak German, she is reminded of listening to an 
interrogator.”534 Therefore, it can be argued that Putin was aware of Germany’s foreign 
policy identity in light of the historical context, which in the twenty-first century will still 
reluctantly use military force; but that does not imply that Germany will stand-by and 
turn a blind eye on its values. Writing for the German Council on Foreign Relations, 
Andreas Rinke referred to the way Putin had “lost Berlin” and pointed out that “Putin 
long ago crossed Berlin’s red line”535 by reverting to violence instead of diplomacy 
within the rules of the UN charter.  
While most of the Western heads of state and government did not take part in the 
70th commemoration of the German capitulation (the end of the European part of World 
War II), Merkel did go to Moscow but denied Putin her attendance at the biggest Russian 
military parade since 1945 and instead laid a wreath at the Russian Tomb of the 
Unknown Soldier. However, far from any sign of German-Russian détenté, Merkel said 
during the joint press conference with President Putin on May 10, 2015, that the German-
Russian cooperation of recent years had suffered a major blow over the “criminal and 
                                                 
532Szabo, Germany, Russia, 1–2.  
533Ibid., 43. 
534Ibid., 2. 
535Rinke, “How Putin Lost Berlin,” 9–10. 
 145 
illegal annexation of Crimea.”536 The strong tone and the usage of the word criminal is 
rather uncommon in international diplomatic language and can be interpreted only as 
considerable proof of the deep split between Germany and Russia. This is even more the 
case as Chancellor Merkel is said to be rather quiet and pragmatic—following the motto 
“think, consult, decide”537—and President Putin fluently speaks German, indicating that 
Merkel was fully aware of what she said, while Putin definitely heard and understood her 
implications.  
To summarize, while Putin’s power play definitely paid off in the domestic 
sphere—at least for the short term—the international sphere has been contaminated by 
foul rhetoric and, from a Western perspective, broken promises from which Putin cannot 
back off without losing support and domestic approval. In light of the sanctions and the 
implications for Russia’s economy, short-term and long-term consequences loom dark on 
the horizon. However, because the sanctions are “shared pain,” and because the Western 
or German economy is also feeling the pain of deteriorating trade relations, it might be a 
gamble for Putin to count on the Russian tenacity to overcome the sanctions or to wait 
out however long the West can endure the situation. 
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V. THE END OF GERMANY’S OSTPOLITIK IN 2014? 
Regarding Germany’s determination for an active German-Russian relationship, 
former chancellor Helmut Schmidt made the point that “for many long centuries, they 
[the Russians] have been our neighbors, and because they will continue to be so, we 
Germans want to have normal relations and live in peace with them.”538 Schmidt’s 
statement encapsulated the general reaction in 2014 by the body politic of 
Russlandversteher (Russian Firsters) in Germany, who, like Platzeck, called for an 
appeasement of Russia by a diplomatic recognition of the annexation of Crimea.  
After 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany emerged as a nation that oriented 
itself and lived by the rules and norms of the UN Charter as it integrated itself into the 
Western European and Atlantic system, ensuring that any doubts about German 
revanchism would have no substance. Such fears were prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s, 
a time in which the FRG included a very large population of displaced Germans from 
Central and Eastern Europe whose political orientation may have threatened to take a 
kind of revanchist form, but did not. The proof of this fact came with the advent of 
Brandt’s Ostpolitik in the early 1970s and unification in 1990. The significance of taking 
a rule-based approach for post-reunification in Germany derives from the forty years of 
national division and the Cold War. All the same, Germany was rebuilt in the center of a 
possible thermo-nuclear battlefield and yet miraculously achieved its peaceful 
reunification, unlike during 1864–1871. Directly after the fall of the Wall in 1989, 
Helmut Kohl recognized the Oder-Neisse-border once more to assure Poland and to 
confirm that Germany is deeply rooted in the rule of international law.539 The 
Westbindung and its European and Transatlantic links, which are at the core of 
Germany’s political foundation in terms of international relations, were the prerequisites 
for engaging closer with the East, which Konrad Adenauer first did in 1955 and which 
then-Egon Bahr and Willy Brandt did in the late 1960s with a revised Ostpolitik in terms 
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of cooperation through rapprochement with the GDR and the Soviet Union. Brandt’s and 
Bahr’s Ostpolitik belongs to the past, of course, in that it reached its goals of reunification 
in 1990. One would not know it in 2015, though, as Bahr’s account is invoked constantly, 
and often out of context, which does little good for him or for the present political 
situation. Now the question is about Germany’s influence on Russia’s domestic 
development as a power in Europe and a nation that aspires to partake in identical values. 
The architects of a new Ostpolitik believed in their misunderstanding that Russia was 
malleable and could be influenced externally; however, “the policy was never envisaged 
as a means to democratize or change the Soviet Union.”540 The post-1990 Ostpolitik was 
initially aiming at supporting Russia to manage what many hoped would be its linear and 
progressive transition from the communist regime of the Soviet Union to democratic 
structures and political institutions in Russia. Guided by German gratitude for the Soviet 
Union’s support of overcoming the German division, Germany felt responsible for 
supporting this Russian that optimists hoped would cleave to the western orientation of 
Germany from its Sonderweg after 1945.541  
In this regard, Germany’s Russia policy changed, and consequently, its post-Cold 
War Ostpolitik as well. While most of the Eastern European states were engaged within 
the frameworks of NATO and the ENP, Russia retained its special status for Germany. 
The approach to Russia was two-fold, as “with the Ostpolitik, the modernization 
partnership is based on the concept of modernization through interdependence. It assumes 
that Russia cannot be changed through pressure from the outside but only through 
continual and nonthreatening interaction and interdependence, which will lead to change 
from within.”542 The aim was to achieve such political development as rule of law, 
protection of human rights, and democratic freedom through economic interdependence: 
cooperation through trade substituted for cooperation through rapprochement. However, 
the economic-driven foreign policy approach of a “modernization partnership” or 
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“Wandel durch Handel” (cooperation through trade) “is in tension with the civilian power 
emphasis on human rights, multilateralism, and ‘Moralpolitik.’”543  
Nevertheless, the German-Russian economic relations in the 1990s and thereafter 
did nothing to change Russia into a democracy, nor did Putin divert from its authoritarian 
path, which, since 2012, has become painfully evident. So, despite the lack of success to 
change Russia internally, Foreign Minister Steimeier remains committed to the legacy of 
Brandt’s Ostpolitik, which he summarizes as “a firm rooting in the West and openness 
vis-à-vis Russia belong together.”544 While Germany’s Ostpolitik after 1990 was about 
the promotion of economic interdependence and democratic transformation, Russia’s 
recent policy is about the European order and is formerly based on the Westphalian peace 
of 1648 and the cosmos of the classical European great power system in which Russia 
became such a great power, along with its European rivals and at the expense of its 
neighbors. Within weeks of the Russian intervention in Ukraine and the annexation of 
Crimea, the European post-Cold War order, “in which [Germany and] Chancellor Merkel 
had invested so much effort to nurture and sustain was shattered.”545 The current 
situation in 2015, after a quarter century of what seemed to be perpetual peace (but was 
not) has had grave impact on the European security order. In other words, “Europe is now 
much less secure, and its security structure less stable, more confrontional, and less 
predictable.”546 
The realization that Ostpolitik did not permanently yield the results the Germans 
had hoped for in the 1990s, and even as late as 2012, came with a swiftness and brutality 
in Ukraine that shocked Germans. This shock exists for two main reasons, and it is no 
surprise that Germany has evolved as the key leader in approaching Russia in the wake of 
Germany’s post-2008 emergence as the power at the center. First of all, despite the 
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argument Berlin no long considers Russia to be a strategic partner by Berlin,547 the 
unique geostrategic, economic, cultural, and historical position of Germany regarding 
Russia remains valid in that Germany is perceived to be the “only country that can broker 
an end to the most serious crisis in East-West relations since before Gorbachev came to 
power.”548 Chancellor Merkel had a significant number of telephone calls with the 
Russian leader (more than forty between March and November 2014), in addition to 
personal meetings.549 Second, Germany’s has exhibited a high level of engagement and 
subsequent leadership, and, being true to the motto “partnership in leadership,” the 
United States has “delegated the diplomacy of the Ukraine crisis to Germany.”550 This is 
evidence to the united calls by German President Gauck, Foreign Minister Steinmeier, 
and Defense Minster von der Leyen at the Munich Security Conference in 2014 for 
Germany to assume more responsibility in international and global affairs. This policy 
comes as Washington once again realizes that Germany is a key partner in all areas of 
European policy, and will be a key player in Europe on dealing with Russia. “Berlin 
plays a decisive role in shaping a coherent and successful Russia policy and no unified 
European policy on Russia is possible without Germany.”551 Whether it is the Euro zone 
crisis or the Ukraine crisis, Germany is currently a leading power in Europe, while fear of 
a “German Uebermacht”552 (German superiority as proclaimed by the Spiegel, a leading 
investigative magazine in Germany) is exaggerated. Germany’s new role in leadership is 
a fact in the year 2014–2015 and an uncomfortable and unfamiliar fact for many amid a 
world of disorder that defies easy rules or a relaxed diplomacy.  
 However, as stated earlier concerning the post-Cold War Ostpolitik, Berlin has to 
acknowledge that “the ‘strategic partnership’ has proven never to have existed; the 
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‘modernization partnership’ [with Moscow] did not get off the ground; [and]…the 
political ‘special relationship’ has come to an end.”553 The consequence of the policy 
failure for Berlin is grave and heightens the burden for Germany’s Russian Policy; 
however, in March 2014, most observers still believed that “no matter what happens, 
Germany will keep talking.”554 The annexation of Crimea, Russian-backed separatism in 
eastern Ukraine, and especially the MH17 airliner tragedy were a wake-up call. As 
NATO Deputy Secretary General put it, “We have all woken up to a new security reality 
here in Europe.”555 This cold dawn is consequently not the end of Germany’s Ostpolititk, 
but the end of what had once been an Ostpolitik with German-Russian relations of détente 
and cooperation with a Russia that became a kind of fantasy in the face of how Moscow 
has altered the rules of international relations by force. Such a diplomatic revolution as 
visible in the Crimean annexation requires a new approach: a matured Ostpolitik 2020, 
unified with a European approach and preferably on common grounds with the West, 
thus including the United States balancing its approach between Asia and Europe and 
thereby re-pivoting to Europe.  
A. ROOT CAUSES AND THE EXTENT OF FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE 
On March 2, 2014, when Putin, finally and with thinly veiled pride, admitted that 
the military forces in Crimea were indeed directly under Russian control, he overstepped 
the red line of statecraft in Berlin. Germany’s government under Angela Merkel then 
reached a point of no return. With Putin’s aggression accompanied by a coordinated 
mass-persuasion campaign in Russia that would have done the years 1915 or 1936 proud, 
the regime let loose a wave of nationalistic and pan-slavist rhetoric. Putin showed his 
own coming-to-terms with history. By deliberately violating the 1994 Budapest 
Memorandums on security assurances, upon which the sovereignty of Ukraine rested, and 
                                                 
553Adomeit, “German-Russian Relations,” 31. 
554“Germany’s Russia Policy: Which War to Mention?” The Economist, March 22, 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21599410-angela-merkel-and-her-foreign-minister-crisis-
throwback-worse-times-which-war. 
555Alexander Vershbow, “Prospects for NATO-Russia Relations: Keynote Address by NATO Deputy 
Secretary General Ambassador Alexander Vershbow at the 2015 Leangkollen Conference, Oslo,” NATO, 
last updated April 2, 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_117055.htm.  
 152 
in which Moscow agreed to “respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing 
borders of Ukraine . . . [and] . . . to refrain from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine,”556 the Kremlin clarified Putin’s 
understanding of the rule of international law, which, according to the Russians, the 
American partner opponent had violated dozens of times more brutally (in the Russian 
narrative) under the motto of two wrongs indeed make a right.  
Moreover, Moscow did not recognize the new Ukrainian government and argued 
that the ousting of president Yanukovych was illegal, as was dealing with an alleged Nazi 
junta in Kiev to which they are not bound by any treaty.  
The boldness and speed of events in 2014 caught a West (mesmerized by Islamic 
terrorism and world economic depression) by surprise. It has been widely argued that 
“Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is not an isolated incident, but a game-changer in 
European security”557 and cannot be accepted under any circumstance. With Germany’s 
current Ostpolitik in disrepair, Berlin is caught between interest-led Realpolitik and 
value-base Moralpolitik. The crisis in Ukraine shows the strained limitations of this 
choice between interests and morality in diplomacy. The conflict pushed the limits of 
these ideals to their world historical edge as the Zeitgeist brutally shifts from peace to 
conflict and ultimately crisis. The imposed sanctions on Moscow by the western powers 
are not something that is taken lightly, and the pain of the sanctions imposed on Russia is 
shared by Europeans, foremost by those Germans whose cars are no longer sold to 
Russians and whose high quality steel is no longer forged for new towns and so forth. 
Although Russia had only been Germany’s eleventh largest trading partner, at least three 
hundred thousand jobs depend on Russian export in a nation where export of high quality 
goods is the highest national purpose in the face of globalization. Germany imported 
mainly gas and oil, 36 percent and 35 percent, respectively, from Russia in 2013.558 This 
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might explain why Berlin is not happy to impose sanctions at all, as the consequences are 
significant, while US-Russian trade relations, for example, are negligible.  
The fact that Germany under Chancellor Merkel has emerged as the key player in 
negotiating with Putin and has imposed sanctions (although initially as a mere diplomatic 
sign, which is powerful and which creates “meaningful pain” in Russia) is evidence that 
even the pragmatic and reserved Chancellor Merkel has come to a point where enough is 
enough. This quiet figure has taken on the mantle of statecraft from earlier times and 
must resist the alteration of the European peaceful order that forms the basis of German 
national existence of security, peace, and prosperity in a united Europe in a time of peace.  
Within domestic politics, Germany’s Russia policy boasts two core groups: (1) 
the human rights and values faction, representing, for example, the Green Party in the 
Bundestag; and (2) the members of parliament of the CDU fraction, while the realist, 
interest-led, economy-focused group represents the majority of the SPD and, via the 
Ostausschuss, the majority of Germany’s economy.559 However, it should be noted that 
the Green Party did accept Schroeder’s Russia policy while being in a coalition with the 
SPD between 1998 and 2005.560 One year after the annexation of Crimea, it has become 
clear that Berlin has hit a dead-end in diplomatic relations in terms of Ostpolitik. The 
Kremlin seems convinced that the confrontational course towards the West is better for 
ensuring Putin’s dominant position in domestic Russia and enhances Russia’s 
international image as a great and strong power. Cooperation and all the glory of Wandel 
durch Annaehrung seems to have fallen from grace, and the prospects for a return to the 
status quo ante bellum are dim in June 2015. To sum up, in regards of the main challenge 
of Germany’s traditional Ostpolitik, it has to be acknowledged that “Germany’s idealistic 
Russia policy is simply not compatible with Putin’s realpolitik” because the strategic 
environment has changed; thus, the makers of European and German policy are required 
to try new approaches.561 This is a diplomatic revolution that goes against the grain of 
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much that has been central to German statecraft, and is thus an especially painful and 
difficult process.  
As discussed in Chapter III on the essentials of foreign policy, change can occur 
on four different levels. Accepting the fact that Germany under Merkel has indeed 
changed its approach towards Russia in the wake of the annexation of Crimea and the 
continuing violence, it can be doubted that this change resembles just another routine, 
partial adjustment, which would widen the scope. Such an explanation could be attributed 
to the post-Georgian War reaction after 2008, which returned rather fast to normalcy. The 
current change is more a program change ignited by external shock of a fundamental 
kind. It is an earthquake to rattle the already shaken edifice of Europe since the world 
economic crisis. Program change, according to Herman, is inherently a qualitative change 
involving new instruments, such as sanctions to pursue an objective. Consequently, “what 
is done and how it is done changes, but the purpose for which it is done remain 
unchanged.”562 The longstanding continuity in German-Russian relations has been 
interrupted by discontinuity in international and domestic politics, but also in the public 
perception of power and the European order. As Stent, Pond, and others have argued 
regarding the brutality of the aircraft shoot down, the so-called MH17 tragedy acted as a 
catalyst for the negative perception of the Ukraine crisis. After all, a plane full of Dutch 
holiday-seekers brutally blasted from the sky in a war zone constitutes a sign akin to the 
Serbian irredentist mortar shells hitting the marketplace in Sarajevo in the early 1990s. Or 
it signifies something far worse: the return of great power conflict to the core of Europe 
as the most severe test of Ostpolitik since the classic crises of the Cold War. The 
subsequent public outrage in Europe and the German debate on how to deal with the 
crisis transformed the perception of the German public, leading to a 13 percent increase 
to 61 percent in support of a tough stance towards Russia.563  
The root cause of the change can be found in the bold violation of international 
law: the trespass of the core functioning principles of Germany’s international relations 
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and the questioning of the security order of post-Cold War Europe as a whole leading to a 
moral dilemma in the Bundeskanzleramt. For Putin, the hybrid or irregular warfare 
annexation of Crimea sent a clear message to the Russian population, but also to the 
international community, when he showed everyone that Russia is back as a great power 
on the international stage. Such a coup de main is how only a great power “can get away 
with such boldness.”564 As the current situation in Eastern Europe is unlikely to be a 
temporary phenomenon, Germany cannot comfortably just revert to old approaches in the 
school of Egon Bahr and his many, many acolytes. Once more, Germany, and this time, 
the most powerful Germany that has existed in a long time, both politically and morally, 
is once again the nation caught in between—mediating between the West and Russia and 
torn between values and interests. However, in a more realistic approach, Germany is 
embedded in its western integration, which is being put to an unexpected and bloody test. 
B. AN END TO “RUSSIA FIRSTER”? 
The Russlandversteher have voiced critique over the approach to Russia, and in 
the case of Matthias Platzeck has even called for acceptance of the annexation of Crimea 
in order to appease Moscow and return to normalization. In addition, in December 2014, 
an open letter, initiated by the former security policy advisor of Chancellor Kohl, Horst 
Teltschik was widely published in Germany under the title “Again War in Europe? Not in 
Our Name!” and signed by sixty prominent Germans, among them former President 
Roman Herzog and former Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. The open letter called for a 
leitmotif, which was based on Germany’s Ostpolitik: “integrate instead of exclude shall 
be the leitmotif of German politicians.”565 The appeal expressed not only the hopes of 
German businesses to return to normalcy in their relations to Russia as soon as possible 
(the Ostausschuss was found in a prominent role within the open letter), but also the 
general perception of Germany as a civil power (unlike its war-torn neighbors and allies), 
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clinging to the reluctance of taking on greater responsibility and the foreign policy 
paradigm expressed in “German foreign policy is peace policy.”566 It also united the 
diverse variations of Russlandversteher in Germany for a moment, as generally the 
groups are from a broad spectrum, reaching from political parties at the extreme right, 
such as the newly emerged right-wing populist party Alternative fuer Deutschland 
(Alternative Party for Germany), or from the extreme left, centering around the 
communist platform within the party Die Linke, the successor of the East German 
communist SED, which also includes economic-driven lobbyists, as well as people that 
are anti-American; thus, they tend to see Russia as a more suitable partner.567 The 
percentage of Germans who are openly anti-American has probably grown since 9/11, 
and especially since Edward Snowden aspired to be a kind of digital Martin Luther, who 
will free Germany and all others from the vice grip of a digital hierarchy of all horizon 
secret police intruders with his WikiLeak theses hammered on the global commons.  
However, Adomeit has clarified the fact that the prominently voiced 
Russlandversteher in the German public and its media do not equal the mainstream of 
German public opinion, as the “overwhelming majority of German academic specialists 
on Russia”568 do not share these analyses. Therefore, one must differentiate between the 
domestic politics of a German approach to Russia, far from being simply a Russia Firster 
approach, while recognizing that Germany has more to lose if relations with Russia are in 
chaos. This helps to make sense of the publicly voiced praise of Russia in light of the 
ever-growing significance of the NSA scandal in the public. Perceptions of the Russia 
Firster approach need to take into account the high proportion of trade interdependency 
between Germany and Russia, as compared to the United States, where hardly any real 
trade relations with Russia exist. Thus, sanctions have tougher consequences for 
Germany and its economy with the national focus on exports amid globalization and a 
growing Eurasian focus. In this regard, Germany has pursued an economically driven, 
interest-led Realpolitik in its approach to Russia and found itself surprised to see that the 
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values Germany represents were left behind in that “the hope[s] of German firms that 
they would modernize Russian and bring in a Rechtsstaat—a state under the rule of law, 
have so far been illusory.”569Thus, stereotyping all of Germany as Russlandversteher 
clearly misjudges its realistic understanding of the world at the political, decision-making 
level.  
The public perception of Russia has also experienced significant change, 
especially after the MH17 disaster in July 2014, when the public opinion towards Russia 
plunged severely. In August 2014, only 15 percent of the Germans saw in Russia a 
trustworthy partner, having decreased steadily from nearly 40 percent in December 
2010.570 Due to the fact that the deep-rooted empathy towards Russia will continue in 
some parts of the German public, primarily in the east, and due to its economy (based on 
centuries of common European and Eurasian history), the Russia Firster will surely 
endure and simply be a part of the German body politic. But because the majority of 
Germans have seen the “real face of the Russian bear,” the Russlandversteher and the 
promoters of a Russia First will be less stentorian as long as Russia is reluctant to 
cooperate with the West within the rule of international law.  
C. DIPLOMACY, SECURITY, AND VALUES 
Because foreign policy is chiefly a state activity undertaken to realize the state’s 
interests concerning its power, economy, culture, and above all, its security vis-à-vis its 
international partners and neighbors, one can suggest that German foreign policy has 
been successful in pursuing Brandt’s Ostpolitik from 1969 until 1990. Such policy has 
assured the nation’s security based on a balanced approach between Westbindung, while 
it maintained a policy of dialogue, and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union up until 
1990 when the aim had been the reunification. Such policy changed in the post-Cold War 
Ostpolitik after Germany had regained its full sovereignty and power in economic terms, 
it exerted its Ostpolitik as a geo-economic power focusing on interests, while hoping that 
the values would come along as the interests are pursued. This goal turned out to be an 
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illusion. Germany, intertwined with a political and economic interdependent global 
system, has well understood that maintaining its strength requires first to help itself by 
fostering its own interests. Further, Germany builds a power base from which it can shape 
the international order according to German values. However, that might require 
weighing political implications against decisions that potentially cause negative impacts 
on its power base—a constant balancing of interests versus values. As the world has 
become more violent and political culture eschews violence for classic liberal, or, as it is 
called “civil” values, such policies encounter a growing headwind.  
The post-Cold War order that emerged in Europe has been shaped significantly by 
a united, peaceful, and secure Germany, which, over the last twenty-five years, developed 
an increasingly considerable weight in foreign policy on its path to normalcy in a 
globalizing world economy and world society. However, with normalization comes 
responsibility for power, peace, and security, not simply prosperity in the balance of 
trade. With waxing chaos in the Middle East, with the United States shrinking under the 
weight of its security burdens and domestic challenges, and with the truths of geopolitics 
at hand, Germany’s politicians have called for Germany and Europe to shoulder its 
burdens at the Munich Security Conference in 2014, a call reiterated by Germany’s 
defense minister in 2015 when she referred to leaderhip from the centre, a phrase that 
means more in German than it does in English, where it falls rather flat. But the question 
remains urgent of which instruments to use. Armed forces in the classical manner are the 
last resort, and in German foreign policy is considered a source of domestic political pain 
for all that must touch such weapons. For the last seventy years, Germany reluctantly 
armed itself within the Atlantic alliance, where the decisive weapons lay in U.S. hands. It 
was happy to more or less disarm in 1990 with unity. Germany has slowly and haltingly 
participated in military operations of any kind since 1994.571 If it comes to hard power, 
as the Crimean case has shown with signal brutality, Germany still plays the moral card 
that wars are always a disaster. Savants referred to what is simply called the ‘historical 
heritage’, which seems to be a code word for “Stalingrad” and “Auschwitz” and the 
impossibility of power in anything other than postmodern categories, that is, post-heroic 
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ideals. Although active military options are not on the table concerning the Ukraine crisis 
in the narrow sense, Germany needs to take into account the geopolitical and alliance 
cohesion consequences of Russia’s actions. Putin has worked a miracle as concerns 
classic NATO security goals under Article 3 of mutual aid and self-help. He has enabled 
what Europe as a whole was not capable of doing: increasing defense spending in 
European countries and re-concentrating on NATO’s core task of collective defense 
under Article 5.572 
Since the chancellor ruled out military options, “Germany confronts a Russian use 
of military power with only economic tools with which to respond.”573 Therefore, it is 
currently evident that Germany’s Russia policy—the long-time, well-working Ostpolitik 
in the form of change through trade—is in shambles. These shambles extend to European 
and U.S. policies as well. Despite the recent change of policy in Germany, with a 
surprisingly tough tone and direct language, the West has to agree on new ways to 
approach Russia in view of the crisis. So far, Merkel has retained the unifying momentum 
for her grand coalition, but also for the European Union, which is on shaky grounds 
regarding the Greek financial crisis. When Merkel spoke with President Putin in Moscow 
on May 10, 2015, one day after the biggest military parade on the Red Square in 
Moscow, she was describing German-Russian relations and acknowledged that the 
cooperation has been severely compromised “by the criminal and unlawful annexation of 
Crimea and the military hostilities in eastern Ukraine . . . [Germany sees] these acts as a 
violation of the very foundations on which our common European peace order is 
built.”574 Although Merkel called for a diplomatic solution and repeated that the dialogue 
with Russia needs to continue, Germany has so far maintained its tough stance towards 
Russia, even though a high cost has been inflicted on the economy. 
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This raises the question of what to do with the tougher sanctions in July 2015, 
when the sanctions have to be reviewed? The German Ostausschuss will make sure that 
the Merkel administration is well aware of the economic costs for Germany, while at the 
same time the SPD with Sigmar Gabriel tries to distinguish itself from the CDU, and the 
NSA scandal is increasingly becoming a domestic problem. In short, all politics is local. 
Insofar as foreign policy has an internal and an external factor, the latter has been widely 
described, and the internal factor needs to be monitored because a Germany that is in an 
election campaign mood might discuss any additional changes to the Ukraine crisis in a 
different way than it has so far.  
To conclude on the question of whether the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 
has changed Germany’s foreign policy regarding Russia, Germany’s answer is a new 
tone in foreign policy, use of tougher instruments, and the fact that Germany stands 
united in confronting Russia—united with Europe, but  more important for Germany, 
united within the grand coalition and the public will. Putin miscalculated if he thought 
that Germany under Merkel would collapse quickly and would not endure standing up to 
the Kremlin; however, Germany and the West wrongly assumed that Putin would bend 
quickly before the sanctions, which he did not most probably will not anytime soon. 
Thus, Merkel did not only stand up to Putin’s actions in Ukraine, but also re-prioritized 
strategic objectives of the European security order over economic objectives.575 For 
Germany, this means that the new strategic security environment with a new political 
map of Europe requires a new German power—a Germany willing and able to safeguard 
the European security order. 
Oriented towards the status-quo, Russia feared losing Ukraine from its sphere of 
influence, something Putin was not ready to accept. The possible reach of the EU into 
Ukraine or, on the contrary, the affiliation of Ukraine with the EU, would have been an 
either-or choice in the future and Ukraine would get closer to “big brother” Russia or take 
its chances with the EU. Mankoff argues that “a Russia that feels itself backed into a 
corner and in need of lashing out isolates itself (as during the war in Georgia).”576 The 
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isolation is hardly in Russia’s interest because it is in desperate need of foreign 
investment and modernization in order to enhance its economy, especially in light of 
volatile oil prices. While Russians were mostly interested in the technological transfer, 
though not in societal change and democratic values, the idea of cooperation through 
trade ran aground, especially because losing a tight grip on society would negatively 
affect the Kremlin’s authoritarian grip to rule the country and stay in power. Thus, Putin 
challenged the post-Cold War security order, and in this regard, the fundamental change 
in German foreign policy is not all about Ukraine. But the root causes are foremost about 
the validity of the European security order based on the principles of rule of law and the 
notion of Westphalian peace therefore the inviolability of national borders and 
sovereignty. 
The international perception of German foreign policy as a Russian Firster 
approach falls short of recognizing the overall context in which Germany conducts its 
Russia policy. Based on the traditional Ostpolitik, Germany had to balance between East 
and West in order to achieve its objective of peaceful reunification, while later, economic 
interrelations were the main drivers of post-1990 engagement with Russia and former 
Soviet republics. However, that interest-led Realpolitik has shown its limitations. Thus, 
the decision to change the program, as undertaken by Angela Merkel and Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier, clearly showed that German foreign policy is not about Russia Firsters but all 
about the peaceful and prosperous European security order. 
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VI. RETAINING CREDIBILITY AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR 
GERMANY’S FOREIGN POLICY 
The fundamental change of Germany’s approach to Russia is inevitable if German 
foreign policy is to remain credible and reliable in the eyes of its partners. However, the 
challenge for Berlin is to find the right balance in its approach to Moscow because it is 
also inevitable that it will re-engage with Russia in the future. Trenin, talking about the 
German balancing act, put it quite well when he pointed out that “a radical, values-first 
strategy is emotionally satisfying and may be politically useful in the short term, but 
otherwise it is usually fruitless. By contrast, a wholly unprincipled value-less approach 
leads to the moral abyss. Politics, including international politics, has always been the art 
of the possible.”577 Therefore, Foreign Minister Steinmeier clarified in spring 2015 that 
Germany could “not act as if nothing has happened,” as Germany continued to take the 
lead role in engaging with Russia.  
Far from maintaining a Russian Firster approach, it is necessary that Germany 
enhance understanding of Russia actions because the West is increasingly “perceived in 
Russia as a power that wants to spread its values into the Russian world, thus threatening 
to change Russia’s unique and increasingly conservative national identity.”578 In this 
regard, the lack of expertise on Russia within the German foreign policy community 
becomes an issue. Multiple scholars argue that insufficient research capabilities and 
expertise threaten to constitute a structural change, which could negatively influence 
future German administrations.579 In the context of writing the new Defense White Book 
in Germany, the ministry of defense has already decided to spend several million euros to 
set up a new institute to study the post-Soviet states.580 For Germany, the relevance of 
Russia and the post-Soviet region is of utmost importance in understanding Russia. 
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Knowledge and expertise are necessary to avoid any misunderstandings; thus, this should 
be a reciprocal approach.  
Challenging the traditional Westphalian system, the advent of the Ukraine crisis 
and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 poses a test of Germany’s foreign policy—its 
Ostpolitik—that does not allow any of the luxuries of choice that might have been said to 
exist to opt out and or to shift burdens, as happened in the period from 1990 to 2011. 
Germany cannot outsource these security policy decisions because it needs to take a clear 
stance towards Russia. The Baltic States and Poland will expect at least a clear sign of 
reassurance from Germany. With Russia testing the limits of contemporary European 
order or challenging them by repetitive action, it must be assumed that other regions (e.g., 
Georgia, Crimea, eastern Ukraine) might follow if the West’s reactions are not able to 
bring about change. For example, the Moldovian region of Transnistria was among the 
regions named in this regard. Expectations regarding Germany are high because not only 
do the Eastern neighbors look to Berlin. Also the western neighbors look upon Germany,, 
when former French Minster of Foreign Affairs, Hubert Védrine in 2012 asked why 
Germany would not accept to take over more responsibilities in other areas, he made 
clear that in his perspective, “Germany could be a real power: peaceful, but not pacifistic, 
in short: useful.”581  
Germany has been more than useful; it has continuously shown its leadership in 
the crisis, and no other political leader has spoken to President Putin more often and more 
critically than Chancellor Merkel since the beginning of 2014. Even though Crimea is 
still Russian and eastern Ukraine is still a pro-Russian rebel area backed by Russia, the 
sanctions regime helped significantly to reduce violence, for the moment. If the Western 
sanctions regime towards Russia will hold and Russia’s economic decline will continue, 
then the fear of Russia turning east to China becomes a real alternative from the Russian 
side.582 Another risk is the current crisis in Europe, with Greece and Cyprus being 
reluctant to impose new sanctions or to renew existing sanctions. Together with the 
increasing Russo-Turkish relations, Germany risks a further division in the EU if Russia 
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manages to come around the southern flank. Thus, as Kuehn stresses, “Europe needs a 
real restart.” Germany, with its power, geographical position, and historic legacy, is 
obliged to take a leading role in shaping Europe’s future and ensuring continuity in 
solidarity, and by so doing reframe the approach to Russia. Currently, Russia shows no 
sign of backing off from its chosen path, so the sanctions will remain an instrument in the 
Western approach to Russia, and the redefinition of Europe’s and Germany’s approach to 
Russia is necessary. The current German approach, in which Merkel takes a tougher 
stance towards Russia, employs sanctions that are hurting German business interests, but 
the constant line of communication she maintains with the Kremlin could be seen as a 
continuous evolution of traditional Ostpolitik. But by using the stick and not only the 
carrot, Berlin accepts the responsibility in international affairs, and in this regard changed 
its policy over the annexation of Crimea and continuous violence in eastern Ukraine.  
The Ukraine crisis of 2014 (sparked by Putin’s aggressive reaction to the pro-
Western Euromaidan protests in Kiev and subsequently the Russian takeover of Crimea 
for fear that the region might break away from Russia’s sphere of influence and its 
privileged interests) has altered the European security order. In light of constant Russian 
military snap exercises and enhanced NATO exercises, the risk for accidental war has not 
been higher since 1983, when perceptions arose that the Soviet Union mistook the NATO 
exercise Able Archer as preparations for a real nuclear war. Therefore, Germany is 
obliged to use its unique position, not only to avoid accidental war, but more importantly 
to resolve the crisis between Russia and the West. In 2016, Germany will become the 
chair of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and could use 
that position to re-engage with Moscow and to foster re-establishment of a European 
security order with a firm transatlantic partnership, as there is no alternative to 
cooperation with Russia. Germany’s Ostpolitik will continue; however, the fundamental 
program change will ensure that Germany can take over the responsibility, as it is rightly 
expected to do. 
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